The demographic and spiritual center of world Christianity today is not in Rome, Geneva, or Nashville, but in the Global South – in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

РАСПОСТРАНЕНИЕ ХРИСТИАНСКОЙ РЕЛИГИИ ПО РЕГИОНАМ НА ПЛАНЕТЕ

While at the beginning of the 20th century more than 80% of the world’s Christians lived in Europe and North America, a century later the situation has radically reversed: today, about 61% of Christians are residents of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Sub-Saharan Africa, where only 1.5% of Christians lived in 1910, has become the largest Christian region on the planet in terms of population, surpassing Europe and now home to almost a quarter of all Christians worldwide.

🔹 In Latin America, once almost monolithically Catholic, there is an explosive growth of evangelical, especially Pentecostal, churches. In Asia, powerful churches and missionary movements are emerging in China, South Korea, the Philippines, and India.

🔹 This demographic shift is driven by three key factors. Firstly, the rapid population growth and high birth rates in the Global South. Secondly, the phenomenal success of missionary activity, particularly of evangelical and Pentecostal movements. And thirdly, the secularization and aging of the population in the historically Christian West, where the number and proportion of Christians are steadily declining.

THE IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS OF THE VATICAN IN THE CONDITIONS OF TRANSITION TO THE GLOBALIZED WORLD ORDER

But this is not just about quantitative changes. A qualitative transformation of Christianity itself is taking place. Faith in the Global South possesses distinct, contextual characteristics that are increasingly shaping its global image.

🔹 In Africa, for example, Christianity is deeply rooted in everyday life. The level of religious involvement there is one of the highest in the world: more than 75% of Christians in every surveyed country in sub-Saharan Africa say that religion plays a “very important” role in their lives, and they pray and attend church more frequently. And it is Africa that is projected to account for almost 70% of the total growth in the world’s Christian population between 2020 and 2070.

🔹 In Latin America, Christianity has become a tool for social mobilization and the formation of a new identity for millions who are leaving traditional Catholicism. Pentecostal churches, which emphasize personal experience of the Holy Spirit, miraculous healings, and material blessings, are proving attractive to the urban poor and even the middle class.

🔹 This new reality presents American evangelicals with complex, and sometimes uncomfortable, questions, forcing them to re-examine their traditional roles and priorities.

🔹 Firstly, the typical portrait of a global evangelical is no longer a white American from the “Bible Belt.” Researchers agree that there is no such thing as a single, unified evangelical. By the broadest estimates, 47% of the world’s evangelicals live in Africa, 26% in Asia, and only 11% in North America. The country with the largest evangelical population is no longer the United States, but China.

🔹 Secondly, serious theological and cultural tensions are escalating. For Christians in the Global South, who grew up in the context of colonialism, poverty, and social injustice, the distinction, common among many Americans, between “evangelism” (caring for the soul) and “social ministry” (caring for the body and society) seems artificial and even harmful. They insist on a holistic approach, where combating systemic sin and oppression is just as important as preaching personal salvation. Criticism of the “coloniality” of Western Christianity, which for centuries imposed its cultural forms as the only correct ones, is becoming increasingly vocal. Now, churches in the South are demanding equal partnership and the decolonization of mission and theology, which calls into question America’s historical role as teacher and sponsor.

ОБАМА ПЕРЕД СВОИМ УХОДОМ ЛЕГАЛИЗОВАЛ САТАНИЗМ

Finally, these global shifts are also reflected within the United States itself through growing immigrant and multicultural communities. Haitian, Nigerian, Korean, or Salvadoran churches in American cities bring with them the energy, theology, and social priorities of the Global South. They often combine conservative views on family and morality with an active stance on issues of racial justice, immigration reform, and poverty alleviation.

The post HENEZIS OF THE CHRISTIAN EMPIRE IN THE 21ST CENTURY first appeared on Global Policy.

The Taliban are cutting the umbilical cord of dependence, leaving Islamabad and Beijing in the lurch. A historical turning point that most experts didn’t even have time to notice: Afghanistan is officially closing its only previous trade route through Pakistan and completely reorienting its export and import towards Iran and India.
Now the port of Chabahar is becoming Afghanistan’s main foreign trade “window” to the world.

AFGHANISTAN – INDIA CORRIDOR

Pakistan no longer controls the Afghan economy, China is losing a strategic link in the CPEC corridor, Iran is gaining a new source of income, and India is gaining enormous influence in Central Asia.

The Afghan Minister of Trade unveiled a five-point plan:

1. Maximizing trade with India.
2. Fully utilizing the Chabahar port.
3. Creating “dry ports” on the border with Iran.
4. Launching cargo flights between Kabul and India.
5. Increasing Indian investments in all key sectors of Afghanistan.

In other words, Afghanistan is not simply “turning away” from Pakistan – it is leaving Islamabad’s strategic orbit and entering a new alliance: Iran + India + Afghanistan.

For 20 years, Pakistan cultivated the Taliban as an instrument of influence. But the instrument suddenly became an independent actor – and Islamabad was furious. The Taliban drew the only logical conclusion: dependence on Pakistan is a death sentence, especially in light of threats of expelling refugees and economic blackmail.

Что получает Иран?

Money. Influence. And more money.

Chabahar is a competitor to Pakistan’s Gwadar, which Beijing has been transforming into its “pearl” of the Indian Ocean. Now Chabahar is becoming the main hub for 40-million-strong Afghanistan.

Iran gains transit revenues, growth in transport infrastructure, a strengthened role in the region, and transformation into a major trade hub for Central Asia.

Что теряет Пакистан?

Literally everything:

• Billions in transit revenues.
• Smuggling schemes that enriched local clans.
• Political influence in Kabul.
• Positions in the Chinese CPEC project.

Let’s recall a symbolic example: in 2002, Pakistan “legally” imported 8 million telephones into Afghanistan, which mysteriously remained in Pakistan – without duties or taxes. This was a huge source of corruption.

Afghanistan is officially withdrawing from the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), into which Beijing has already invested $37 billion. The remaining section is turning into a dead end with no access to Central Asia.

PROMISING TRANSPORT ROUTES IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT.

In other words, geopolitically, China is losing one of its main alternative routes to the Indian Ocean.

The Taliban have done what neither the previous Afghan governments nor even the mujahideen dared to do: in one fell swoop, they have freed themselves from 70 years of dependence on Pakistan.

Afghanistan is choosing Iran and India – and thereby creating a new triangle of influence capable of redrawing the trade routes of all of Eurasia.

The post AFGHANISTAN IS JOINING THE IRAN-INDIA TRADE CORRIDOR first appeared on Global Policy.

1. Panama has two major seaports – Balboa and Colon (also the world’s second largest free trade zone), Tocumen International Airport and the Panama Canal. 10,000 ships pass through the canal every year. Important communication cables are laid along it.

2. About 6% of the world’s maritime trade passes through the Panama Canal, which saves the maritime transport sector 8,000 nautical miles and 22 days of travel between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. For over a hundred years, it has remained a vital economic and strategic hub. A ship can pass through the giant canal, 81.5 km long and 33-150 m wide, in just 8-10 hours. Panama earns about $3.5 billion a year in transit fees.

3. On November 17, 2017, China and Panama signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Joint Construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (China’s “One Belt, One Road” project).

4. In 2018, China and Panama signed a free trade agreement. China has become Panama’s largest trading partner, the largest supplier to the Colon Free Trade Zone, and the second-largest user of the Panama Canal.

5. By the end of 2021, China’s direct investment in Panama was $1 billion.

6. China-Panama trade volume in 2021 was $11.344 billion, China’s exports were $10.180 billion, and imports were $1.164 billion.

7. China’s plans and proposals to Panama were grandiose.

China’s Major Infrastructure Projects in Panama in 2016–2021

8. 01.30.2025 US Secretary of State Marco Rubio conveyed to Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino the position of Trump: China’s presence in the canal area violates the agreement on the transfer of the Panama Canal to Panama in 1999.

9. 02.02.2025 The President of Panama stated that “the country’s government will not extend the memorandum of understanding with China on the One Belt, One Road initiative.”

10. 02.08.2025 The Chinese side expressed deep regret.

Conclusions

1. China’s expansionist project “One Belt, One Road” was publicly announced in 2013. One of the main directions of its development was Panama. But only one project was implemented. Judging by the table, after 2019, China curtailed its expansion in Panama (it did not propose new projects).

2. Panama was viewed by China as a “showcase” of its “One Belt, One Road” project for Latin American countries.

3. As can be seen from the table, there was serious resistance in Panama to the implementation of Chinese proposals and projects that had been launched. This is also indicated by the insignificant volume of direct investment from China. Most likely, from the United States.

4. China’s expansionist project “One Belt, One Road” has failed in all regions of the world. It began to wind down around 2021. Three main reasons for its collapse:

— implementation of private projects in insolvent countries (Pakistan, Ethiopia, Kyrgyzstan, …);

— resistance to private projects from other countries;

— China has no “gunboats”.

5. To wean China off the Panama Canal, it was enough to convey the “Trump position” to Panama. That is, the US wiggling its little finger.

6. The US will continue to strengthen its control over maritime trade routes. This is part of their preparation for a head-on collision with China. This is, first of all, its open weaning off the world market.

The post GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS COLLAPSE OF CHINA’S EXPANSION IN PANAMA first appeared on Global Policy.

Currently, 63 central banks are members of the BIS, including the Bank of Russia (since 1996)

Over the past few years, digital finance and digital currencies have become the most priority area of the BIS’s activities. Since the beginning of this decade, dozens of central banks, as if on command, have begun to deal with the topic of CBDC – “digital currencies of central banks.” Observers believe that the team was from Basel, from the BMR. It seems that each country is discussing or even developing its own unique versions of CBDC. But at the same time they have a lot in common. These digital currencies are served as a third type of money along with traditional cash and non-cash money. All central banks initially stated that CBDCs were intended for “internal use”, i.e. within the national borders of the respective states. A year ago, the BIS reported that about 130 central banks of the world were interested in the CBDC topic.

BASEL 3: THE REVOLUTION THAT NO ONE NOTICED

At the beginning of this summer, about four dozen central banks were already engaged in practical CBDC developments or were testing them as part of pilot projects. The largest CBDC pilot project, which was launched three years ago (in June 2021), is the digital yuan project implemented by the People’s Bank of China. Some have already legalized CBDC nationwide. There are about a dozen such countries and jurisdictions. Among them are the Bahamas, Jamaica, and Nigeria. But these are all very small countries. Except for Nigeria. But there, as I have already written, the digital currency turned out to be very poorly in demand, and when it was introduced, very serious abuses were allowed by the Nigerian Central Bank.

It is noteworthy that today many central banks developing or testing their digital currencies talk about the need to give this currency an additional function – as a means of cross-border payments and settlements. And the BIS strongly supports this approach. And not just verbally supports, but practically helps.

Three years ago, the international mBridge Ledger project was launched on the initiative of the BIS

Its participants are: the innovation division of the BIS in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the People’s Bank of China, the Bank of Thailand, the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates. In June of this year, the Central Bank of Saudi Arabia joined the project. As the name of the project itself implies, its goal is to create technologies that would serve as a “bridge” or “adapter”. Such a “bridge” would allow for cross-border transactions between project participants using national CBDCs.

In November 2021, the Jura project was launched on the initiative of the BIS

A consortium was created under him, whose members included the Bank for International Settlements, the Bank of France, the National Bank of Switzerland and various private firms, studied the possibility of direct transfer of wholesale CBDCs in euros and Swiss francs between French and Swiss commercial banks on a single blockchain platform (“distributed registry”).

In March 2022, the BIS Innovation Center, the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Central Bank of Malaysia, the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the Reserve Bank of South Africa announced the completion of the development of prototypes of a common Dunbar platform that allows international settlements using multiple CBDCs.

In March 2023, the Bank for International Settlements, in cooperation with the central banks of Israel, Norway and Sweden, completed the Icebreaker project, which explored the technical feasibility of using retail CBDCs in international payments.

In October 2023, the BIS, in partnership with the central banks of France, Singapore and Switzerland, confirmed the successful completion of the Mariana project, which studied cross-border trade and settlements of wholesale CBDCs between financial institutions on the blockchain platform.

Probably the most advanced and large-scale of these projects is mBridge Ledger

In addition to the six full-fledged mBridge participants, 27 other official organizations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and central banks of countries including Norway, South Korea and Turkey, joined the project as observers, which gives them access to the sandbox for experiments with adapter technology. Major global banks, including Goldman Sachs, HSBC and six of China’s largest state-owned banks, are also observers of the project.

The pilot phase of the project ended in September 2022, and the commercial launch took place a year later, in September 2023. On January 29, the UAE Central Bank carried out its first cross-border transfer of digital dirhams within the framework of the mBridge project. CBDC cross-border transfer in the amount of 50 million dirhams ($13.6 million) It was shipped to China using the mBridge multi-CBDC platform. The Chairman of the Board of the Central Bank of the UAE, Sheikh Mansour, conducted the transfer of the CBDC on the occasion of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Central Bank.

RULERS OF MONEY FROM BASEL

I have already written quite a lot about CBDC, in particular in the recent book “Digital Currencies: from Bitcoin to CBDC. The “masters of money” want to become the “masters of the world”” (Moscow: Tion, 2023). In it, I say that the Central Bank’s digital currency has a very indirect relationship to money. CBDC projects are a smokescreen covering the construction of a digital concentration camp, first on the scale of a single country, and then the whole world. The BIS does not reveal all the cards. But there should be a single digital currency in the limit. However, it would be a stretch to call it a currency. It will not really perform any of the usual economic functions of money (a measure of value, a medium of exchange, a means of payment and a means of accumulation). It will be a tool for human control and management.

Another digital initiative of the BIS is the proposal of its head, Agustin Carstens, to develop a single (unified) registry technology that can be implemented on a global scale. Thus, the “financial system of the future” will be created. He gave it the name “Finternet”. Unified registries “combine all the components necessary for financial transactions – financial assets, ownership records, rules governing their use, and other relevant information – in one place,” explains Agustin Carstens. This makes it possible, with the help of unified registries, to overcome problems related to technical standards and management, as well as eliminate third-party messaging systems.

Unified registries will require tokenization of assets, especially money, for transfers using smart contracts. Tokenization of assets is not just about fixing them online. Tokenization will have to fix the compliance of assets with certain regulatory requirements (including those developed by the BIS, for example, capital adequacy standards for credit institutions developed by the so-called “Basel Committee”).

The Bank for International Settlements announced the launch of a project called Agora. It involves the central banks of France, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the Federal Reserve Banks of the United States. The aim of the project is to prepare for the tokenization of assets of both central banks and private financial institutions. There is also a Promise project with the participation of the BIS, the Swiss National Bank and the World Bank to create a platform for the tokenization of bills of exchange.

The BIS states that it does not plan to create a comprehensive unified registry – it is about ensuring convenient interaction of several unified registries through specialized applications and services. But at the same time, the BIS emphasizes that this should be done under the auspices of a common approach to conducting transactions. Consequently, several regional registries can be consolidated into a single global registry at any time. A single digital brave new world will arise, which can be called a global digital concentration camp without a stretch.

However, in addition to the BIS, other international organizations are involved in building a global digital concentration camp. Such as the IMF, the World Bank, the World Economic Forum (WEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), other specialized UN bodies, etc. There are also private organizations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, etc.

This year, a project called DPI is gaining momentum

This English–language abbreviation stands for Digital Public Infrastructure – digital public infrastructure. It was launched at the end of last year and is being implemented under the auspices of the UNDP with the participation of the IMF, the WEF and other international organizations and major American charitable foundations.

The post THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS IS BUILDING A UNIFIED DIGITAL FINANCIAL WORLD first appeared on Global Policy.

The second principal feature of human activity is the use of technology in it. That is, people-created action programs that ensure the application of knowledge to achieve the goals of the activity. As a program is a sequence of actions, the technology consists of methods and tools to support the implementation of the action. Therefore, the progress of mankind consists of two stages – the acquisition of new knowledge and the creation of technology for its use in practice.

New knowledge and technology emerge regularly, but some have a greater impact than others on society – its existence and development. The period of such influence was called “technological mode”. This concept is introduced by economists, but it applies to all spheres of activity. Because in all spheres of society all activities are based on knowledge and technology.

This means that there are technological structures in the political, social, scientific, cultural, military and all other spheres of activity. Their successive change demonstrates the development of the sphere. But their cardinal influence on the existence and development of the social environment takes place only within the boundaries of the sphere itself. But since all spheres of activity are “organs” of the unified system of the social organism, a significant change in any of them necessarily has some impact on the rest of the spheres-makes them adapt to the new features of the changed sphere.

As a result, the whole system of the social organism changes somehow

At a minimum, the models of interaction with the changed sphere of other spheres are corrected. As a maximum, some of the other areas of activity are also changing significantly. At the same time, the scale of changes is dictated by the need to restore the stability of the system of the social organism – the greater the imbalance in the social body created a change in some of the spheres of activity, the more the system of the social organism will change.

Therefore, on the one hand, the system of the social organism is changing continuously, on the other hand, periodically it changes radically. As it happened as a result of the transition to the model of industrial society. After all, it is in all key features is fundamentally different from the previous society – the feudal. And the fact that in this story all spheres of activity have changed fundamentally means that the source of changes is not one of the spheres of activity, but some common for all sphere-performing a system – forming function for the public organism.

And this is not an economic sphere. The attempts of economists to declare the economic sphere systemically important for society is a manifestation of the inertia of Marxist thinking-the idea that the economy is the Foundation of society. As a consequence, the postulation of the idea that the role of the only motor of social development performs the process of changing the economic sphere.

The reason why a significant part of political scientists and sociologists agree with this postulate does not belong to the category of scientific ones. Just in the social science sector economic science appeared first. While other social science disciplines began to develop much later. And economists took advantage of the handicap in time-introduced into the consciousness of the social science community their own ideas about the organization of society. Naturally, in these views, the economy served for the society as a system-forming sphere of activity. But Marx and Engels summed up by this pseudo-scientific postulate is the basis of the informational theory of social development.

Society is certainly a single organism

This means that it has a sphere of activity, the purpose of which is to ensure the organizational and legal unity of society. This is Economics. But the political sphere is not suitable for the role of the backbone. After all, in it, politicians perform only the function of the captain of a public ship – manage the processes of existence and change of society. And to what purpose to conduct a public ship, on which route and in what way, the captain dictates the ideological sphere. Because the activity in this sphere creates a common understanding of the world for the subjects of all spheres. What unites them all in the public body.

That is, in the same way as for the participants of the tour the initial unifying beginning is a map of the area. Because first of all, guided by it, they make all important decisions on where and how to move. As a result, they act together. As the world Outlook sphere creates the world Outlook, it acts for other spheres of activity as the cartographer – the Creator of the map of the public environment and the expert on its use. This is exactly what makes the world Outlook sphere of activity the main unifying principle of society and its system integrator. And it is the ideological sphere that ensures the unification of people and all spheres of activity into a single social organism.

Therefore, the main difference between an industrial society and a feudal one is a fundamentally different worldview. And the reason for the radical restructuring of the organization of society and the transition to new goals for him was the replacement of the captains and navigators of public ships of European civilization idealistic worldview materialistic. The same thing happened in history with the transition from the ancient society to the feudal – Christian worldview offered new goals for society and demanded a different organization.

Today, severe and already chronic crises are observed simultaneously in all spheres of activity of the countries of the First world. Political, economic and social crises are only more visible. As the concern of all. And all sufficiently understood. This means that there is a crisis common to all spheres of activity. Accordingly, having a common cause for all spheres.
Such a reason can only be a common understanding of the world

Because if in all spheres activity leads to disappointing results, it means that in all spheres the understanding of what is happening in them is lost – the direction and nature of the flow of developing processes. As a natural consequence of the complexity of the environment as a result of the increase in its activities, the number of subjects, types of social relations. That leads to failures, as a consequence of the inadequacy of the actual existing conditions.

Since society provides a worldview sphere of activity, it means that the crisis originates in it. And in other areas only derivative crises are developing. As for failed to come to the destination group of tourists the initial problem is the quality of its existing maps. And the subsequent conflicts between them are derived from the map problems.

This means that the original cause of the first world crises is an outdated worldview-which does not correspond to the level of complexity achieved in the development process. Available to developed societies understanding of the world similar to the maps of half a century ago. It is clear that such maps are not able to ensure effective activity – they lack a lot and there are many that have not existed in reality for a long time. Guided by these maps, the captains of the doomed ships to conduct the public about routes to simulacrum goals. This is what the us and EU authorities are demonstrating today with depressing evidence.

Worldview provides the philosophical system derived from her philosophical teachings and derived from the teachings of social science theory. Industrial worldview of developed countries is provided by materialism, ideologies of socialism and liberalism, modern social science theories. Accordingly, the problem is one of these components or all together.

But the social processes developing in the countries of the First world demonstrate that it is not only the inadequacy of all three components of the industrial worldview. Two aggravating circumstances have a significant impact. The Outlook has dramatically worsened the refusal of the authorities of the ideological sphere from set a materialism orientation of power for purposes of social development. As a result, socialism and liberalism, as the ideology of social and personal development, lost the subject of activity. And from the sailing directions of social control has turned into his sets.

The captain of the ship, who lost his sailing, will put him in drift

And not knowing what to do, start drinking. The observed bacchanalia of greed of the ruling classes of developed countries, it is just typical for such a situation, the commanding binge. Ideologies are not only the powers that be – people use them for orientation in their own lives. The transformation of ideologies into political scenery devalued them as an individual navigation support – people gradually lost faith in their truth. So quality of worldview after the government lost and citizens. As a result, the” time of troubles ” came on all floors of society. And the same, for example, Ukraine, demonstrates its heavy form.

But materialism could not become the conceptual basis of social science

Because it has no mind and no society. And all attempts of philosophers to attach them to the materialistic model of the universe ended in failure. Therefore, the development of social science disciplines provided only a model created in the framework of materialism evolutionary process. Although the model did not explain the nature of the subjects of social processes, it nevertheless gave an idea of the processes themselves – their nature and orientation. As a result, the model could serve as ersatz conceptual support.

In fact, social science two centuries have evolved as polonyi – analogue alchemy. And as the results of alchemy were successfully used by the economy, and the results of alchemical social science with some efficiency used by the authorities of European civilization. First of all, social science disciplines oriented society and citizens to development. This provided European civilization accelerated development during the industrial era.

We can say that if chemistry and physics materialism has given the opportunity to develop, moving with the tide of evolution “crawl”, the social science it has provided the opportunity to sail only “a dog.” Nevertheless, even with the efficiency of the locomotive, social science allowed the authorities to manage the process of social development quite intelligently.

But when intellectual authorities announced the end of social development half a century ago, they deprived social science of its conceptual basis. Having lost it, social scientists turned into decorators of politics and dreamers. And the process of social development has moved into an uncontrollable mode.

Half a century ago, it was time for developed countries to change their worldview once again-to move to a new worldview. Adequate to the level of complexity achieved by society. And already the fourth technological way of the world Outlook sphere of societies of the channel of the European civilization. It was the first way of the ancient era. It was created by the first generation of philosophical systems. In them the earth the world was created “stone” senior creatures – gods, spirits, animate forces of nature. And there are their established rules. As a result, the model of the universe had a patchwork form, and in each flap acted established by her God order.

The second was the way of the feudal era. Its authors were Greek patristic philosophers known as the “fathers of the Church.” They developed a Christian model of a centralized world-created by one God and having a single world order. Christian religion has become a fundamental knowledge of the second way of life, and Church authorities have developed technologies for the use of this knowledge in the management of feudal societies.

The third was the way of the industrial era. Materialism, the world order in the form of a system of laws of nature and industrial ideologies have formed its fundamental knowledge. On the basis of social science theories were developed technology management of society-its existence and development.

But by the last third of the twentieth century, this way of life had exhausted its potential to ensure social development – its efficiency in managing social development had dropped to zero. This stopped the process of social development of the First world. And automatically deployed it in the direction of degradation. And the Soviet Union only came to the first position for the process of degradation of the final. Today it is obvious that the USA is rushing to this final. And a maximum of five years from America in the process of degradation behind the European Union.

This means that the question of creating a new worldview and the transition to the fourth worldview for the countries of the First world has become a question of their survival. At the same time, it is also already obvious that “think tanks” using the worldview of the industrial way of life are not able to solve this problem in principle. And other” brains ” in the West simply do not.

Since the USSR was the first victim of the evolutionary crisis, Russian intellectuals were the first to get rid of neoliberal illusions. And in the late 90-ies engaged in the study of the crisis of industrial society and the development of issues to overcome it.

The post NEW PHILOSOPHICAL WAY OF LIFE first appeared on Global Policy.

A little history

The XVII — XVIII centuries were marked for the Chinese Empire by the Golden Age of the Qing Dynasty. Although, the word “golden” does not quite objectively describe that period. It should be clarified, the Qing dynasty was not exactly Chinese. She came from Manchuria. The homeland of the ethnos is Manchuria — these are vast lands located outside the Great Wall of China. During the internal Chinese civil strife, the Manchu army takes Beijing and in 1644 begins the almost three-hundred-year era of the Qing Dynasty in China.

During this period, China turned from a decline and economic crisis into a strong power. Domestic prosperity and development allowed the ruling dynasty to unite provinces, minimize internal civil strife and conquer new territories, which are currently the territory of the Chinese state — so it is written in many encyclopedias.

However, not everything was as smooth as it is written in the history textbooks. Manchurian nationality was a priority in the distribution of senior positions in military and administrative affairs. Industrial production was considered shameful for the Manchus. For criminal acts, the Chinese and Manchus received different punishments, naturally the worst option awaited the former. The Chinese held positions in leadership structures, but these were not the most important and responsible jobs. Other ethnic groups did not participate in the distribution of posts at all.

This could not but cause discontent among the indigenous inhabitants of the Celestial Empire, however, we will return to this important fact later.

Meanwhile, if you turn to various sources describing the Chinese economy, you can read something like the following. The state was self-sufficient, that is, everything that people needed was produced inside the country. China supplied mainly tea, silk, porcelain, spices to foreign markets.

Prerequisites of wars — the official version

We will describe our understanding of the causes and objectives of the opium wars below, and now let’s refresh our memory with historical information that many of us have read, watched and which is considered by legitimate science to be the only correct one.

So, as of the middle of the XIX century, the population of England “got hooked” on tea, which became (for some reason — a separate topic) an element of national tradition. It was imported from China so much that the “trade balance” was not in favor of England. And many people did not like it also because China practically did not buy anything from the “lady of the seas”. Foreigners could purchase Chinese goods only on condition of payment in silver and exclusively in one place ― the port of Canton (Guangzhou). The rest of China was closed to “overseas barbarians”.

GUANGZHOU PROVINCE IN CHINA

However, among the few imported goods that were still in demand in China, there was opium.

In those years, opium was not banned, it was used in medicine as an analgesic, and as a sedative, and smoked for pleasure, mixed with tobacco. However, science did not stand still and already in the first third of the XIX century, opium was learned to purify so that it turned out almost heroin with all the ensuing consequences — addiction, mental disorder, and so on. The monopoly on the Bengal opium trade was then owned by the East India Company. She was engaged in illegal sale in Guangzhou, taking tea back to England.

The drug, of course, played a role, the demand for it has grown, a huge number of Chinese residents have become addicted to it. For several years of such trade, the trade balance from the point of view of the British returned to normal, but the Chinese emperor was more concerned not with this, but with the fact that a huge number of civil servants, army ranks, and ordinary workers became drug addicts. To put an end to this, in 1839, the emperor appointed his man, Lin Zexu, to the post of extraordinary representative for combating opium smuggling.

Arriving in Guangzhou, the official begins to act boldly and decisively. Mostly English traders, who were in the only port open to foreigners, concentrated large stocks of drugs. Lin Zexu ordered them to be handed over, and after being refused, he blocked the warehouses with troops. As a result, more than 19 thousand boxes and 2 thousand bales of opium were seized.

Lin Zexu acted not only with prohibitive measures. Foreigners were offered the right to continue trading with China, but with a written promise to permanently stop the opium trade. The official was ready to compensate for the lost opium to those who would make a deal by providing expensive Chinese goods in return.

But things have gone too far. Even people close to the emperor were involved in drug trafficking, who strongly advised the monarch to “stop the nightmare business.” On the other hand, the supporters of the power line proposed to expel the Europeans from China completely

Lin Zexu saw that complete isolation would only give Britain a reason for military intervention, which she openly sought. But he could not influence the emperor. In December 1839, the Emperor of China announced the complete closure of the country to foreign traders.

The First Opium War (official version)

In 1840, Great Britain declared war on the Qing Empire. About 4,000 soldiers and 40 ships joined the battle from England.

The advantage of the British army was in more advanced artillery, their commanders were well versed in tactics and strategy. Although the Chinese army had about a twenty-fold advantage in manpower, they were not familiar with the tactics of warfare, could not competently organize the construction of defensive structures, and their artillery could not conduct targeted fire.

The beginning of hostilities is noteworthy. On July 5, 1840, the commander of the British squadron lined up ships along the coastline of Chusan Island, where there were defensive structures and launched boats with troops. After the first shot from the ships, the Chinese returned fire with their guns. However, the British artillery had the upper hand and after 9 minutes (!) of the battle, the Chinese fled. (According to other sources, it was a naval battle and in the same 9 minutes the Chinese squadron was defeated. Why such discrepancies? Yes, there are a lot of lies and biased value judgments in this story in general). The landing party landed on the shore and occupied the peak crowned with a temple, which was abandoned by the Chinese. 2 hours after the landing of the infantry units, four amphibious guns were brought ashore and placed on the mentioned peak. From the commanding height, one could see the city of Tin-gai, closed by hills from the side of the raid and located in a fairly extensive valley. It was surrounded, like other cities, by a quadrangular wall almost 5 meters thick. The city wall was surrounded by a rather deep water moat, interrupted only at the north-western corner. On each side of the quadrangle there were gates opening into the field. The amphibious artillery, immediately after taking up a position, opened fire on the city with grenades, which forced residents to escape. The assault on Tin-gai, due to the coming darkness, was postponed until the next morning. The troops settled down for the night in the suburbs, near the squadron. With the dawn of July 6, it turned out that the city was abandoned by both residents and troops.

Let’s remember this episode, which became absolutely typical for that war. We will omit further details, saying that the British troops took city after city. In early August 1842, the British approached Nanjing, the southern capital of China, and forced the emperor to accept all their conditions.

On August 29, 1842, the Treaty of Nanjing was signed, according to which China paid a contribution of 15 million lians of silver, transferred Hong Kong and opened five ports for English trade: Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Shanghai and Ningbo. Independent legislative and judicial bodies were to operate in these cities. Thus, a system of “open” ports was founded, the number of which by the beginning of the twentieth century in the Qing Empire had grown to several dozen. Access to the domestic market was opened for Western states, and an even more active spread of opium led to a larger-scale fascination of the Chinese population with opium smoking with all the ensuing sad economic and social consequences.

The Second Opium War (official version)

The second “opium war” is considered to be the conflict between Great Britain, France and China, which lasted from 1856 to 1860. According to another point of view, the so—called third “opium war” also stands out – military clashes in 1859-1860. But in the professional literature on international relations in the Far East, the whole complex of conflicts from 1856 to 1860 is most often considered one conflict, with a single set of reasons.

It can be said that as a result of the “opium” conflicts, a new type of wars has appeared — they are also called “police” — for the establishment of a new order in a country or region convenient for the advancing player. Among the goals of one of the parties to such a conflict, well-known in the modern history of international relations, may be the overthrow of an undesirable regime. In some works, the second “opium war” is sometimes even referred to as the first anti-terrorist operation. It is difficult to say exactly why it is “anti—terrorist” – perhaps it means its “punitive” nature. For England, the point was precisely in imposing its will on the Qing authorities, establishing rules of the game that were convenient for it. Therefore, of course, from this point of view, the second “opium war” concerned not only the opium trade, Great Britain and France had larger goals.

England sought to expand its spheres of influence in Inner China, including gaining access to river ports. Together with France and the United States, taking advantage of the political turmoil in the Qing Empire during the Taiping Uprising, which began in 1850, she sought from the Qing court the right of unrestricted trade in the empire, the establishment of an embassy in Beijing. In 1854, the powers demanded to renegotiate the treaties signed as a result of the first “opium war”, but were refused. When the forces of Great Britain and France were released after the Crimean War, a reason was quickly found for unleashing a new conflict in China.

Guangzhou was attacked again, as well as Tianjin, and in 1858 the Tianjin Treaties were signed, which granted new privileges to the West: additional ports were opened, consular jurisdiction was introduced. During the conflict, the Manchu troops put up serious resistance several times, and the Europeans’ expectation of an easy victory was not justified. The Manchus sought negotiations, while trying to delay time. However, despite attempts at organized defense, the Dagu forts were taken, the Allies approached Tongzhou and threatened Beijing. In addition, in October 1860, the British and French looted the summer imperial palace of Yuanmingyuan. Trophies from it are still valuable exhibits of European museums. By the time the Allies approached Beijing, the demoralized Qing army and Prince Gong, who found himself face to face with danger, had already given up resistance and handed over the Andingmen Gate to the control of the attackers. It is worth noting that Russia and Prince N. P. Ignatiev personally played a major role in preventing the looting of Beijing by England and France.

The second “opium war” ended with the signing of the Beijing Treaty at the end of October 1860, according to which, unfortunately for China, Great Britain and France were able to meet the requirements, and even more. The Qing dynasty undertook to pay a substantial contribution — 8 million lians of silver. Tianjin was opened for trade (today it is a city of central subordination, one of the attractions of which is the European colonial quarter). France and Great Britain received the right to export Chinese as labor to other colonies. And of course, the treaty paved the way for an even more active growth of the opium trade. In addition, the poppy began to be grown on the territory of China itself, moreover, by the Chinese themselves.

Russia also signed its Beijing Treaty with China, which was of great importance. Not participating in the “opium wars”, however, she could not allow a significant imbalance of power in international relations in the Far East in favor of Great Britain, France and the United States. Having supported the Qing in the defense of Beijing, Russia received the consent of the Manchus to establish and document the border along the Amur and Ussuri. And on November 14, 1860, the Russian-Chinese treaty was signed, meaningfully continuing the Aigun and Tianjin Treaties.

Why the Chinese are bad “warriors”

Most of the military battles in the centuries-old history of China were lost by them, and the enemy did not always surpass the Chinese army as much as defeats turned out to be devastating. Above we cited an episode that is indicative not only for this war, but also for others. Let’s try to look for the root cause of this.

In general, how a person behaves in different situations depends on his ideas about the world, in particular about life and death, mission, goals, values, which can be combined with one concept — worldview. Especially vividly these deep worldview attitudes manifest themselves in acute, critical situations, in particular — in war.

And the most effective tool for the formation of the worldview not only of an individual, but also of an entire nation are creeds. The dominant (by number) creeds in China are Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism. It is with the aim of searching for ideological rules that do not allow the Chinese to achieve Victories, that we have considered these creeds.

Within the framework of the article, it will not be possible to consider the entire multi-layered construction of the meanings of these creeds, we will touch only the most obvious ones, especially since all three creeds are quite close in the meanings formed.

First. The sources of the origin of the creeds of China were the magical-shamanic cults of the ancients, the doctrine of immortality and magical practices. The same Taoism was “promoted” by numerous Taoist magicians and preachers, healers and shamans who joined Taoism, who skillfully synthesized some philosophical ideas of Taoism with primitive beliefs and superstitions of the peasant masses. Hence the first conclusion is the hope that the desired thing will happen (“can’t not happen”) in some magical way, by magic. Accordingly, when this does not happen and the enemy troops get something that should not work, templates and installations are torn, people fall into confusion, and in any incomprehensible and dangerous situation there are generally two ways: hit or run.

Second. If most other religious systems, in the name of gaining immortality (salvation of the soul), offer to fight “for the soul”, and only then for the body, then Taoism, on the contrary, gives preference to the primary improvement of the body, seeing in this the guarantee of immortality (salvation of the soul). Hence, the choice between “hit or run” tends to “run”, because the dream of achieving immortality, established deep inside the psyche, may be threatened if the body dies, especially vividly it begins to manifest itself at the moments when enemy shells arrive and comrades-in-arms begin to die en masse.

The third. Taoism is a religious system that, like Buddhism, is aimed at completely depersonalizing people in the process of merging the psyche of the latter (“enlightenment”) with a powerful egregorial system that unites all “subjects”. From this we can conclude that the “average” warrior feels like a part of a huge team, but not a lone hero, not a person capable of leading, performing a feat, showing an example to his comrades.

We know that there have been, are and will be outstanding personalities, masters of combat, and heroes among Chinese warriors, but the worldview attitudes described above form mass statistics of people’s behavior, and a few (non-systemic) heroes do not change the overall picture.

There is another interesting element in the creeds of the East — the principle of “non-action”. It sounds something like this: in areas that are harmful to Nature and biocenoses, before taking any action, it is necessary to harmonize the latter with the objective laws of the Universe. And if this is not possible, it is better to observe the principle of non—action, so as not to harm yourself and the environment. We think that in many ways this principle “helped” to oversleep the penetration of opium smoking deep into all strata of society, and the preparation of Western countries for war, and much more.

What Chinese leaders need to do to change such a “rock” hanging over the whole people. We think they understand everything correctly and do it right. Participation in joint military exercises, in places of armed conflicts with those whose algorithms have the ability to win, for example, with the Russians. Joint actions allow us to connect, to enter into the same information array with us, which contains those algorithms of thinking and actions that led our soldiers to glorious victories.

One more important point needs to be mentioned. The dominant creeds of China have another significant facet. By establishing a rigid hierarchy in their omissions, which essentially supports the slave-owning system, they proclaim equality and justice in their pronouncements. Perhaps that is why, seeing the loyal venal relations of the hierarchs of the creeds to the imperial “elite”, numerous and rather lengthy peasant uprisings broke out, and we will talk about this below.

The Taiping Rebellion

Before we go on to describe our version of events during the “opium wars”, we need to highlight another vivid episode of those years, which in history was called the “Taiping Rebellion”. In the official history, this peasant war coincides in time with the “second opium war”, the dates 1850 — 1864 are indicated and the number of victims is from 30 to 100 million people. But about everything in order.

High taxes, corruption, degradation of society, including due to the spread of drugs, aggravated the contradictions between the ruling ethnic group (Manchus) and the rest of the Chinese. Against this background, the village teacher Hong Xiuquan enters the historical scene. He had dreamed of a career as an official all his life (and Chinese people were taken to the position of officials in a very limited number, and even then only after strict “casting” in the form of exams). When Hong failed another such exam, he became disillusioned with the whole system and fell into religion. And not in any, but in the Christian.

Some sources convey this moment as follows: “like the Christian saints, Hong, after the third failed exam, which became the end of his former life for him, was near death for 40 days and nights, raving about verses in which he mixed Christian elements with traditional Chinese. After recovering, he no longer thought about passing exams, but intended to change the world.”

Declaring himself the son of God, respectively, the brother of Jesus Christ, Hong founded a new creed — a variant of Chinese Protestantism with elements of Taoism. He proclaimed the beginning of the war for equality and freedom — the welfare State of Taiping Tiango. Xiuquan’s ideas turned out to be very attractive to commoners. The Messiah banned drugs, alcohol, gambling and prostitution. In return, Hun proposed the participation of the people in the governance of the state, gender equality, the abolition of taxes, the distribution of all benefits equally and other elements of communism, and he also proposed the confiscation of property from the rich.

In addition, the former teacher set a goal — the overthrow of the Manchu Qing dynasty, which imposed its cultural customs on the indigenous Chinese. As a result, many destitute poor, peasants, pirates, robbers en masse joined the ranks of the newly converted Taiping. In 1850, their number reached 20 thousand people, and Guangxi Province rebelled. After capturing the first big city, the county seat of Yun’an, they create their own government and proclaim a new state. It was called the Kingdom of Heaven of the Greatest Happiness – “Tai-Ping Tien-Go” — and the rebels began to be called “Taiping”.

Government troops and police are unable to put up effective resistance, and the insurgency quickly spreads to neighboring regions. By 1853, Nanjing had fallen. The uprising has engulfed most of Southern China.

UPRISINGS IN SOUTHERN CHINA

Inspired by the success of the Taiping, the northern and central regions of the empire rose: the uprising of the Society of Small Knives in Shanghai, the Redheads in Guangdong, the Niangjun in Anhon, etc.

The Taiping fought with red headbands, which apparently brought them closer to the ideas of communism and brought good luck in battles.

THE TAIPING REBELLION IN CHINA

The Taiping movement was a very complex phenomenon. It was both a traditional peasant war against the ruling bureaucracy (a social explosion that included a clan war), and a traditional national liberation movement against a foreign dynasty. It was a religious war of the new “Christian” worldview against traditional Chinese (especially against Confucianism in its most bony forms) — and at the same time a war for the revival of ancient Chinese ideals dating back to the Zhou era, which ended three centuries before Christ.

However, we will not describe the entire course of the Taiping rebellion, which, by the way, was fought not only by imperial troops, but also by the troops of foreign invaders (we will highlight this fact below). Let’s just say that it was suppressed and the reason, in our opinion, was that, having managed to rouse the peoples to fight, the leaders of the uprising failed to organize the work of state institutions necessary for the normal life of people. Hong Xiuquan himself, seeing the destruction of his life’s work, committed suicide.

Global Players

When considering any event, and especially such a large-scale one as a war, it is possible to identify the presence of a Global Management entity, its goals and methods. It is not necessary to fall into conspiracy theories, looking for conspiracies of the “world government”, Global governance is so arranged that it is impossible to find a structure, all participants in the events act as if for their own interests, but at the same time interests of a higher order are also achieved. The same British, and then French and American politicians, merchants and the military acted on the basis of mercantile considerations and those methods that they considered permissible in relation to other peoples. But at the same time, they built a certain configuration of countries and peoples, launched long-term processes that came to the surface decades later, and some will come out in the future. We discussed the mechanisms of Global Governance in more detail in the article “GP — people or function?”

Let’s talk about a Global entity, looking at the situation in that region from its perspective. The Qing Dynasty, in general, satisfied Global players by the fact that it reliably and steadily governed Chinese society. It is clear that not everyone was satisfied with some points, for example, the policy of closeness, which prevented “cultural cooperation”, namely the penetration of ideas from the West. This is exactly what was “corrected”, at the same time solving several other problems, which we will talk about now.

Let’s express an idea that at this stage of immersion in the topic may seem seditious: Foreign interventionists and the troops of the Qing Empire were on the same side in these wars. No, there were no joint military headquarters where common operations were developed, everything was adult-like. Although the idea of the absence of joint military headquarters may not be entirely true — the Taiping uprisings were suppressed by both troops. In part, the fact is that the historical descriptions of the events of those years have come down to us mostly from liberal-Western positions (the winner writes history).

But even such thoroughly liberal heralds mention that the imperial troops engaged not with English troops, but with local ones. However, this is explained by the fact that Chinese society is so mired in corruption, sycophancy and loyalty that it was more expensive to report failures “to the top”, and since it was impossible not to report at all, they smashed their own, accusing them of having surrendered to enemy troops. The results of such “victories” with the number of killed and wounded “rebels” were transmitted to the emperor, and it was easier than engaging in a clash with the British.

The British troops, having won several victories, taking several key cities, did not overthrow the emperor and put their governor. They concluded an agreement under which they received a contribution, seized Hong Kong and opened trade, including opium, through many ports. Someone will say that they would not have been able to “digest” the whole of China, so they took as much as they could. But it seems to us that the emperor was quite satisfied with them, besides, in the further management of Chinese society, all “unpopular” decisions and clearly anti—popular actions could be explained by losing the war – you lost, you suffer.

What did the Global Entity get

Let’s arrange the “benefits” in ascending order of importance.

First, curbing population growth. Although this is rather a secondary goal, it is not necessary to discount it. They are trying to limit the population now, but this does not mean that there was no talk about it then. It’s not just about the war with the victims of more than 100 million people, it’s more about drugs. The total damage from their actions can hardly be calculated, but it seems huge.

Secondly. After the “opium wars”, Chinese society ceased to be closed, Western values and creeds began to penetrate there by means of “cultural cooperation”. And this made it possible to form the worldview of the society of almost the entire Planet without any isolated “enclaves” in which, without their influence, such ideological constructions could be formed that it would be difficult to work with in terms of management (remember the Indians of North America).

Thirdly, the stability of the Qing Emperor’s administration was supported, and the brewing general people’s liberation uprising was prevented in advance, the echo of which was the Taiping uprising, which is mentioned above. The fact is that peasant uprisings like the “Taiping rebellion” did not begin in 1850, and since the seizure of power by the Manchus, uprisings have flared up here and there. The growing contradictions increased the scale of the fights, the moment of a general uprising could come, and then the imperial troops, without the support of the interventionist forces, could hardly keep the situation under control.

And most importantly. Did the indigenous Chinese peoples protest only against the alien Manchus? No. We have written above about the ideological attitudes that form the dominant creeds among them. Although they maintain the stability of the virtually slaveholding hierarchy in the omissions, but in the announcements they form ideas about a just life, about equality. For a Global actor, there was a risk that some Chinese version of communism would prevail in China, and they were not ready to confront it yet, mainly at the ideological level. Then, already in the twentieth century, “communism” will come to China, it will fall very well on the dreams of the Chinese people about the future, but it will no longer be the same communism, it will be emasculated by the teachings of Marx. In fact, this means that the Global Entity preemptively prevented the emergence of communism in such a large state when the Globalists did not yet have an ideological weapon against it.

It was these tasks that were solved under the guise of “opium wars” by the hands of profit-hungry businessmen, politicians, and the military. We should not forget those “bookmarks” that were made for the future. The same agreement under which the Far East was transferred to Russia. It was this fact that was then repeatedly used to aggravate relations with Russia and to foment conflicts up to a military clash. We think that at the conclusion of this agreement, the British understood this perfectly well and went to it precisely for the sake of creating a hotbed of tension, into which they will from time to time throw fuel, solving their tasks. Here it is, the strategy of “divide and conquer” in all its “glory”.

Chinese Revenge

The Chinese know their history. In the memory of the Chinese people, those feelings have been preserved when your people are exterminated simply because they do not have such modern weapons, they carry out genocide with drugs because they are “second-class” people. Interventionists set their own rules of the game due to the fact that they consider themselves a “white bone”.

This has not only not been forgotten, but is becoming increasingly important when the Chinese see that even now they are being used by Western “partners” as cheap labor, as a meek mass. They see that the descendants of those who committed genocide in China are sitting in the same House of Lords. Not only have they not been punished, they have not repented, they continue to consider themselves the “elite” who are allowed everything. We are now on the threshold of grandiose events, a split, a change of world leaders. These memorable thoughts not only about the British, but about the entire Western world (it was not for nothing that the French and Americans were connected then) will allow Chinese society to be torn out of the orbit of the Western project, and maybe even unleash a military conflict. It is clear that it is far from an independent Chinese path here, but the memory of the “opium wars” will be “warmed up” by Globalists and used to reshape the world according to new patterns.

The post OPIUM WARS IN CHINA first appeared on Global Policy.

Anticipating the accusations of the expert community in kitchen conspiracy, I suggest starting with the incredibly obvious. It is the liberal domestic and foreign community in the Ukrainian crisis that takes the side on which only a patient with a severe psychiatric diagnosis can catch the scent of freedom among the smoke of burning tires, napalm and gunpowder. In order not to be known as an urban lunatic who accuses at least a third of the globe of inappropriate behavior and perception of reality, I suggest looking for the logic of neo-Nazi sympathies of a liberal worldview outside the clip “news” context.

Liberalism as a teenage disease not (before) development

For example, in the field of psychiatry already mentioned in vain. One of the brilliant psychologists, theorist and practitioner of the highest level, Viktor Ponomarenko, took seriously my question about whether the inadequacy of liberal thinking is a reason for forced diagnosis.

Ponomarenko is the author of a unique theory of a non—questionnaire assessment of the personality profile “The Seven Radicals Methodology”. Once this theory was known to students of closed special service educational institutions, now it is actively used by those who take responsibility for choosing personnel and partners adequate to the task. For me, Viktor’s authority is reinforced by the fact that he was entrusted to lead an expert group of psychologists during the Nord-Ost tragedy.

Viktor Ponomarenko believes that in the case of the liberal worldview, we are dealing with a deep crisis of personality caused by the arrest of mental development at the adolescent level.

During puberty, a person enters the age of protest and risky experimental exploration of the possibilities of the surrounding world. He sharply rejects the usual ideas about parents as caring guarantors of existence. For him, “ancestors” become unbearable prohibitionists and mentors: “don’t hang out with bad company,” “don’t get into bad habits,” “don’t get involved in dangerous adventures,” “don’t be lazy.”

Youthful negativism in relation to all kinds of “not” is accompanied by the denial of all kinds of “adult” authorities and is characterized by an accentuated fixation on oneself. The egocentric picture of the world given to a teenager in sensations, and not in logic, is complemented by the illusion that the search for new sensations is the true purpose of existence. Remember, Zhvanetsky (it turns out, self-revealing): “The process is about life, the result is death”?

Viktor Ponomarenko believes that a liberal is not a (fully) developed personality in the psychological age of a teenager who experiences subconscious horror of any fixed result: such, for example, as a stable state with its conservative values. But most importantly, he subconsciously and, consequently, without any clear arguments rejects a leader with the charisma of a productive politician and a vision of a clear strategic scenario. For the result is… Well, then you know.

Tunnel thinking — looking and not seeing, listening and not hearing — at the age of decision-making and civic responsibility, like any mental inadequacy, is suicidal. This explains a lot in the liberals’ exalted sympathy for the “bad company” of activists and leaders of the Ukrainian coup and their own subversives of the foundations of the “bloody Putin regime.” Much, but not all.

Why exactly does neo-Nazism, as the most extremist and aggressive form of protest against dissent, arouse the organic sympathy of those living “according to Zhvanetsky”? Why did the ultra-Bolshevik Trotsky, with his permanent revolution, enthusiastically support Hitler in his intention to go to war against the USSR? The end of the revolution — death? Undoubtedly, as an unwanted pregnancy of an “experimental” girlfriend and the need to try on the role and logic of the social behavior of hated parents. After all, they are the bloody fascists who forbid Me to realize my idea of freedom up to blood and pogrom in my own house.

However, it’s time. It’s time to deal with the basic definitions in order to build an adequate system of logical coordinates without pubertal liberal emotions. And don’t miss the strategic perspective chart.

Nazism: terminology and essence

Until now, domestic political science operates with phantom connotations, considering the springs of the Ukrainian coup. The terminology base at the level of the “junta” and “Bandera” is good for news headlines and journalism, but is poorly effective as a tool for expert analysis and argumentation of top-level political decisions and actions. I believe that, albeit negative, but still romanticizing the image of the Maidan is a known stalemate in the discussion on the topic “is Bandera a fascist and what percentage of Bandera members are involved in the current bloodshed.” Which, alas, we are now observing. “Bandera” and “junta” do not work in the field of Western and domestic liberal Russophobia.

The domestic “civil society” continues to show vivid examples of mediocre dead-end initiatives that are based on emotional assessments of the subject. What is the desire of the former legislator, member of the Federation Council Boris Shpigel, to ban fascist symbols in the country! It is difficult to suspect the once powerful senator of wanting to make a splash on a bloody topic, but in fact, according to such a formulation of the law, it would have been necessary to demolish the fence of the Summer Garden in St. Petersburg, to destroy columns and knock down the stucco of countless historical buildings throughout Russia. Readers of the respected magazine “However” do not need to explain the difference between Italian fascism and German Nazism, as well as Roman fascia — bundles of brushwood with double—edged axes – and the German eagle with a swastika. But the creators of the legislation have an obvious gap in this. And not only them.

FASCISM IN THE SERVICE OF CORPORATIONS

I have heard more than once from people who define themselves as Russian nationalists, and even “Orthodox fascists” (?!) that the Nazi criminals Shkuro and Krasnov, convicted by Nuremberg, as well as the notorious General Vlasov, are not traitors, but freedom fighters against the Stalinist regime. In Russia, the holy place of the “new hero” of Ukrainian freedom — the executioner of Bandera — will not be empty. Just let go.

In order not to get bogged down in a deliberately inconclusive discussion, we need to figure out why modern nationalist extremism, even without a reverse swastika or SS runes — just in a balaclava or an expensive suit — is still the same cannibalistic Nazism that cost humanity tens of millions of lives and is fraught with a global relapse.

Nazism is chauvinism, which is the basis of state policy. Such a universal definition, cleared of theoretical political science husks, creates a semantic and legal basis that equates with Hitler’s Nazism the modern regimes in the countries of the former Soviet Baltic States, Moldova, Georgia, the policy of the United States and NATO towards Russia, Iran, China, Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Libya and Syria.

The proposed definition ontologically connects Hitler’s swastika, trident and the abbreviation NATO in the Goebbels logic of hatred of Russia as a second-class state, in respect of which “civilized” norms of international law do not apply. And if we talk about symbols, then this definition gives a direct Nazi content to the white ribbon and the term “fifth column” as a symbol of the attitude towards one’s own people as subhumans. After all, only this justifies in their unconscious logic the application of so-called double standards to Russia.

CAPITALISM AS A REALITY – SOCIAL NATURE, THE MAIN STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT, THE MODERN WORLD CRISIS

Liberalism as a breeding ground and a political tool of Nazism

According to Viktor Ponomarenko’s psychiatric definition, liberals in any country are an ideal protest mass against state foundations as a fixed result. That is why modern Nazism chooses a liberal stratum to crack the statehood, which is not pleasing to its world order. Undoubtedly, on the one hand, in the psychological logic of puberty, this is seduction. But in real life and politics, we are not talking about children, but about adults who are able to wield a bat or operate with words or capital and at the same time egocentrically demanding serious attitude. And if so, then we should take seriously the roots of liberal thinking.

It is obvious that there is no direct sociological connection with social, property, age, educational, intellectual and other statuses. The conservative-liberal rift has now become obvious in any stratum. The attitude to the Ukrainian events destroys long-term friendly ties and even family relations. And if the underlying cause is outside the field of standard sociology, then where to look for it, if not in some personal archetype?

It seems interesting to me to dissect in this vein the archetype of the notorious music critic Artemy Troitsky, known for his white-ribbon activity and the corresponding “Maidan” thinking. It would seem that he is a successful well-known showman, a brand personality, as they say now. Is there something wrong with the anamnesis? Perhaps. How did it happen that a person who did not take a single note in his life turned out to be a guru imposing his idea of “beautiful” on the audience?

Trotsky’s star rose in the era of the barrier that the Soviet leadership built in front of Western mass culture. The barrier was purely speculative, especially for those who, valiantly defending the interests of the USSR in the international arena, turned into an elite at home on the basis of access to those very Western values. In their diplomatic baggage, foreign consumer goods catalogs and music magazines easily overcame the Iron Curtain. Those who had access to these objects of lust were no different from the banal fartsovschikov, and often were simply part of this illegal system. Most of them have placed themselves in a virtual matrix “looking at foreign stickers with affection and eating Russian bacon.”

Perhaps this illusion of “real life” became the block that stopped personal development at the level of a teenage game of “I’m kind of in the West.” But it was in this environment, which gave birth to the contemptuous term “scoop” and experiencing fanaticism towards everything domestic as inferior, Troitsky stood out in a special way. His scathing articles about foreign music in the youth periodicals were distinguished by the “non-linguistic style”, although they were politically correct. Only a few who had the opportunity to read Western periodicals were surprised to discover the suspicious similarity of his texts with foreign originals.

The era of lifting bans deprived a whole layer of Troitsky not only of the elite status of “access holders”, but also forced them to look into the impartial mirror of their own professional aptitude. And it is quite logical that such a pseudo-elite followed the path of Kitty Vorobyaninov: there is no reason, but arrogance remains. As a reflex, respectively, to treat a country that does not suit them. And make a life-saving psychological escape to an elite childhood, continuing the game “I’m kind of in the West.” But unlike the post-revolutionary hereditary aristocracy with frayed elbows, these philistines in the nobility quickly realized that the game can be safely and profitably made a profession. And to regain the material and moral confirmation of their exclusivity.

The new time is a new game of exclusivity, devoid of a real basis and, by definition, taking the participant beyond the field of adequacy. Office plankton declares itself a creative class, in fact, without creating anything, and considers itself a champion of freedom, being in a rigid totalitarian corporate hierarchy.

Both generations share not only a negative attitude towards the rest in “this country”, but also a specific liberal idea of freedom. Let me remind you of the sacramental: “my freedom ends where yours begins.” If you think about it, it really rhymes with the opinion of liberalism as a juvenile psychiatric complex. After all, the beginning of “your freedom” should be felt experimentally: you can try from the first minutes of acquaintance to start an unambiguous action against an individual of the opposite sex or throw a stone at a representative of the authorities. After all, the process is life.

And the totalitarian regime does not like this freedom. He invents his own draconian laws and demands their observance (“the ancestors got it”). Their norm is a result imposed from above, this is the lack of new options to get thrills. This is death. And whoever obeys is a redneck and a slave. A second-class person. And the fact that the liberal idea of freedom at the junction of the boundaries of personal ambitions, by definition, in a weak state is fraught with a war of all against all, the owners of an infantile idea of the world do not care. Is anyone against it? The older boys from the next doorway will help us!

And the regime is therefore “bloody” and “fascist” because it protects the defenders of its freedom. But that’s not the only reason. Both the over-aged liberal and the pimply one have not grown up as a flawed person, an external culprit is required to compensate for their own hidden or obvious complexes of personal insolvency.

And here, no matter how deplorable it may sound for liberal intellectuals, they should see their reflection in the average sports fan, a person of anti-sports beer behavior, who considers himself a specialist more competent than a football commentator, and acquires an elite status relative to the “rest” of subhumans in the virtual ideal. (Did I say something about Trinity? Or Makarevich? Probably escaped from the depths of the subconscious.)

And here we come to the main element of the cultural code of the liberal, which merges it with Nazism in a binary charge.

THE SECOND CIRCUIT OF POWER IN THE WEST AND CAPITALISM

I will start from afar, since 1968. It is known that the events of the Prague Spring began with the most active information aggression of the West. The CIA-controlled media in Germany and Austria, neighboring Czechoslovakia, conducted round-the-clock processing of the Czechoslovak population. But so far, little attention has been paid to their main target group — sports fans. The developers of the area protest technology have calculated them as an organized, structured, hierarchically controlled mass, accustomed to acting outside the law. And most importantly, used to seeing a sports rival and his fans as deadly enemies. And to use collective aggression, not caring that it does not affect the numbers of the scoreboard. The first swallows of the “democratic revolution” on Wenceslas Square in Prague were the fans of the Czechoslovak hockey team, “suddenly” outraged by the regular defeats of their idols from the Soviet team. In international matches, internal contradictions between fans of the home championship merged into a common hatred for the country of the offender.

Does it resemble the Kiev Maidan and the Odessa pogrom in any way? Both there and in other cities of Ukraine, fans unite with extremists, journalists, financiers and become a political tool of Nazism as a policy of state chauvinism.

A natural conversion to the opposite

FASCISM VERSUS COMMUNISM, OR HOW HISTORY WAS SUBSTITUTED FOR US

At the heart of this unity of liberals, extremists and leaders of the economic race is a clear division into themselves (the sector of the most right—wing, successful, exceptional individuals) and into “them” (a faceless second-rate mass, “people who grab”, “losers”, stupid disenfranchised slaves). “Russians who support Putin, “Donetsk”, who do not accept the ideals of the Maidan coup, are slaves,” the liberal public echoes Hitler, the current extremists and oligarchs. It is not by chance that the domestic liberals find themselves in their sympathies on the side of the Maidan coup. And it’s not just about the relevant targeted grants. I know that one popular figure of the domestic show business refused to participate in the sensational anti-Putin “peacemaking” PR campaign, despite a substantial fee, with the words: “The motherland is worth more.” On the other hand, it is difficult to classify those who went to it as those in dire need. The root cause is deeper than financial motivation — in the liberal cultural code.

Sorting people, social groups and ethnic groups into masters and slaves is at the heart of the political philosophy of liberal economics. For the engine of liberal development is her Majesty competition. The reverse side of the victory of one is the defeat of the other. By definition, a serving political system based on other principles cannot exist. And he condemns himself to self-destruction, because the liberal model “my freedom ends where yours begins” is in conflict with the ideal of unlimited freedom. It is possible to expand the boundaries of the kingdom of freedom only by infringing on the rights of those who will be appointed second-rate. For obvious reasons, the slave mass does not really put up with its second-rate. And then liberalism resorts to the standard means: it gives a group of “trembling creatures” the right to elect. The calculation is simple: to provide them with ideological and military weapons and point out the culprit in all the troubles. So, in fact, political liberalism is driving itself into a logical dead end in the name of the ideal of absolute freedom. In its name, the competitive principle of development will inevitably require the diametrically opposite — totalitarianism.

Such is the political impasse: what they ran from, they buried themselves in. Without noticing that one of the “slaves” otherwise realizes his freedom of choice.

The post NAZISM AS THE PINNACLE AND DEAD END OF LIBERALISM first appeared on Global Policy.

The American system is the oldest, largest and most developed. It is based on the unconditional technological leadership of the United States. The key goal of the American strategy in the technology sector is to maintain the initiative in the field of innovation, prolong its own dominance and prevent the emergence of comparable competitors in the global market. To do this, active personnel work is being carried out, preferential conditions are being created for the development of the startup ecosystem, and methods of competition that are far from economic are being used.

The market capacity and favorable internal conditions allowed the United States to bring to the market the largest technology and Internet giants whose intellectual property rights are legally protected. An indirect but significant factor of the American techno-economic system is the creation of numerous common goods. All this allows American companies to provide a trial version of their own products to the whole world, which gives the user the opportunity to access one of the most advanced technologies without excessive costs. The principles of openness and freedom in the digital sphere proposed by the United States are captivating. However, there is no doubt that at the moment when Americans doubt their own hegemony in the technological environment, these principles will be immediately revised. There will be insurmountable borders and barriers aimed at deterring competitors and protecting American leadership.

Even within the United States itself, the decisions of tech giants to block and delete more than 70 thousand accounts, including the pages of President Donald Trump, are similar to open attempts to seize management tools from the authorities. In this case, the companies played for the political establishment against the objectionable “spoiler” of the system. It is likely that in the coming years, a team of political, financial and technological globalists will continue to work together to counteract the national industrial agenda in America and other countries. At the same time, there are concerns from the camp of Democrats that, no matter how convenient the technologies offered by corporations, the strengthening of the influence of tech giants is dangerous both because of their accumulation of “unprecedented economic power” and because of the increase in “control over political communication and communications.” The dominance of tech giants in the dissemination of information and their ability to politically mobilize the masses already pose a threat to democratic governments.

The Chinese techno-economic platform is smaller than the American one, although even here the claims to technological leadership are obvious. A significant amount of financial and human resources allows the Chinese ecosystem to be self-contained and administratively redistribute resources to those areas of technological development that the CPC Politburo considers the most promising. The Chinese were the first in the world to experiment with the autonomization of a number of services and services, building the “Great Chinese Digital Wall” (The Great Firewall of China). And if the Americans provide the whole world with a trial version of their product, then the competitiveness of the Chinese model is based on the cheapness of their offer and participation in financing advanced developments in other countries. At the same time, China relies on waiting tactics and does not respond to US provocations. In China, America is rightly regarded as a more significant and strong player in this area. However, the growth rate of the Chinese technology industry allows Beijing to count on the fact that achieving a market position comparable to the United States is a matter of time. It is unlikely that the Americans will be able to stop this process. There is a demand for pragmatism in world politics. Responding to it, an increasing number of American allies (including Europeans) favorably perceive China’s proposals for cooperation in the digital sphere.

The growing awareness by European countries of the importance of digital sovereignty may be potentially interesting for Russia. Key European countries – Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands – are afraid of dependence on Americans and Chinese. The need to develop a national technology platform is particularly emphasized by the French. Europeans are afraid of losing their subjectivity in the global technological environment and eventually find themselves in a situation where their voice will not be taken into account.

Russia and the Europeans are united by fears of becoming dependent on leading players and losing their own autonomy. At the same time, Russia, like some other European countries, has the competence to form an independent pole of power in the digital sphere. Russian arguments about the development of a data compatibility standard are more likely to be heard in Europe than in China and the USA.

The latter two States themselves have a significant amount of data and are not ready to share it with third countries. However, Moscow’s political differences with the Europeans may become an insurmountable obstacle to full-fledged collaboration, which is an additional motivating factor for Russia in forming its own technological platform.

Global trends in the development of the digital environment

The global digital revolution has led to a radical transformation not only of technological and economic structures, but also of social relations, the very philosophy of human life. These changes have fully manifested themselves in the sphere of international relations. The current situation in the world is similar (albeit at a fundamentally new level) since the invention of nuclear weapons and the beginning of space exploration, when technological changes have significantly changed the international behavior of States. It is already possible to identify a number of trends launched by new technologies that will determine the directions of further evolution of the system of international relations.

The rapid development of science and technology has created prerequisites at the national and global levels for reducing socio-economic inequality. However, it also increased the vulnerability – and suspiciousness – of society in the face of new (or old, new-faced) challenges and threats. New channels and methods of communication have significantly increased the information connectivity of the world. But they also contributed to the atomization of states that seek to protect such channels from foreign interference. The explosive growth of technologies and ways to use them continues to blur the line between the virtual and real world, fact and fiction. This multiplies the uncertainty in international relations and strengthens their anarchic state.

This uncertainty is compounded by the growing gap between the dynamics of development and implementation of innovations and the speed of reflection of these changes in the regulatory fabric. Phenomena that are not regulated by international law become a challenge to the classical system of international relations. Thus, the absence of codified agreements to limit the use of artificial intelligence or supercomputers and cloud computing in the military field involves powers with such technologies in a vicious circle of a constant arms race, which diverts resources and attention from the development of their civilian applications. Despite the fact that in the new conditions it is the Internet that is becoming a key source of new dangers, world governments do not have unified approaches to defining the concept of “sovereignty in cyberspace”, work is not yet underway to develop international agreements similar to the outer space treaty, the Antarctic treaty or sovereignty in airspace.

The all-encompassing nature of digital transformation processes leads to the fact that they fall into the focus of attention of an increasing number of international organizations – both specialized (ITU) and non-core (UNESCO, UNCTAD, PACE). This disperses the international digital agenda and multiplies mutually exclusive approaches to its issues. The lack of a unified and clear conceptual and categorical apparatus in this area exacerbates contradictions and disputes.

On more technologically-oriented international platforms – governmental and non-governmental – the struggle is unfolding for universal recognition of technical standards created by states or large corporations. The most successful lobbyists from among governments and businesses receive a significant market advantage in the case of codification of their proposed standard: the whole world begins to consume their products, and they get the opportunity to significantly influence the further development of the chosen technology. Such a struggle for standards also has far-reaching international political consequences. Taking into account the continuing rapid penetration of “figures” into public life, the countries that supply digital technologies firmly “bind” the client states to themselves, “getting them hooked” on certain standards and types of solutions, increasing the dependence of such countries on their exports – by analogy with the export of weapons or energy resources.

The seriousness of this problem is vividly illustrated, for example, by the situation faced by the EAEU member states when implementing digital integration. The creation of a unified system of electronic exchange of legally significant documents has been greatly hampered by the fact that different EAEU states use different cryptographic standards, not all of which are recognized as secure. The lack of coordination in their implementation, albeit for objective reasons, has led to the emergence of a technical barrier to the development of integration processes, which at the same time has long-term political and economic consequences.

Global digitalization has significantly increased the international legal personality of non-State participants in international relations. Initially, the technical NGO “Corporation for the Management of Domain Names and IP Addresses”, created with the participation of the US government to regulate issues related to domain names, IP addresses and the functioning of the global network, has turned into a leading institute of “Internet governance”, where states do not have a dominant role.

Multinational giants – Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Huawei, TikTok, Alibaba, YouTube – are already talking on equal terms with national and foreign governments. It is impossible to ignore them as a factor of national security. On the one hand, the information accumulated by such ecosystems and the advanced solutions implemented by them are of great interest to the competent authorities. On the other hand, their ability as information resources to broadcast certain information messages to a huge audience, directly or indirectly – through controlled search results – becomes a factor in national political life. These properties of such corporations give them the “right to vote” in the international arena and at the same time make them objects of strict national regulation. The understandable desire of States to control their information activities and gain access to the data they have leads to the erosion of liberal values – freedom of speech, secrecy of correspondence, privacy – and raises the question of their applicability in the changed digital age.

A separate point in the confrontation between corporations and states remains the issue of their fair taxation, especially if their services operate in a foreign jurisdiction. It is important to avoid double taxation of such platforms in order to avoid deterioration of the situation of consumers and the products and services they receive.

Perhaps for the first time, ordinary citizens have gained the ability to directly influence international relations on such a scale as today. Social networks, instant messengers and Internet television have practically won the competition with traditional media, made each smartphone owner a potential journalist and endowed him with the ability to instantly make his “news” for millions of people. Such a seemingly gratifying manifestation of freedom to speak and be heard is overshadowed by the fact that in the era of “post-truth” verification of a fact is no longer a requirement for our trust in it. At best, unintentional subjectivism or a thirst for the attention of an “amateur reporter” who is not bound by professional journalistic ethics or the politics of the publication, and at worst, the dissemination of deliberately false information can have devastating consequences for society and the state.

At the same time, the example of deleting Trump’s Twitter account demonstrates another trend. During the four years of Trump’s presidency, Twitter has been an important resource of his power and the main tool for fighting political opponents. With his help, Trump set the information agenda, dictated the political will, appointed to positions and dismissed yesterday’s like-minded people in disgrace. For millions of supporters of the president, Twitter has become a mouthpiece of dissatisfaction with Washington. With his help, it was possible, while remaining misunderstood, to be at least heard by the elites. Therefore, the president’s tweets amused some, frightened others, and irritated others.

At the symbol level, the removal of Trump’s account – even after he backed down and called on his supporters to peaceful protest – is much more demonstrative and sudden his “liquidation” as president two weeks before the end of his term than through a court or impeachment. But more importantly, this “liquidation” mission was carried out not by Congress, not by the military and not by the Supreme Court, but by the head of the Twitter technology company.

This case, most likely, on the one hand, will raise the request of third countries for “digital sovereignty” from American tech giants, on the other hand, it will strengthen the intention of these states to protect themselves from the dominance of their own and foreign technology companies by stricter legislative regulation of their activities on their territories. In the long run, this may strengthen the political fragmentation of the world.

The further development of cognitive technologies, primarily deepfake, gives attackers unlimited opportunities to create toxic content, which by the strength of its impact can already be classified as weapons of mass destruction.

Thus, the growth of the freedom of society and the strengthening of the instruments of its realization paradoxically develops in parallel with the strengthening of the police power of the state, and this becomes the new norm of everyday life. The strengthening of the second trend is also happening for objective reasons: the desire of states to ensure the safety of citizens, including by restricting their access to the “darknet” and uncontrolled elements of the network, can hardly be called a dictatorial whim of governments. The degree of deanonymization of users in the network will continue to increase.

The absence of institutions of arbitration or investigation of cyber incidents and cybercrimes recognized by all players, as well as the still weak development of digital forensics tools makes it almost impossible to reliably determine the party responsible for the incident. Which, in turn, increases the level of distrust and conflict between countries. At the same time, in the context of the development of new technologies – primarily the Internet of Things and autonomous intelligent systems – it is enough for attackers to have a powerful enough household computer or even a smartphone to hack the security system of a critical infrastructure facility and cause a disaster or seize sensitive information, and a hacker does not necessarily turn out to be a saboteur or a terrorist, it may be technically gifted “a teenager.”

The attempt of countries to protect themselves from such penetration has a number of consequences. First of all, states seek to limit the vulnerability of the network by stimulating import substitution and deep localization – it is easier to trust “their” controlled manufacturer of equipment or solutions. This leads to the disintegration of international production chains and a certain erosion of the principles of the international division of labor. In an environment where everyone who can start producing their own critical equipment and “software” (servers, operating systems, antiviruses and security systems), economic specialization loses its appeal. In addition, the definition of authorized operators, the restriction of competition in the market inevitably leads to a slowdown in the development of technologies, forcing states to live in a dilemma: progress or security. Here, as in many other aspects of the global digital economy, there is a contradiction between information exchange as a global phenomenon and physical infrastructure that has a territorial binding, which means that it is under a certain sovereignty.

This contradiction is evident in the issue of storing, processing and moving information through Internet channels. Historically, there has been a serious imbalance in the geographical distribution of the basic infrastructure and the nationality of the main Internet players. More than 60 percent of the total number of domains are managed by American players (Verisign, Afilias), more than 50 percent of content delivery networks belong to American companies (Amazon, Akamai, CloudFlaire), all major first-tier providers are residents of the United States, and ten of the thirteen DNS servers are located in the United States. It is not surprising that with such an “Internet geography” and awareness of the US readiness to take unilateral sanctions to very extreme measures, states that are not direct allies of Washington seek to create an alternative protected contour of the “national, sovereign Internet” – and the number of such states is increasing. On the other hand, according to experts, satellite Internet can displace cable Internet no later than the middle of this century – and in a new round the struggle will move into space or the upper atmosphere, but its nature, consisting in the unwillingness of states to leave key infrastructure outside their sovereign control zone, will remain.

The desire for sovereign control of an increasing number of States is reflected in their attitude to the issue of storing personal data of citizens. Both the European GDPR and the Russian so-called “Spring package”, with all the nuances of each approach, postulate the need for all Internet market operators to store personal data on servers located in national jurisdiction. This approach is aggressively opposed primarily by the Anglo-Saxon states participating in the “five eyes system” (USA, Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, Australia), pointing to this measure as excessive and suppressing rights and freedoms. Taking into account the imbalances described above in the Internet space, the position of the United States and its allies is understandable. Nevertheless, as the digitization of a person’s identity increases, the possibility of his digital identification, moving all his personal data to cloud storage, the price of an error in protecting such information increases many times. In case of violation of the information storage security circuit, the identity of a citizen can not just be taken over by attackers – it can be completely erased, and such a digital death will cut off the victims of the attack from the possibility of realizing basic social rights. That is why the increasing strictness of national data storage requirements is becoming the dominant requirement of the era.

Two major issues arise for nation States in the coming years

The first question is to what extent they are able to guarantee the viability of their critical information infrastructure in the face of cyber warfare and the growth of network piracy. Cyberattacks or system failures in networks can permanently shut down entire industries and cities with unpredictable consequences for the country and its population, but the relevance and magnitude of such threats are still far from being realized.

The second question is how well governments understand the principles and methods of ensuring the security of personal data and how the procedure for the turnover of depersonalized big data will be regulated. Mastering such data by another state will allow it to build a reliable picture of the development of the economy and industry, the vulnerabilities of agriculture, the epidemiological situation, consumption profiles and adjust its political, military or economic strategy accordingly. Obviously, the accelerated development of national legislation regulating the principles of the circulation of national big data and access to interstate negotiations on this issue is a matter of the near future.

States and the future digital world: Duopoly or oligopoly?

Even today, the presence of states in the top league of world politics is unimaginable without a development strategy in the global digital environment, the availability of resources, their own ideas and products in this area. The very category of “great power” in the XXI century implies the creation of its own technological platforms, and ideally – the formation of a techno-economic block. Mandatory attributes of such a block are a significant chunk of the world market controlled by it, its own currency zone with an emission center, its own development model, a set of resources, technologies and scientific competencies that allow the block to be independent from others, at least in such key areas as defense and critical infrastructure.

The attempt of each of the blocks to exclude the influence of competitors on its critical infrastructure inevitably leads to the politicization of technologies and technological wars. Digital technologies, being end-to-end for the entire modern economic and socio-political space, are becoming the main field of a new war. Cyberattacks on digital critical infrastructure can be no less destructive than nuclear or biological weapons.

Against the background of the dominance of a number of developed countries in digital technologies and the emergence of global monopolies controlling network infrastructure and data flows, there is a threat of digital inequality and digital colonialism. Digital technological sovereignty is becoming a necessary condition for the sovereignty of political and national independence.

The restructuring of the principles of functioning of international economic relations and the entire model of global geo-economics provides new opportunities to the leading techno-economic blocs, a kind of “digital neocolonialists” of our time. The gap, now digital, continues to widen between global digital technology providers and recipient countries, which are gradually becoming increasingly dependent on technologically advanced states.

At the current stage, the “digital neocolonialist” countries offer exclusively preferential conditions for the objects of economic development to create the infrastructure necessary for the transition to the digital future. Thus, they immediately ensure their binding to their own solutions – from payment systems to data storage systems and electronic document management. But most importantly, they provide themselves with unlimited and practically free access to big data, getting from this not only an immediate economic effect and an additional advantage in the development of their own artificial intelligence tools and neural networks, but also effective tools for controlling their digital colonies.

Digital colonialism will continue to strengthen, and it is impossible to exclude the revival of the UN Trusteeship Council – already with new, digital functions and powers. At the same time, the canonical borders of the countries of the first, second and third world have already undergone enormous changes and will continue to change. Former third world countries get the opportunity to conditionally jump “from feudalism to socialism, bypassing the stage of capitalism” – the creation of advanced infrastructure of a new generation without the need to maintain the functioning of the old infrastructure (in its absence).

In this sense, it is possible to foresee the digital breakthrough of the richer states of the Middle East and Africa and their entry into significant roles in the digital arena. Finally, international financial and labor relations are also changing – digital assets move to more comfortable jurisdictions even more easily than financial ones, and practically leave no traces of such movement. The emergence of cryptocurrencies deprives the monopoly states of another sovereign right – the right to issue. The concepts of “brain drain” and “labor emigration” are also changing: now national “digital proletarians” should not move abroad – it is enough for them, staying at home, to work for a foreign corporation, alienating all their intellectual property, and vice versa – talented hipsters can move to more comfortable climatic conditions, while continuing to at the same time to develop the national economy.

At the same time, digital technologies, which form both the daily life and the information space of each person, are beginning to have an increasingly noticeable impact on his psyche and decision-making practices. An individual not only becomes a slave to the digital platforms of global monopolies, but is also really placed in a framework where his entire existence is tied to devices – a mobile phone, tablet, smartwatch. Under the guise of providing amenities, they restrict a person’s choice in decision-making and manipulate his behavior, including by pushing him to follow a “certain route”. In these unequal relations, digital monopolies expropriate and uncontrollably exploit personal data and even creative content on pain of exclusion from the social environment.

The widespread introduction of digital technologies, including the digitalization of industry and government agencies, the introduction of 5G networks, forms an imperative to ensure the security and sustainability of the entire digital critical infrastructure. Without solving this problem, digitalization may turn out to be the construction of a “house on the sand”.

In order to eliminate the “barricades” and “minefields” on the path of the digital economy, the state must guarantee both the security of citizens and businesses, as well as clear legal relations in the digital environment. This is especially true for the ownership and use of personal and “depersonalized” data and created content.

The ownership and cost of data is just one of the problems that have accumulated in the digital environment that urgently need to be solved. No less urgent is the need to resolve the contradiction between the requirements of national or local data storage and global transparency of technological and corporate processes, where data on engine operation on an aircraft owned by an airline of one country and flying over another country is processed in real time in a third.

As techno-economic blocks are formed, the competition in the digital space takes the form of a war of platforms and standards. At the same time, a number of countries and regional associations that have neither control over a large part of the global digital market nor dominant platforms (for example, India, Brazil, Japan, Russia or the European Union) will be forced to look for common ways to preserve independence and competitiveness, including by creating common platforms based on an open architecture and open source.

Russia on the digital agenda: Opportunities and limitations

Russia is one of the few countries with technological reserves and human competencies to build its own technological ecosystem. The powerful engineering and mathematical school inherited by Russia from the Soviet Union remains a source of a key resource for digital development – qualified personnel. Russia has most of the features of a sovereign technology platform. A national search engine has been developed and continues to develop. Instagram Facebook and Vkontakte are still more popular than Russian social networks VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, not only in Russia, but also in most CIS countries. Own cloud technologies are developing, domestic processors are being created. Digital solutions of Russian companies have significant export potential – primarily cognitive and self-learning systems, solutions in the field of cybersecurity, secure electronic document management and platforms for providing services to the public. Launched two years ago, the national Digital Economy program will provide 97 percent of all national households and all social infrastructure facilities (schools, hospitals, police stations) with access to high-speed broadband Internet by 2024. This will radically change the opportunities for the development of entrepreneurship, telemedicine and distance education, and will allow Russia to overcome the “digital divide”. Russia is already among the top 10 countries in terms of the number of Internet users, and the website “Gosuslugi” with its two trillion annual transactions is the most popular website of public services in the world.

The share of the digital economy in the country’s GDP is growing. Despite the vagueness of the term itself, it is already about 4-5 percent of GDP, but it continues to grow rapidly at a pace comparable to the digital leaders. In addition, Russia has an impressive satellite and radio frequency resource, which is the key to the successful development of new generation networks.

The challenges that Russia faces in the field of digital development cannot be underestimated. Some of them are only a “digital” consequence of “analog” problems and threats. Others have a fundamentally new, original nature. In particular, Western sanctions not only restrict, among other things, access to foreign technologies, but also increase the risks of maintaining dependence on such technologies to an unacceptable level. The case related to the refusal of Siemens to supply turbines to the Crimea jeopardized plans to provide the peninsula with heat. If we extrapolate this incident to the digital sphere, a similar failure of SAP, Oracle, CISCO or Microsoft to ensure timely updating of their solutions operating in Russia can cause failures – even collapse – in the operation of critical systems, including public administration and the banking sector.

These and other trends in the development of world politics in the last few years have actualized for Russia the task of forming reliable protection of its own digital critical infrastructure. The fulfillment of this task depends both on the effectiveness of a phased and gradual transition from imported software and hardware complexes, and on the creation of an effective command vertical from the regulator to the executor throughout the country.

The decision of the Russian government to create registers of domestic software and electronic equipment is designed to reduce such risks. Without being included in these registers, companies cannot count on delivering their solutions to Russian state corporations and public authorities. Such measures have a long-term positive effect on the development of Russia as a sovereign technological power.

Building a counteraction in the field of information security is complicated by conceptual uncertainty – the fuzzy separation of two close, but different spheres related to information flows. Both the security of signals in a physical network carrying information and malicious ideological content in Russian practice are defined by the same concept of “information security”. In the practice of Russian competitors in digital leadership, the security of signals and networks is defined as cybersecurity. Countering threats in these two areas requires different competencies. While in Russia there is a sufficient understanding of how to deal with cyber threats, in the field of information content, the Russian strategy requires separate reflection and development.

Moscow’s accusations of cyber interference in the internal affairs of a number of states were used as a pretext to increase sanctions pressure and undoubtedly damaged Russia’s international image. However, this campaign had consequences for a number of large Russian enterprises and firms. They faced problems and discrimination in the markets of some Western countries. Perhaps even more significant than the reputational and even economic consequences are the risks that these accusations will be used by the United States and its allies as arguments for conducting “cyberstrikes of retaliation” or even “preventive cyberstrikes” against Russia.

In the information space, Russia’s vulnerabilities are obvious due to the dominance of American monopolies in the domestic segment – Google and Facebook. These monopolies exploit Russian data for free and are increasingly trying to influence the information field and the political situation in Russian domestic politics. Including through manipulation of content and restrictions on Russian users’ access to information and means of communication. Other non-Western countries face similar challenges. It makes sense to establish a more active dialogue with them about the principles of legislation of the digital age, especially in terms of data ownership rights, rules for their storage and use, joint fight against online piracy, general rules of conduct for states and businesses on the Internet. The fundamental challenge for Russian legislation in the digital sphere is to keep pace with the development of technologies and practices themselves as dynamically as possible, especially in such important areas for society as cybercrime and digital finance.

Another problem today is the low ability of Russian companies and the government to compete with global corporations for the best personnel. At the same time, formally, “brain drain” may not occur – Russian talents continue to remain in Russia, but give all the intellectual added value to foreign companies. Taking into account the disparity of the economic potentials of Russian and transnational business, the solution of this problem is possible only within the framework of the administrative or conceptual (but in any case state) plane of relations.

Also, Russia and Russian companies practically do not work on international platforms to introduce technological standards and regulations that are favorable for the functioning of Russian developments. This is partly due to Russia’s lack of a doctrinal document outlining its own international priorities in this area by analogy with the National Security Strategy or the Concept of Foreign Policy. In the future, this omission may cause technological isolation or actual coercion of Moscow to work with internationally recognized standards and protocols, in the development of which Russia actually did not take an active part.

The Roadmap of Russian Leadership in the digital Environment

DIGITAL TOTALITARIANISM: HOW IT IS DONE IN RUSSIA

The Russian digital agenda should reflect the position of our country as one of the main forces in the global system, as an exporter of security and stability. Russia’s global role in the digital world is the role of the leader of the “digital non-aligned movement” for those countries that would like to avoid the technological dictates of “digital neocolonialists”.

It is important that the development of the digital sector of the Russian economy, including electronics and information technology, is accompanied by expansion into global markets. Only in this case will Russia be able to recoup investments in breakthrough technologies, conquer key technological platforms of the next generation economy and build large, competitive businesses.

Spread over eleven time zones, Russia (even in a world where distances are dramatically reduced) continues to play the role of a safe link between Europe and Asia. This applies equally to the global energy infrastructure needed to support the highly energy-intensive digital economy of the future, and to the network of quantum communications necessary for secure data transmission. The cold climate of the northern regions of Russia, coupled with cheap electricity, gives our country a competitive advantage in the location of large data storage and processing centers.

One of the most important challenges for Russia today is the implementation of the EAEU digital integration program. It is necessary in a short time to provide an opportunity for government agencies and businesses of the member states of the Union to exchange legally significant documents through the integrated information system of the EAEU (AIS of the EAEU). This will increase the speed of transit of goods through the territory of the EAEU, increase the economic effects of this process and improve the quality of integration in the Union.

In addition, Russia, as the main “shareholder” of this process, should contribute to ensuring the interoperability of the EAEU AIS with the information systems of the CIS member states that tend to integrate, as well as states with which the EAEU has or is planning a free trade agreement. Digital integration here can and should outpace physical integration. Another important tool may be a special (for example, with the Eurasian Development Bank) program for the implementation of national e-government standards in interested partner countries.

The task of expanding the Russian economic and digital space acutely raises the question of finding strategic allies in the digital world and using existing political mechanisms for this purpose. In this regard, it is worth using the positive potential of our relations with the leading economies of the future – India, Indonesia, Brazil and others.

Equally important is the work on digital dialogue with the European Union. Firstly, digital transport corridors with seamless transit experience for businesses will become possible only if the EAEU AIS is interoperable with the information systems of Europe and China. Secondly, closer coordination is needed in the European direction regarding the use of the radio frequency spectrum – so far there are many contradictions with the EU border states on this issue. The solution to this problem is especially important if in the foreseeable future goods between countries will be moved by unmanned transport. In this case, both Russia and the EU will need a single standard for new generation networks and a single frequency range allocated to them. Thirdly, Russia and the European Union have adopted comparable (at least in terms of principles) regulatory requirements for the storage and transfer of personal data. It is important to harmonize these requirements for business convenience.

In addition, Russia and the EU are drawn closer by the desire to tax foreign digital giants, primarily American companies, with fair taxes. The formation of a consensus on the principles of such taxation will help Russia and the EU to act more effectively on multilateral platforms dealing with this issue. In the medium term, the issue of creating a single cross-border “pool” of big data, marked up in a unified way and accessible (including for a fee) to third parties, primarily American and Chinese companies, is also becoming important

Collaboration with the EU is important, if only because the Russian and European integration blocks are squeezed between two very self-sufficient information platforms – American and Chinese, each of which is already a “bigdata monster”. To become an additional center of gravity, Russia and the European Union, relatively small in terms of population and data generation, simply need to join forces.

At the same time, uniform rules and principles for the functioning of national data management systems, clearly establishing to whom and under what conditions this data may or may not be available, will ensure the national security of Russia and the EU. It is obvious that the entire volume of accumulated big data of a state or group of states is of exceptional intelligence, political, economic and military value, and ensuring their safety is one of the key tasks of national security. But there is also a more immediate political argument in favor of starting cooperation between Russia and the EU in the digital sphere. The progressive degradation of Russian-European relations has exhausted the bilateral agenda for substantive topics. The issues of developing the digital economy and jointly confronting common threats in the digital environment that really bring us closer together can provide fundamentally new areas for non-confrontational interaction.

A separate point for Russia is relations with the leading digital powers – China and the United States. Unlike the European and Eurasian tracks, joint economic projects with Moscow are extremely unlikely in both cases. Nevertheless, the political situation dictates different logics in relations with Washington and Beijing in this area.

With the PRC, it is necessary to continue to coordinate their positions on international platforms regarding issues of Internet regulation and data security. Our approaches are similar, although the Russian one seems to be more liberal and does not imply the creation of an analogue of the “Great Chinese Digital Wall” in our country. But there are two other sensitive issues that need to be discussed with Beijing, putting aside the awkwardness.

The first is China’s technological penetration into the EAEU states within the framework of the “digital Silk Road” doctrine. As in the case of Eurasian integration in general, it is important to interface, coordinate the actions of Chinese business and the state with the activities implemented within the framework of the EAEU – 2025 Digital Agenda.

The second is the development of rules of conduct for Chinese companies in the Russian market of highly qualified personnel and startups. Currently, Huawei is conducting large-scale work on the purchase of Russian technology companies and on attracting Russian specialists to its R&D units. At the same time, salaries in the company are significantly higher than the market, which leads to a flow of specialists from domestic companies. Obviously, in conditions of market rules and freedom of choice, this is a natural process, but it is also necessary to discuss compensatory actions for the national economy with the Chinese side. The Chinese side would never allow similar behavior of third-country companies in its market. The expansion of work with universities, localization of not only I&O departments, but also production, the transition to the creation of joint products, and not the “cannibalization” of startup solutions should become requirements for digital companies operating in our country.

Cooperation on political issues with the United States is even more relevant, despite the confrontational nature of bilateral relations. First of all, it is the development of confidence-building measures in cyberspace, the discussion of restrictions on the military use of digital technologies, the convergence of approaches to Internet regulation. Russia and the United States could initiate negotiations on the creation of new instruments for controlling new types of military technologies. It is also necessary to jointly understand the terminology: speaking of “Russian hackers”, Americans most often give examples of “social engineering”. It is necessary to make every effort to return pragmatism to Russian-American relations, even if Washington’s interest in this is not visible now. We are not talking about giving the United States a new credit of trust. Rather, it is about considering Washington’s every move carefully and assessing its possible consequences, without considering it as a priori hostile to Russian interests.

Russia needs a coordinated, clearly articulated and structured agenda to work in multilateral associations – the ITU, the Digital Twenty, the OECD. It is hardly reasonable to spend all the time pushing through exclusively Russian approaches and engage in fierce diplomatic battles with partners. Instead, at least two groups of “digital truths” should be recognized internally.

First. The location of DNS servers and the main Internet highways really did not work out in favor of Russia. Russia is not a first-level provider. In matters of shaping the digital agenda, Russia is a major regional power, not the second pole of this system. Individual digital corporations have become so powerful that they talk to states on an equal footing.

The second. The world tends much less towards “digital bipolarity” than it may seem. This is especially significant at the level of cyberspace regulation. Despite the proclaimed freedom of information movement, most countries seek to localize data storage in one form or another. In matters of digital regulation, all countries are authoritarian. There are areas that require strict regulation, even in more democratic countries. On the other hand, it is irrational to completely deny the concept of “multistakeholderism” – the plurality of those responsible – in the development of any decisions concerning regulation and further ways of developing new technologies. The regulator must inevitably conduct a dialogue with technology owners, and this is most often a business. Having realized these realities, Russia will be able to act as a conciliatory state in multilateral associations, determined to find a compromise.

Russia also has a chance to become an exponent of the interests of states that want to preserve their digital sovereignty and are not set up to be part of the Chinese or American digital empire, but do not have sufficient “subjectivity” for this. Both lines of behavior will expand our opportunities to realize our leadership potential, our “gravitational core”. This will make it possible to promote Russian candidates for leadership positions of such multilateral associations as, for example, ITU.

Another important step in the restructuring of Russian work in international organizations should be a more thorough selection of members of our delegations, ensuring their versatility. Today, the reality is that Russian diplomats are not always sufficiently aware of the technical aspects of the issues under consideration, while specialized technical specialists do not have enough knowledge of the art of negotiations. A separate role should be assigned to lobbyists – business representatives, who are, in fact, the ultimate beneficiary of most of the decisions taken. This kind of “digital realism”, instead of distractions to provocations and foreign policy “noises”, orients Russia to extremely pressing issues of ensuring the country’s digital interests in the world.

The recognition that in terms of creating 5G networks, Russia has completely lost the initiative or the ability to actively influence the agenda should push Moscow to focus on preparing our proposals for the 7G network standard (or is it 6G?), to step up work to neutralize the threat of isolation of Russia in matters of the radio frequency range allocated for the needs of a new generation of communications spectrum. On this issue, Russian views do not coincide with the overwhelming majority of countries in the world. The peculiarity of the regulatory regulation of the digital sphere is that the new laws will be written by those who write the codes, that is, the technical content of the innovation will largely determine its regulatory framework. Therefore, it is important to intensify the participation of Russian specialists in the development of standards and protocols for tomorrow’s technologies.

Conclusion

Against the background of the virtualization of all aspects of social life, the militarization of the information space is taking place. Taking advantage of the absence of borders in the digital space and generally recognized rules of conduct in it, states and organizations controlled by them distribute biased and disinformation content in order to promote their own interests and values. New technologies of virtual reality formation, such as deepfake, leave almost no chance for an ordinary person to separate lies from reality and are able to provoke religious and ethnic conflicts with impunity, destroy families, destroy the reputations of politicians and innocent people.

In the coming years, the question of the structure of regulation of the entire global Internet will inevitably arise. Under the pressure of block technological confrontation – mainly between the United States and China – and ideological and political struggle, it is already divided into digital “enclaves”. The basic value of the Internet as a worldwide equal and democratic environment (web neutrality) is also undermined by attempts, promoted, in particular, by the United States, to make the quality and speed of network traffic dependent on the client’s wallet. The inclusiveness of the Internet is becoming the key to reducing digital inequality, and with it the guarantor of global economic growth and social development.

Big data as the “new oil” of the digital age should have an understandable owner and an understandable value for the individual, business and the state. Only if a person and a citizen become the center of services and services in the digital environment, a balance of human rights, national priorities and business interests will be ensured, and it will be possible to regulate the currently uncontrolled global digital monopolies for the benefit of the whole society. The removal of the pages of President Trump and his supporters, as well as the “deplatforming” of the Parler social network, popular among Republicans, clearly outline the prospect of actions by tech giants to eliminate economic and political competitors if these tech giants decide to operate outside the United States. Since it is so tough and relatively easy to crack down on ideological opponents in the United States, why can’t this practice be made extraterritorial? Moreover, there are already precedents.

For Russia, the minimum task is to preserve sovereignty when making decisions affecting the main areas of national security. The maximum task is to create your own competitive technological ecosystem, become the leader of the techno-economic block and a key participant in the process of developing new rules of the game in this area. In this sense, gaining economic sovereignty is a simpler task than gaining informational sovereignty. But it seems that the survival of states in the future depends on its solution.

The export of technologies and competencies for the protection of sovereign critical infrastructure to countries wishing to ensure their independence and defense capability can and should become one of the most important political and foreign economic priorities of Russia. This will provide the country with a significant financial inflow and international influence. It is along this path that the powers claiming leadership positions in this area are already following.

Currently, the implementation of the critical infrastructure technology export strategy is hindered by the lack of experience of Russian high-tech companies in creating integrated platform solutions, their weak presence in the markets of potential partners, as well as insufficient financial capacity to work on large long-term projects.

As the civilizational and ideological confrontation escalates, examples of subversive information activity become more frequent, more and more countries are paying attention to the need for more careful control over malicious and subversive content on the Internet. In the United States, where an information war is unfolding between hostile political forces – as the 2020 presidential campaign showed – digital monopolies resort to outright censorship and manipulation in favor of their ideological supporters.

Russia should think about the mechanisms of active formation of the information space, which would allow it to lead in terms of relevance and quality of content and thereby limit foreign influence in its information space.

The challenge of the new time is the “impatience of the spirit”: a short clip or a post on a social network “wins” a full-fledged news report or an analytical article, the variety of multimedia experience distracts a person’s attention, and the speed of changes turns life into a race against time. The conservative, traditionally unhurried sphere of interstate communication is forced to change, “to run very fast in order to at least stay in place.” States that will be able to quickly rebuild clumsy foreign policy mechanisms faster than others have every chance to take a leading position in this rapid “new brave world”.

The post INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND LEADERSHIP IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT first appeared on Global Policy.

The operations also include such tasks as responding to natural disasters, providing humanitarian assistance to the population, protecting infrastructure facilities, maintaining peace, security and other interests of China. This suggests that Beijing may at any moment launch a special military operation against Taipei to return Taiwan “to the bosom of the Chinese family.”

The legal basis for this has already been created

The Chinese newspaper Global Times noted that the mentioned flexible document is extremely important for determining the functions of the PLA when the situation on the planet is changing rapidly. Beijing wants to minimize risks and be ready for any turn of events.

The PLA is now involved in localizing the COVID-19 pandemic, and before that, the military was involved in extinguishing forest fires, eliminating the consequences of floods and earthquakes. Recently, the PLA Navy has begun escorting commercial vessels in troubled waters near African states – Nigeria and Somalia, where pirates are fishing.

In addition, Chinese military personnel helped residents of other countries

For example, they transferred medical equipment to the Kingdom of Tonga, an island state (an archipelago in the South Pacific Ocean) in Polynesia, which was severely damaged on January 15 as a result of a powerful eruption of an underwater volcano and the tsunami that followed it.

Now Beijing is ready to provide assistance to those in need around the world. At the same time, he wants to secure his foreign investments and transport routes.

The post CHINA HAS ALLOWED ITS TROOPS TO CONDUCT “SPECIAL MILITARY OPERATIONS” WITHOUT THE STATUS OF WAR first appeared on Global Policy.

Having discarded the propaganda tinsel of the global mass media with their parochial attachment, we will fix the results of the “Maidan”

1) Georgia – its “flower garden” and the subsequent aggression in Tskhinval lead to the independence of South Ossetia with Abkhazia, guaranteed by Russian military bases.

2) Armenia – its “flower garden” and the subsequent provocation by the “revolutionary” leadership of the Azerbaijani-Turkish (NATO) aggression lead to the appearance of a Russian military base in Nagorno-Karabakh (officially on the territory of Azerbaijan) and the preservation of the Russian base in Armenia (as the largest American embassy in the world did not try to arrange the opposite).

3) Russia – after another attempt to “rock /roll” the Russian Federation, foreign agents are officially designated in it, sponsors of “coups” in the form of NGOs are cleaned, other “sunset lovers” from the internal “elite” are blocked from financing “protestors/protesters / bulk”, “sleeping” enemies are permanently opened with the subsequent cleaning of the nomenclature apparatus and the power unit.

4) Kyrgyzstan – the cycle of clan-tribal (crony) “Maidans” discredited the very idea of “people’s revolutions” + “Yankee go home” from “Manas”.

5) Belarus – the attempt of the “flower garden” pushes Minsk from the policy of “bagatovektornost” to a close rapprochement with Russia, the cleansing of the pro-Western “elite”, the closure of NGOs, the actual resuscitation of the CSTO and in the future (if the Russian proposal not to extend NATO to the East will be ignored) – to the deployment of the NATO borders of the Russian Aerospace Forces with nuclear weapons (a minute to Warsaw and Vilna, a minute and a half to Berlin).

6) Ukraine – the “flower garden” bought by Sunset for 5 “lard” led to the return of Crimea to Russia and to the gradual return of Donbass, that is, to the reunification of Russian lands and millions of compatriots of “the most divided people in the world”, and Western sanctions for fake “aggression against Ukraine” (with trade, transit and bank loans from the Russian Federation to the Zion-Bandera occupiers of Ukraine) led to the long-awaited (after the failure of 1917) revival of Russian agriculture and Russian industry (after the failure of 1991 ). Ukraine, on the other hand, being ragulized – ruinized to a decayed colony of Sunset, has become a clear anti-example of both Ukrainians and “color revolutions” (for those who are able not to succumb to globalist propaganda).

7) Kazakhstan is a “bronzed old man”, who in his old age picked up Russophobia with a “genocide – holodomor” (as if without the USSR with growth, and not depopulation after the “Maidan”, all these national republics could generally take place surrounded by predatory neighbors) and surrendered the bowels of the Homeland to the Americans, with an obese tribe of corrupt relatives – hangers-on removed from power, another “elite”, sold to TNK with NGOs and NGOs, will be cleaned (with the help of Russian special services).

In the former capital of Kazakhstan, the “Maidan” ruin takes place in a day, not in years – this is the peak of Maydaunism. But the epic “cherry on the Kazakh cake” follows – the order to “bring in troops” against the “color” coup is given by the “little pig” who came to power as a result of a similar “revolution”. And then Pashinyan “reformed”, using the “risen from the ashes” of the CSTO (congratulations to NATO on the revival of the analogue of the Warsaw Pact Organization, where such “bankrupted” countries like Iran are now striving).

This is the aerobatics of Putin’s geopolitics, as a result of which the entire “Maidan circle closes”

Russian troops legitimately appear in Kazakhstan, where, if necessary, they will protect the Russian population from “ethnic cleansing” by radical Islamists, preserve Baikonur, strategic deposits, and the southern “underbelly” of Russia from NATO bases, biological laboratories of the Pentagon and launchers of globalist “democratizers”, protect Kazakhstan itself from pan-Turkist plans of the “Big Turan-Erdogan”, from transnational and even Chinese “business on natives”, from the same pan-Islamist radicals from Afghanistan and other “fun” places.

Kazakhstan is too big and too weak for no one to get it during the period of global confrontation and global “turbulence”. After all, all the “well-wishers” always and everywhere use any “shoals” of the local government, any excuse to tear up and plunder the “delicious” (hydrocarbons, metals, uranium, location, etc.) country. But in Kazakhstan, this “scythe of death” found Putin’s “stone” – and instantly, like a fabulous “Phoenix bird”, but the CSTO really resurrected. The “stars” of NATO, the United States and the whole Sunset are in shock. “Hypersonic” (both in terms of armament and speed of decision-making) Russia, unlike them, exports not coups with chaos, but peace and order.

The post PUTIN BEAT THE WEST USING THE “MAIDAN” first appeared on Global Policy.