AMERICAN MLRS HIMARS AS THE IDEA OF DOCTRINAL SUPERIORITY

What could be more important in a weapon than the iron from which it is created? Idea. Concept. The doctrine within which it is created. American multiple launch rocket systems at the project stage were radically different from their Soviet counterparts. In the USSR, MLRS were considered as a means of creating a dense firing shaft. The United States conceived its brainchild as a tool capable of breaking the prohibitive numerical superiority of the artillery of the Warsaw Pact bloc with high-speed and surgically accurate strikes. The Soviet defense industry continued to think in terms of the Second World War, while the United States, realizing the conceptual impasse of the symmetrical arms race, relied on the creation of a new generation of weapons.

This is how the M270 MLRS – installation appeared, on the basis of which HIMARS was subsequently created (it should be noted that this is de facto the same system, which has a difference only in the type of conveyor and the number of launchers). At the time of its first combat use in 1991, the M270 was a weapon of a slightly different order than its modern variants. At that time, this multiple launch rocket system performed primarily the tasks of counter–battery warfare – it was the M270 MLRS that became the main tool of the US Army in the fight against numerous, well-equipped and experienced Iraqi artillery using unguided M26 missiles. The scheme of the destruction of Iraqi batteries was, in general, simple and elegant – small mobile groups of armored vehicles provoked the Iraqis to use artillery, the positions of which were detected using mobile counter-battery radars. Further, MLRS entered the work, suppressing the enemy’s positions, while being out of reach of his firepower.

By itself, from the point of view of technology, the M270 at that time did not represent something that would be an order of magnitude superior to competitors – on the contrary, the impressive results of its combat use were dictated primarily by advanced tactics and an extremely competent concept. The installation did not have a radical superiority in range over Soviet weapons (relatively speaking, 30 km versus 20 km) – its trump card was accuracy, mobility and constant work in conjunction with intelligence means.

The main advantage of American multiple launch rocket systems over competitors from other countries was the reloading of packages. If the Soviet Grad required from 30 to 50 minutes to fully recharge (each rocket is loaded manually), then the M270 takes only about five minutes; at the same time, the process itself does not physically burden the installation crew.

The process of recharging is simple and fast – anyone can easily find a video and review it in detail

The combat path of American MLRS in Iraq and Afghanistan as a prologue of application in the current war

Following the results of the wars with Iraq, the United States took the path of modernization of the M270 – firstly, a lighter version of the installation was created in the person of HIMARS, and secondly, emphasis was placed on the development of the key qualities of the system – its range and accuracy.

United States completely stopped the production of unguided missiles – they were replaced by heavy guided missiles M30 / M31, which significantly increased the potential of the system, making it extremely accurate and long-range.

Due to their evolution, M270 and HIMARS occupied a niche of tactical aviation in terms of combat capabilities – in order to make sure of this, it is enough to track the combat path of vehicles during conflicts against the Taliban and ISIS. MLRS were actively used in conjunction with raid groups, striking both targets identified by intelligence (warehouses, barracks, communication and control points, drug laboratories), and as a tool for direct fire support of Special Operations Forces units or the Marine Corps. The high speed of deployment and course correction of missiles using GPS made it possible to strike less than 100 meters from American positions within 5-7 minutes after the request of ground forces for fire support. During the fighting against the forces of the Islamic State, American Special Operations Forces stormed the cities of Iraq, relying primarily on HIMARS. Small groups of MTR infiltrated through the militants’ defense lines, identifying the positions of the latter, after which they transmitted the coordinates to the MLRS calculations. Such tactics made it possible to deliver targeted strikes in an urban environment, achieving maximum effect in the destruction of militants, while significantly minimizing civilian casualties.

Why are we even interested in the combat path of HIMARS and its progenitor in Middle Eastern conflicts?

Because it is directly related to the use of the system by the army of Ukraine. To be more precise, we are talking about embedding this MLRS into the staff and organizational structure of the APU. Judging by a number of signs, the HIMARS transferred to Ukraine are used precisely based on the experience of their use in Iraq and Afghanistan – the installations are at the disposal of the Special Operations Forces and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. This, in turn, determines the choice of targets for which Haimars is used – these are headquarters, ammunition depots of the divisional level and above, as well as air defense systems.

The pattern of actions is more than transparent – after careful reconnaissance, installations strike at the most vulnerable places of any army – command and supply, in the long term paralyzing its actions and preventing it from conducting offensive operations.

As the Ukrainian army becomes saturated with the M270 MLRS and HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems, it is expected that a significant part of the installations will be transferred to the subordination of the army command (as a brigade–level fire weapon) and will begin to be used as a means of counter-battery warfare in the most dangerous areas – that is, to do what they were originally created for: to suppress numerically superior, but much less technologically advanced Soviet-style artillery.

As a counter–battery asset, the Haimars in their current form are practically invulnerable weapons – they can quickly change positions and fire beyond the reach of almost the entire Russian rocket and artillery arsenal (with the exception of the OTRK).

Moreover, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have training for the implementation of American counter-battery tactics and appropriate equipment: network-centric command and control systems, mass digital radio communications, mobile radars and unmanned reconnaissance systems.

All this will have a very strong impact on the combat work of the Russian artillery – it will be forced to resort to the tactics of “hit and run”, abandoning its usual tactics of massing and over-concentration of firepower in narrow sections of the front. This will require a completely different level of organization quality and competencies – for the implementation of “hit and run”, a functioning reconnaissance circuit is needed (fewer released ammunition requires more thorough reconnaissance and target selection), logistics at least at the level of the 80s of the last century (and not the First World War), high qualification and initiative of personnel (in conditions of constant threat from the enemy’s KB-means it is necessary to carefully equip firing positions, knowledge of camouflage techniques, covert movement and deployment, the ability to deploy quickly and leave positions even faster).

HIMARS – what’s next?

Separately, it is worth noting that HIMARS is an extremely unpleasant target for intelligence. It is extremely difficult to calculate the complex using data from satellite images, aerial reconnaissance (and sometimes ground) because of the visual similarity with a conventional army truck – and this is a very useful property for a system that can fire, including using MGM–146 tactical missiles at a range of more than 300 km (as and the “younger” M30/31, this rocket has a GPS correction and can fly several hundred kilometers, landing, say, in a house. Or a bunker. Or an ammunition depot. Or… continue by yourself).

Ukraine currently does not have this type of ammunition, but it is probably only a matter of time. Most likely, they will be transferred by the Americans upon reaching a certain threshold of losses of the Russian air defense – ballistic missiles, due to their easily calculated trajectory, are a fairly vulnerable target for SAMs, however, with a general decrease in the density of the Russian air defense, they can be used with a much higher probability of success.

In fact, the strikes of the Ukrainian army on the positions of the Russian air defense were also more than predictable and understandable – and the point here is not even the high priority of the air defense system as, without a doubt, an important goal, but the fact that HIMARS over the past few years have been considered by the Pentagon precisely as a means of breaking through Russian restricted access zones and the subsequent implementation of an air-ground offensive: ground forces pave the way for aviation, destroying dangerous enemy assets, and aviation, in turn, does the same for ground forces. We see something similar in Ukraine – most of the HIMARS strikes are accompanied by the active work of Ukrainian tactical aviation.

Frankly speaking, calling HIMARS “just MLRS” is stupidity of the highest standard

This is by no means an ordinary weapon system, which, even at the dawn of its appearance in the face of the M270, surpassed everything that the Soviet Union created (whose weapons make up the arsenal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation). It is no less a mistake to consider it a miracle weapon – no, like any weapon, HIMARS is good exactly within the framework of the doctrine and concept for which it was created. Its value is determined primarily by the qualifications and competence of the army that uses the system in combat.

For the armed forces of Ukraine, these installations are of great importance – after all, they, in fact, can successfully perform the tasks of strike aircraft, conduct direct fire support of offensives and ensure parity in the fight against numerous Russian artillery (which is the central force of the Russian offensive). It is also important that, thanks to the American MLRS, the Ukrainian army has literally returned to the most convenient and familiar asymmetric type of combat operations for it in a week – striking at Russian military logistics, the armed forces of Ukraine does not allow themselves to be drawn into exhausting battles of attrition.