Evgeniy GILBO

POST-INDUSTRIAL TRANSITION AND WORLD WAR

Lectures on Introduction to Sociology and Geopolitics of Modernity



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LECTURE 1: SOCIAL DESTRUCTION AS A SOURCE OF THE THREAT OF WORLD WAR

The weakening of the control of global elites as a source of the threat of world war

"If you are not interested in the world war, then maybe she is interested in you?" - Lev Davidovich Trotsky, Chairman of the Petrosoviet, once asked rhetorically. Today we live in a situation where the world war is already interested in us.

How will the process of this war develop? Trends are well predictable, while their specific implementation is some kind of accident. I told in my lectures that there are probabilistic processes that take place at the level of ideas, at the level of the field of probabilities. There is a regularity in the deployment of these processes, it is describable, it is predictable. But the implementation of processes in the material world is random. But these are stationary, stable random processes.

In reality, we are dealing with random processes. We can talk about their characteristics and their boundary conditions, about the foundations on which they develop.

Let's discuss the fundamental patterns that underlie the events unfolding today.

The main thing that is happening in the world is changing the technological base. In the twentieth century, we dealt with mechanized production, which underlay **the industrial phase** of the economic formation. In the last 25 years, we have dealt with flexible production lines, which underlay the economy of the period of transition to the post-industrial phase. Now we are facing a situation where the dominance of robotics, the domination of robots, is beginning.



Industrialism

Transition phase

Post-industrialism

In industry, military affairs, and even in household appliances, we are already seeing a transitional situation from automatic machines to robots. So far, we are mainly dealing with automata that are somehow controlled by the operator, but there is already a transition to automata that can make decisions based on the algorithms embedded in them or non-algorithmic decision-making systems embedded in them. From now on, we are slowly entering a situation where robots begin to play a fundamental role in the world in which we live.

The first place where robots begin to show themselves is, as always, the military area. New technology has always shown itself, shows itself and will show itself in the military field.



For example, the XM1216 reconnaissance robot for ground operations.

What social contradictions are formed and accumulated in this situation in the world around us? After all, today we are clearly dealing with such an accumulation of contradictions that the modern world elite, or modern world elites, is unable to cope with.

What are the world's elites doing? What are they used to? They are used to all the problems one way or another to resolve the money. This formed a certain hierarchy of elites, within which the first and basic was the financial elite. The financial elite at the second stage of the industrial formation has grown together with the ideological elite. The financial elite exercised global governance as they could.

In recent decades, financial instruments have begun to weaken as instruments of global governance. First of all, the possibilities for the redistribution of property have weakened. Over the past 30 years, the volume of monetary transactions that are needed to change hands of the same property has increased by about two orders of magnitude. If the redistribution of property worth 1 billion used to require approximately 20-50 billion transactions with fictitious capital, today operations for several trillion in fictitious capital are already needed.

This means that financial instruments have weakened by a factor of about 100. As a result, the financial elite was forced to issue, and is now issuing more and more money in order to solve the problems that have accumulated in society. The lack of other levers, the lack of

understanding of the situation, the lack of tools of modern global governance has led to the fact that the aging elites are unable to cope with the accumulation of contradictions.

A similar situation was 100 years ago, when there was a search for a new management toolkit. Prior to this, power, tradition, class privileges and the ideology corresponding to them were the tools of management. From the last third of the 19th century, it became clear that those people who managed these tools were not able to cope with the management process. The old elites could not cope with the management process, and therefore it became clear that only money is the tool that in the new economic situation is able to provide effective management.

That is why there was a transfer of power into the hands of the financial aristocracy from the hands of the old aristocracy. Part of the old aristocracy managed to degenerate into a financial aristocracy, part was thrown into the dustbin of history. This happened as part of a process of disorganization of government called the First World War. The World War was a consequence of the disorganization of government, a consequence of the inability of the old elites to cope with new challenges.

At the beginning of the last century, there were already states in which, as a result of the processes of the 19th century, a change of elites took place, and power passed into the hands of the financial elite. There were also states where power remained in the hands of the old class elites. The World War turned out to be an acute phase of the process of transfer of power from the estate elites to the financial ones.

On the eve of the First World War, Russia was on the side of the financial aristocracy, but at the same time it was not a country dominated by financial circles, and therefore objectively could not emerge victorious from the First World War. Even her stay in the Entente could not save the old obsolete system. On the other hand, the financial aristocracy in Russia was so weak that it was not able to take power even with the support of external forces. During the First World War, the estate and semi-estate Empires - Russian, Austro-Hungarian, German - collapsed.

In Germany, after the defeat, the transfer of power into the hands of the financial aristocracy began, relying on external forces. There, the process broke down. Forces focused on modernized class-religious methods of government seized power. This led to the Second World War against this very Germany.

In Russia, the financial aristocracy has failed to manage. She was not even able to take power into her own hands after the revolution was made and the old system was abolished. The financial aristocracy simply did not have management tools that would be adequate to the situation in Russia. And then the October Revolution and the civil war happened. The Western financial aristocracy initially supported the Bolsheviks when they became convinced that the Russian financial elite was not capable of governing Russia. After throwing, they relied on the Bolsheviks. This outwardly unnatural cooperation continued for quite a long time, and was interrupted by the Cold War, although even during the Cold War, some relics of this cooperation remained.

Such was the history of the past breakdown and transition to new methods of management. Now we have a situation, and a mirror to that one, and similar to that one. **There is a breakdown in the management of the world by the financial elites.** There is a formation of new elites, post-industrial elites: corporatocracy and netocracy. I'll talk a little later about the models that both classes offer.

The class struggle does not necessarily have to take on armed forms. She accepts them only if a compromise is impossible. Today, objective conditions require the inevitable transfer of power from one class to another. It is about **how** the transfer of power will proceed, the transfer of responsibility from one class to another. But the class that holds power today does not understand this.

As Lycurgus used to say, if the Lord wants to punish someone, he first of all takes away his mind. This is exactly what happened to the old feudal elites at the end of the 19th century. The intellectual level of these elites has gone down. He flew there for a very simple reason.

Using the old tools in the new world was interesting only to those representatives of the feudal class who were stupid enough not to realize the new realities and new management tools. In that part of the aristocracy that was smarter (in England and France there were more smart aristocrats, and the further east, the less), a transition began from the class of feudal rulers, that is, priests and landowners, to the class of financial aristocracy.

The rebirth of the Western <u>aristocracy</u> went on throughout the 19th century. Just as the feudal lords used to rule the peasants, so the financial aristocracy began to rule the bourgeois class, that is, the producing class, and, indirectly, the proletariat class, which the bourgeois class organized. The class of the feudal aristocracy gradually flowed into the class of financial aristocracy, which began to exploit the bourgeois class through a system of financial instruments. By the beginning of the 20th century, they had undergone a complete transformation.

This system of governance formed the basis of the world we saw in the 20th century. During the first half of the 20th century, almost all over the world, all regimes that used more archaic management tools were swept away.

The USSR and the socialist bloc around it were the visible exception in this process. It seemed that there was no financial aristocracy there, and management was carried out by partially modernized archaic methods. There was also a class distinction, although it was carried out very gently. Class differences, in contrast to feudal society, were leveled at the

ideological level, which was a very competent decision. Financial management was effectively complemented by planned management.

We are now being told that there was no financial management in the USSR, that there was a State Planning Commission, a funded supply. But both the State Planning Commission and the funded supply were, in fact, instruments of financial management. The tools are very efficient. So effective that they were studied and implemented in the West. In Asian countries, they were introduced at the level of the state and corporations. In the countries of the Anglo-Saxon world and Europe, these methods were introduced at the corporate level.

In terms of the use of financial management tools, until the end of the 50s, the USSR was a leader in world development. Only later, with the beginning of the general degradation of the USSR, under Khrushchev, did the disintegration of this toolkit begin.



Economics of the era of automation

What is the difference between a post-industrial civilization and an industrial one? In an industrial civilization, a manufacturer replicated something. **The process of replication was the backbone of the economy.** In a post-industrial society, **replication costs nothing,** and each manufacturer creates a product that has novelty and significance on the scale of all mankind.

This is a very important process. In Marxist terms, labor becomes universal. Previously, products of universal value

were produced only by fundamental science. It was outside the dominant economic structure, although it gradually became a direct productive force, fitting into these structures. But she was the top, not the ruling order.

This is clearly seen, for example, in the methodology used by S.Yu. Glazyev. Analyzing the contribution of scientific and technological progress to the creation of new value, the well-known Soviet economist does not take into account scientific and technical progress in his mathematical model as a factor of production equal to labor and capital, but paints it as an appendage to the closed pair "labor-capital", resulting in a gigantic length and complexity formulas worthy of de Broglie's pen. But when the cost of the sample is introduced as an equal factor, an extremely compact, homogeneous and easily analyzed formula is obtained, the study of which is easily carried out by methods of searching for optimal control.

The ideology that forced S.Yu. Glazyev to resort to such a complex and heterogeneous model, reflected the realities of a very specific era, where the production of value was based on the process of replication. Therefore, academic science has traditionally neglected

the cost of an intellectual product and its transformations in economic processes. S.Yu.Glazyev tried to introduce into consideration the new realities of the contemporary economy, trying not to completely destroy the dominant ideology, which gave rise to such a complex mathematical apparatus of his model.

At a later stage, the industrial economy consisted in turning a sample into technology, replicating this technology, mass-producing it, selling it, and bringing it to the consumer. This is the basis of industrial social technologies.

In the post-industrial world, everything is different. Here, each manufacturer creates a fundamentally new product. On the one hand, this product has novelty and significance on the scale of all mankind. On the other hand, there are very few consumers for it, but these consumers use it to influence or spread their interests on a global scale. The issue of replication in this economy is removed by the fact that everyone has automatic means of replication. Those who do not possess today will soon acquire.



Напечатанный в 3D принтере Aston Martin



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If you have a solid laser 3D printer that can work with composite materials, then today you can produce anything without resorting to other manufacturers. This applies to both military equipment and civilian equipment. We see in the near future an economy in which GVCs go into infrastructure, and real money can only be made by creating a globally unique universal good. Money is paid

for samples, designs, modifications. Replication does not bother anyone, sales - too. The dominant economic structure becomes the one that was characteristic of fundamental science in past eras, that is, it was marginal.

All this happens exactly in accordance with Marx's predictions. There are no deviations from the path he has planned. We see with our own eyes the formation of the material and technical base of communism, but what will be built on

this base will turn out to be completely different than what Marx saw in his blissful fantasies.

Marx's economic predictions come true with absolute accuracy, and his blissful fantasies about communism often come true exactly the opposite on absolutely the same technological basis. It includes the action of factors that Marx not only could not foresee, but simply did not want to foresee them, because they were outside the bounds of his ethical ideas.

Correlation between the economic structure and the political organization of society

Society is formed on the basis of those technologies that underlie its economic structure. But the formation of a political superstructure, a form of political organization of this society, is not a direct function of this basis, the structure of the emerging production relations. In reality, we are dealing with a transitional process.

Ideally, this technological order, this structure of productive forces should correspond to adequate production relations, that is, a set of social and humanitarian technologies that



allow these productive forces to be used for the benefit of society and man. They are slowly building up. But the problem of the historical process is whether they have already been legalized or not.

New production relations exist regardless of their legalization. They can be legalized as a result of an evolutionary political process, or they can be legalized as a result of a revolution, as was the

case during the breakdown of the feudal structure and the transition to an industrial one. In the process of these legalizations, through the forms of these legalizations, a new **political superstructure** is being formed.



The political superstructure is never in its pure form the product of production relations. **The economy is multifaceted.** Along with the new way of life, there are also old ways, the only question is **which economic way is dominant.**

In a feudal society, there is both a post-industrial economic structure and a manufacturing, protoindustrial economic structure, but co-natural management is naturally dominant - the direct

exploitation of natural resources: either agriculture or mining. Accordingly, the source of feudal power is the control of a natural resource: land, springs, mines, deposits, and so on. This is a classical feudal society based on a co-natural economy. But if this way of life

dominates, this does not mean that there are no more other ways.

A post-industrial society is a society dominated by a post-industrial economic structure. But this does not mean at all that it is the only way. Next to it, there are also old ways, but at the same time, these ways **are simply no longer dominant.** They are not a source of power, you can no longer make the profit on them that can be a source of power. Nevertheless, these old ways and the classes and layers that have formed in their depths are fighting among themselves. From the struggle of these ways, balancing the interests of different social strata, a political system is formed. It is always transitional.

In the Russian Federation, as a result of the destruction of the industrial system in the 1990s, **the feudal system became dominant.** This mode is typical for an economy in which the source of rent is the exploitation of a natural resource - land, a source, a mineral deposit. The main issue of power is to ensure ownership, control of a natural object - a source of rent.

The industry was partially preserved. Representatives of industrialists are present in power. But the basic order on the basis of which the political superstructure has developed and which determines the nature of power is a purely feudal system. Both industrialists and post-industrial layers pursue their interests through it. Both those and others are forced to act according to the rules of this system.

Both those and others are not satisfied with this system. It is hostile to them because they cannot realize their own interests through this system in an adequate way for their production relations. Therefore, for them, objectively, the task of restructuring this system is on the agenda. To realize this task in peacetime conditions is a long-term task. Perhaps this is through political struggle and squabbles around the administrative resource.

Let's say I want to somehow lobby for my interests, and the feudal lords tell me: we keep the administrative resource, so you have to bend according to the rules of the feudal boy. The representatives of the new forces do not like this. They begin to perceive this political system as hostile. But at the same time, they do not yet have sufficient forces to overturn this system. Therefore, now they are forced to put up with this system.

The same is happening in all other countries. The post-industrial classes are quite strong in the USA. They are extremely hostile to the political system of the financial aristocracy, which leads the dominant economic order. The US political system was once based on the union of the interests of the national bourgeoisie and the financial plutocracy. But in the last 30 years, due to the weakening of the national bourgeoisie, the plutocrats have seriously strengthened, and the new forces no longer fit into this system, and more and more want to overthrow it as a whole. As soon as the national bourgeoisie decides to abandon the plutocrats and enter into an alliance with the intensified post-industrialists, the US political system will be overturned and replaced by something else.

The same picture is in Europe. In Europe, the post-industrial strata use the central Brussels bureaucracy against the national bureaucracies that represent the interests of the declassed industrial strata, the parasitic class.



This is the real political alignment. Theoretically, its transformation is possible, transition into something more acceptable for the post-industrial classes with the help of a political process, through reforms. To do this, a reformer must come from somewhere who would want to carry out these reforms. For example, when the German Empire was formed in the 70s of the 19th century, it was headed by a rather wise emperor, Wilhelm the Great, and his extremely capable and intelligent chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. This bunch had enough political will and understanding of the situation to carry

out the necessary reforms that created a political system that adapted Germany to the era of industrial imperialism. Various forms of state organization were possible in the industrial age. Wilhelm and Bismarck set themselves the task of pursuing an active imperialist policy. They definitely sharpened the system for this, competently reconciling the interests of the classes that made it up.

There are examples of successful reformers and successful reformations in history. There are examples of reformations that were not very successful, but somehow solved the issue. There were situations where the transition was the result of either a revolution or a war. The First World War served as a powerful catalyst for the transition process, primarily in Eastern Europe, where only thanks to it did an active and very successful adaptation of states to the industrial order begin.

Growth of class contradictions in the process of post-industrial transition

Why in the first half of the 20th century did humanity survive a world war that lasted more than 30 years - from 1911 to 1945? What was this <u>World War</u>?

The problem was that the world's elites were unable to agree among themselves on the stable transformation of society under the dominance of new production relations. At that time, Chekhov wrote a very good play, The Cherry Orchard, in which there are representatives of the old feudal class and a representative of the bourgeoisie, who all the time offers compromises in the interests of these representatives of the feudal class. The representative of the feudal class does not understand the realities at all. The lady does not understand that the resources are no longer with her. She treats with contempt the representative of the bourgeoisie. She says no to every attempt by the bourgeois to fit her

into the realities of the new society. As a result, property and power passes into the hands of the bourgeoisie.

It was a soft transition. It took place before the Stolypin reaction. In the process of this reaction, relations of such intolerance have already developed in society that a harsh version of the transition meant the excision of representatives of the old elite and their closest servants. This was accomplished in Russia by the February revolution and the civil war that continued it.

What is happening in the world now? Which elites are going up? Between whom are class contradictions growing today?

The financial elites rule society through the religion of money, which I have spoken about extensively and intensely for 25 years. The religion of money is based on the general belief that money is the universal problem solver, that money solves everything. Within the framework of this belief, people begin to direct all their actions towards taking this money into their hands in order to earn, earn, earn. Because money isn't really a universal problem solver, people can't spend that money efficiently. Therefore, in society there is a system of restriction of money through various kinds of fraudulent projects, tax exemptions, withdrawals associated with lotteries, stock trading, forex and other shiza. The restriction system plus the inflation system - and as a result, an amount of money equal to 20-30% of GDP or more can be injected into society every year.

How is the injection of these money masses? The financial elite emits them, they buy something. Corresponding to the issued amount, 20-30% of GDP, that is, tangible or intangible values produced by society, passes into the hands of the financial class. As a result, this class is enriched by 20% -30% of GDP every year. In 10 years, this is already 2-3 GDP. The redistribution of these resources in their favor is the basis of power in such a society. In fact, the process itself is a little more complicated, I outline it here in a



simplified way for the sake of this presentation.

The global financial elite is issuing the dollar today, as well as all currencies that are pegged to the dollar are pegged through a currency board and other emission control mechanisms. All national banks, say the Bank of Russia, are second-tier banks in the Fed. The Bank of Russia is not an independent bank. It has certain procedures for subjection to Fed regulation. Other national banks are in the same position, with the exception of Europe, where there is a European Central Bank, and the national banks of Europe,

which used to be subordinate to the Fed, are subject to its regulation.

This is, in general terms, the procedure of financial management, **the system of financial power.** Now it has failed for a number of reasons.

Corporations are increasingly learning to do without money emitted by someone. They begin to issue these or those means of payment themselves. They begin to transfer internal settlements to these settlement funds. More precisely, they started this process 20 years ago, and now many corporations have already switched to a system where not money but other signals circulate inside the corporation. Often, even in external economic relations, many corporations settle accounts with the values they themselves emit.

The class that owns and manages corporations - **the Corporatocracy** - is now moving to non-cash mechanisms of internal management, flows go on the basis of pure electronic accounting. And for external payments, it uses the same money. Since she does not use them inside, she accumulates them and uses them outside. Corporations are trying to negotiate among themselves in order to interact not through money, but through funding mechanisms, that is, not to depend here, in mutual settlements, on the financial aristocracy. In communicating with the outside world, you still have to use money, which creates dependence on the financial aristocracy and forms those class contradictions that are the source of the war of the corporatocracy against the financial aristocracy

The trade aristocracy is beginning to behave in the same way - the owners of retail chains, who are increasingly beginning to issue their money, primarily for wholesale settlements, are increasingly beginning to offer their credit cards, that is, they take interest-free, free credit from their customers.

As a result of these processes, the dependence of the corporatocracy and the commercial aristocracy on the financial aristocracy is becoming less and less. The main burden of exploitation by the financial aristocracy falls on the most stupid circles, dependent and others, in which the religion of money still operates. The more the top gets rid of the religion of money that was once imposed on it, the more this religion becomes enslaved at the bottom.



The process of intercepting the levers of control and getting rid of the dependence of new classes on the

financial aristocracy is the content of the class struggle in the process of post-industrial transition.

Basic concepts and definitions

This subsection is introduced in order to briefly give an idea of the sociological model that adequately reflects the realities of today's society. Unfortunately, Marxist dogmas of a hundred years ago are usually broadcast as sociological ideas in our society. Theories that are outside of Marxism are even more inadequate to the prevailing reality.

We live in an era of transition from the industrial phase of the economic social formation to the post-industrial one. This transition means a radical change in production technologies: from human participation in the process of replicating a sample to a complete automation of the replication process. A person in the new economic order remains productive activity only for the production of samples, as well as unique goods and services. This activity is primarily related to the production of a digital and motivational product.

A radical change in production technologies (productive forces) means a radical change in production relations. The new **technological order** dictates a new **social order** and a new system of basic values. The source of power in the new society is not the possession of the means of production, but of unique information resources, structures of connections and human contacts (networks).

Within the framework of new production relations, the main **classes of modern society took shape:**

corporatocracy, whose power rests on the possession of administrative resources in corporations, integral systems of organizing people;

• **post-industrial producers,** whose independence and - when united - the power of which rests on the ability to produce unique information resources and the possession of them;

• **consumer** - the lower class of society, consuming the benefits produced by the ruling classes within the framework defined by the ruling classes;

• **merchant aristocracy,** whose power rests on the control of networks for the promotion of goods to the consumer;

• **netocracy**, whose power is based on the formation and management of network structures of an organization of people.

The social structure of the post-industrial way of society is determined by the dialectical interaction of these classes. The integrating role in this structure is played, competing with each other, by corporatocracy and netocracy. Each of these classes offers its own social model of the organization of society.

The model proposed by the corporatocracy (corporate society) provides for a hierarchical

organization of a pyramid-type society. The model proposed by the netocracy is based on **the relational structure** of the organization of society as a system of network structures. The actual formation of the social structure of society is determined by the ongoing dialectical struggle of these two structural decisions. At present, the corporatocracy model prevails, the promotion of which relies on the resources consolidated by the corporatocracy during the crisis of the industrial model due to their expropriation from the bourgeois classes (capitalists and state bureaucracy).

In the social model proposed by the corporatocracy, the class of post-industrial producers is assigned the role of an exploited class, using modified exploitation technologies inherited from industrial society. The consumer is offered cyberpunk, that is, existence within a framework that limits the level of consumption and creativity.

In the social model proposed by the netocracy, the class of post-industrial producers is offered self-organization and the position of an independent producer, and the consumer is offered forms of self-organization that provide for wider social mobility and the possibility, especially for young people, of social lifts to the class of post-industrial producers.



The main content **of the class struggle** in the emerging post-industrial society lies in the competition of these two models, just as in an industrial society the class struggle was reduced to the competition of capitalist and socialist models of social organization. Under these conditions, netocracy is the vanguard of a coalition of netocracy proper and post-industrial producers, whose possible allies, due to their class interests, may be the consumer and merchant aristocracy. On the other hand, for the consumer and merchant aristocracy is possible if they agree to the position of the lower layers of the hierarchy proposed by this coalition. For a significant part of the consumer, as a parasitic class, such a coalition turns out to be quite attractive due to the exclusion of responsibility.

The transitional era from industrial to post-industrial society is characterized by the competition of two economic structures. At present, we can state the final **collapse of the industrial structure** all over the world, except for the backward East Asian region, and the establishment **of the dominance of the post-industrial structure.** In this regard, there is a retreat and the actual liquidation with the change of generations of the old classes that dominated the industrial society - the bourgeoisie, the financial oligarchy, the bureaucracy, as well as the declassification of **industrial** producers and their transition to the consumer.

The bureaucracy, public servants and employees of subsidized industrial production have today moved into the position of **parasitic classes** of society, having formed a corresponding parasitic psychology and social practice. In Europe, the USA, the CIS, we equally see the degradation of the old structures of public education and health care with the transition of their workers from a productive to a purely parasitic existence.

Public education, not providing the knowledge and skills necessary for life in a modern society, exploits the deceived student with the help of extortion and obtaining budget money for turning the victim into a "qualified consumer", that is, an uncompetitive cyberpunk biomass. Public health care exploits the victim with treatment methods that are incompatible with the cure and the extortion associated with this process. The bureaucracy, as its social base, is engaged in the importation of parasitic and culturally hostile immigrants with their social security at the expense of society. Workers of subsidized industries are actively fighting for the preservation and expansion of subsidies, provoking a financial crisis, as in Greece and Spain, and seizing administrative heights for this, as in the Ural region of the dying Russian Federation.

Similar processes of declassing embrace the bourgeoisie (with the exception of East Asia for the time being). In the CIS countries, where the big bourgeoisie has not developed, and its role is played by nominal owners authorized by the bureaucracy, the behavior of this stratum completely coincides with the parasitic behavior of the decaying bureaucracy.

The process of decomposition of the industrial structure is accompanied by a tough class struggle of the corporatocracy against parasitic classes. The corporatocracy is waging **an antagonistic struggle** to destroy the lumpen-bourgeoisie, the lumpen-bureaucracy, the lumpen-intelligentsia and budgetary parasites on a global scale. The netocracy, the post-industrial producers, and the commercial aristocracy are currently neutral in this struggle.

Another antagonistic contradiction of the era is the confrontation between the merchant aristocracy and finance capital. The content of the class struggle here is the question of the right of trading networks to issue their own money. With the growth of network structures formed by the netocracy, it will inevitably become a strategic ally of the merchant aristocracy in this confrontation.



An inevitable component of the transition process is **the crisis of the welfare state** and the nation state in general, which were based on the social structure of industrial society. The class interests of the bourgeoisie and later the bureaucracy, which gave rise to the main forms of these states, were dictated by the interest in the existence of a mass, responsible and skilled labor force, which, within the framework of universal employment, carried

out the process of replicating patterns. In the modern productive order, when this process is automated, there is no interest in the reproduction of such a labor force among any capable class, which led to the disappearance of the demand for systems of its reproduction by the end of the last century - universal education, health care and social security, as a result of which we see the degradation and curtailment of these structures.

Post-industrial classes are not inclined to finance dying states, seeing this as purely unproductive spending. The corporatocracy itself forms the structures of the power protection of its interests, post-industrial producers do not see an effective protector in the state and are looking for other options for protecting their interests. **The state finally turned into an instrument for the redistribution of resources from producers to parasitic classes.** The producing classes agree to such a redistribution of resources only on their own terms, but in the old states the bureaucracy, that is, the parasitic classes, dictates the terms.

Under these conditions, the transfer of economic activity to less hostile jurisdictions became an instrument for protecting the interests of post-industrial producers. The bureaucracy is fighting this process, using the repressive apparatus and legal tricks, which is **the content of the class struggle** at this stage. There are various forms of this confrontation - from class antagonism, as in Europe, to **class peace**, as in friendly jurisdictions. In the US and <u>CIS countries</u>, we see an intermediate option, when the pressure of the bureaucracy is rather sluggish and generally non-hostile, which opens up opportunities for class peace and cooperation.

The crisis of states within the Western world means their inevitable disappearance in the near future. In real terms, the revenues of the state budgets of the states of Europe for 20 years have decreased by 2-2.5 times, in the USA - by almost 2 times. In the CIS, this happened in a landslide in 1989-1992, and the budget provision per capita today is 4 times lower than it was in the USSR. The budget crisis has not yet affected East Asia, but even there there can be no talk of building and maintaining a social state of the modern era.



Thus states disappear like the Cheshire cat. If today only a smile is left of them, then the smile will soon disappear. In the next decade, we will see an acceleration in the process of phasing out funding for mass health care and education, social security, the reduction of power structures and their privatization. Already, the EU and CIS states cannot maintain armed forces intended for the

external protection of territories and contain, basically, police troops only to suppress protests within their countries. In Europe, only Greece and Turkey have combat-ready contingents, England and France actually fight only with mercenaries and technological troops (aviation, electronic troops). These troops are applicable for special operations, but can no longer guarantee the protection of territories in the event of serious external aggression. The ability of the Russian Federation to maintain the police force today is provided by budgetary filling through the sale of natural resources.

The process of the disappearance of national states, regardless of whether it is stable or catastrophic, puts on the agenda the question of the forms of existence of the existing **national-cultural egregors** in the conditions **of stateless** existence. The only reasonable solution here is the transition to a corporate and meta-corporate existence, when the security of the egregor and its members is ensured by the forces of the national corporatocracy, just as in an industrial state it was provided by the bureaucracy. Naturally, the question arises of the ability of some clans of the existing bureaucratic classes to degenerate into a national corporatocracy, or of folding it on the basis of a national netocracy.

Depending on the solution of this issue by the nations, the very post-national **existence of egregors turns out to be.** For example, despite the fact that half of the Russians have been outside the national state since 1991, the Russian egregor has not yet been able not only to solve, but also consciously raise this issue for himself due to the lack of class self-awareness of almost all classes within the entire hypercommunity.

Since territorial control and external security of territories outside small enclaves of an island or polis type turn out to be technologically and resource-impossible in the new society, a radical change in the geopolitical situation in the world is taking place. The **cyberpunk** space turns out to be vulnerable to the influence of the power structures of corporations (and for the pseudo-feudal entities that will develop there, the Libyan scenario will be a daily threat turning into reality), and the corporations themselves turn out to be based on well-defended enclaves **or chains of enclaves**.

On the other hand, the entire space of cyberpunk turns out to be easy prey for the creeping aggression of industrial states. Their gestures in this matter will be limited only by fears for internal stability during expansion and the danger of post-industrial aggression of corporations destroying these states from the outside. In any case, industrial nations will pour internal instability into cyberpunk territory.

Under these conditions, **the producing classes will be forced to separate themselves** from cyberpunk in post-industrial enclaves. Those egregors that will give rise to national-egregorial metacorporations based on an enclave or a network of enclaves will be able to protect their consumer in the zones of cyberpunk pseudo-feudal formations. In the absence of such protection, this consumer will be assimilated in one generation by other egregorial and global corporations, which will undermine the base of the egregor's producing classes, and they will also be forced to assimilate into other egregors or create a closed enclave and / or an order-type corporation.



Due to the digital and **culture-centric nature of production** in a post-industrial society, the basic basis that determines the unity of egregor and the structure of the market is **language and linguistic affiliation.** Those languages that today unite large masses of people are the main candidates for survival as the basis of markets for post-industrial products. It is clear that in addition to the mass character, the level of development of the language for post-industrial life also plays a role.

From this point of view, the prospects for survival and assimilation of the rest have the following languages (in order of perspective):

- English
- Spanish
- Chinese
- Russian
- Portuguese
- French
- German
- Japanese
- Italian
- Korean
- Turkish (with assimilation of Azerbaijani, etc.)
- Arab
- Polish
- Farsi

Languages whose survival as an egregorial basis is possible:

• Urdu (if the Urdu elite abandons the practice of assimilation into the English-speaking world, which is unlikely)

- Vietnamese
- Thai
- Romanian (if a post-industrial class develops in Romania, which is not yet visible)
- Dutch (if there is a tough policy to protect it)
- Hungarian (because the Hungarians have nowhere to go and can try to survive)
- Greek
- Czech
- Serboh o Rvatsky
- Swedish (for the same reasons as Hungarians)

It can be assumed that the industrial development of the backward peoples of Hindustan and Southeast Asia will also prepare them in the future for the transition to an egregorial existence. Or maybe the pressure of global corporations will lead to their assimilation.



Under these conditions, for almost all peoples of the CIS, the Russian language turns out to be the most important competitive advantage, even in cases where insufficient knowledge of it puts it in the position of "little brothers". The bet on ethnic languages turns out to be futile in the historical perspective. For example, the policy of the Nazi regimes in the Baltics is the disappearance and English-speaking assimilation of the Baltic

peoples in a situation where belonging to a Russian-speaking egregore already today opens up access to more attractive markets. The stake of the Ukrainian Nazis on turning into a dialect of the dialect of the Galician sub-ethnos not only failed, but also put the Galician sub-ethnos itself in front of the inevitable hard assimilation by the Polish egregore instead of a calm existence within the framework of the Russian egregor. Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan face an inevitable choice between assimilation into the Turkic-speaking or Russian-speaking world, and the weakening of the level of Russification in recent decades makes this choice not obvious. For the South Slavs, Russification remains the best choice, while for the Chekhovs, the choice between assimilation by Russians or Germans is still decided in favor of the Germans. In Romania, able-bodied elements prefer assimilation among the four promising Romance-speaking egregors. Whereas for Moldovans, Russification in the historical perspective is inevitable.

Economic And cultural interest national post-industrial producers in the preservation of their own cultural market makes it possible for them to abandon the narrow class approach and alliance with dependent classes in order to preserve, survive, and develop the national egregore. If such class cooperation is implemented on the basis of a national community, the post-industrial elites may refuse their current orientation towards assimilation into the Anglo-Saxon cultural and egregorial environment, which is being imposed today by the policy of the authorities of the CIS countries and the position of parasitic classes. Such a development option is probable, which means that there is hope for the survival of the Russian cultural egregore, its successful overcoming of the post-industrial transformation and taking its rightful place in the world that is emerging in the process of this transformation.

Such, in the most general terms, is the metapolitical situation in the world today. I recommend that you re-read this section several times in order not to get confused in what follows. As V.I. Lenin used to say, without solving general questions for ourselves, we will always rest against them, solving particular ones.

LECTURE 2: RUSSIA IN THE CONTEXT OF POST-INDUSTRIAL TRANSITION

Class struggle in Russia in the geopolitical aspect

What is happening in the world today in the geopolitical context? There are no more industrialized countries, with the exception of Southeast Asia, today. All countries are post-industrial to one degree or another. The rest are divided into countries of the post-industrial core and post-industrial periphery. The corporatocracy takes on the mission of reformatting the post-industrial periphery in accordance with its own interests.

What are the properties of this post-industrial periphery? The main property is the complete subordination of these countries to the financial aristocracy. The elites of these countries, the so-called compradors, work for the financial aristocracy.

How do they work for the financial aristocracy? They work out of phase with how corporatocracy works. If the corporatocracy sits on some kind of resource flow, then it makes this resource flow the base **of its power**. If compradors land on some resource stream, they begin to sell this resource for a currency issued by someone, turning their resource stream into the basis of **someone else's power**. The basis of the power of the one who issues this currency.

As a result, there is a strengthening of the financial aristocracy. She dies more slowly, she has the resources to continue the fight against corporatocracy.

We have seen this situation over the last quarter of a century. When the class struggle called Perestroika was going on in Russia, there were two coalitions of political forces. There was a coalition led by Gorbachev, oriented towards cooperation with the corporatocracy, towards cooperation with progressive world forces. For her there was a high-tech Soviet elite, a technocracy. It was opposed by a coalition of all kinds of reactionary forces, irresponsible party nomenklatura, crime, Nazis of various kinds. This coalition was focused on cooperation with the financial aristocracy. As a result of the well-known battle of 91-93, those forces that were guided by the financial aristocracy won.



According to the Soviet tradition, all the shit is poured on the losing side, blaming it for the consequences of their own actions. In the 50s, those who organized the repressions of the 30s joyfully attributed them to Stalin and Beria, who, according to the documents, were more engaged in rehabilitation than repression.

Today Kurginyan and other brethren are pouring shit on Gorbachev, although it was not Gorbachev who signed the Belovezhskaya Accords, it was not Gorbachev who organized privatization, not Gorbachev arranged Gaidar inflation, it was not Gorbachev who invited Jeffrey Sachs, and it was not Gorbachev who shot the parliament. That this is all slander is understandable, but in a mentally healthy person who has been raped, There are not so many ideological syphilitics - Yeltsinoids - in a society of mentally healthy people. Therefore, this whole gang can continue to lie as much as they like. Only Russia will have to pay for the slander of Gorbachev as dearly as the USSR had to pay for Khrushchev's slander of Stalin.

What would cooperation with the global corporatocracy look like if Gorbachev's policy, more precisely, the "Andropov plan" were victorious? The plans of the progressive group were to turn all ministries, especially high-tech ministries (of course, few people were interested in the textile industry) - and the USSR had many high-tech ministries - into corporations that would be competitive in the world market. These



corporations were supposed to be given the assistance of certain structures of Soviet intelligence so that they could protect their competitive interests in the world market.

The cooperative movement was conceived not to launder money, as the Yeltsinists did, but so that a private initiative could carry out high-tech activities. For the same purpose, TsNTTM was also conceived. There was a focus on the Japanese model, where the main innovations are carried out by small offices, or - as it is now in Israel - a system where small enterprising firms carry out innovations, then give them to corporations. Innovators get resources for further development, corporations get the opportunity to deploy innovations.

The transition to such a model was conceived as part of the transformation that is now called the "Andropov plan". No privatization of the national treasure was envisaged - all shops, light and food industries were subject to privatization in order to transfer to private hands the provision of the population with consumer goods, unloading the state that could not cope with this.

The Gorbachev group staked on the class of post-industrial producers. So that they could get their representation in power, a democratic system of elections to councils was created. It was designed so that post-industrial producers could break into power in the areas where they were in the first place. And then they broke through.

The first convocation of the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, for example, was represented by manufacturers, not parasites. Who was there and how it looked, it is

unrealistic even to imagine for those who see the current Duma in front of them. It was only after Yeltsin's coup in 1993 that parasitic classes began to dominate the Duma, as a result of a change in the electoral system.

Gorbachev could not bring this policy to its logical conclusion due to his weakness as a politician, due to the fragility of the coalition that was around him. If this policy were successful, Russia would make a leap next to which China would be ridiculous today. Russia would be a successful post-industrial country, but China is still industrial, it is only now creeping towards the transition to post-industrial. For 20 years of development within the framework of the post-industrial strategy, Russia would very well break forward.

Even with an extremely gradual and conservative development of new productive forces, there would have been neither the recession of the 1990s nor the stagnation of the 2000s. The GDP of the USSR would have grown steadily by 2005-2007 to a size per capita three times higher than that of the United States today - simply due to the introduction of GPS everywhere in the 1990s, and after 2007 - the transition to the mass introduction of automatic productions. However, in this case, the United States in this case would have had twice or three times higher GDP today, since in this case they would have faced an undoubted crisis in the early 1990s, which would have allowed the corporatocracy to seize power from the financiers and start economic competition on a new basis (or cooperation?) with the USSR. Such a development of events, quite real technologically, turned out to be a fantasy due to the fact that it was against that part of the elite that is rooted in the people, and the people themselves. Gorbachev relied on that part of the elite that was rooted in the party and, especially, in the technocratic system of managing the productive forces.



That part of the elite, which is rooted in the people, was closer to the model offered by the financial aristocracy. The people loved and loves the dollar very much. He believed and believes in him. The people loved to steal. He loves to immediately monetize everything stolen, turn it into a dollar, take it somewhere. At the same time, he likes to call anyone who points out these qualities and their

inefficiency for success a Russophobe. The current Russian elite differs from other fellow citizens only in that it managed to realize what the rest only dream of.

That part of the elite that was rooted in the people and experienced common aspirations won. The elite did what everyone dreamed of. Those who dreamed voted and still regularly vote for those who do it. Appropriate people came forward, and the Yeltsin regime was formed. Yeltsin was the obvious leader of this people. He himself dreamed of stealing, in Aeroflot, stir up with Berezovsky, establish a fund with Abramovich. This was the moral content of a certain religion and personality, but this personality was put forward by the people precisely because the people accepted money and thus decided to stake on the financial aristocracy.

After the defeat of Gorbachev and the collapse of his group, the power still remained in the hands of the supporters of post-industrial, technological development. We could go for the use of force in the mid-90s, force this elite to break with the financial aristocracy and destroy the active compradors by force. This meant betting on their own currency instead of the dollar, and this would entail the emergence of an iron curtain on the other side,



closing the country for 5-7 years, until the corporatocracy gained predominance in the Western world. For the elite, and For the middle strata of the USSR, this would mean that the opportunity to buy real estate abroad, to travel there, would be closed to them from the other side.



To force people to do this, it was necessary to have a significant part of the comprador elite plant or otherwise neutralize, that is, return to Stalinist methods. But then the question arose: where to get new people who would have a different idea of life? There was nowhere to get enough of them. The people would inevitably nominate new adherents of the religion of money.

Our cause was a strategic loser. After the clash

with the compradors in 1993, when the people essentially supported the comprador forces, the elite that guided on post-industrial transition, after elaboration of all possible scenarios in 1994-1995, was forced to admit that its goals could not be realized within the framework of a normal political process, without confrontation with the majority of the people. It was decided to accept the choice of the people and leave.

In the 1990s, Russia chose the path of betting on cooperation with a dying class, on cooperation with the financial aristocracy. Russia in 1991-1995 chose the complete subordination of the religion of money. Now the whole of Russia with all its resources is the base of the financial aristocracy.

In 2000-2012 alone, 800 billion dollars were exported from Russia to the United States by

government agencies (invested by the regime in US IOUs) and 2,500 billion dollars by private compradors (invested in various instruments of fictitious capital without acquiring material resources). Because of this, the financial aristocracy received huge resources. Having received Russia as its base, it was able to counterattack the new rising classes, primarily the corporatocracy, and delay the process of post-industrial transition, delay technical development.

In the US, this led to a very strong crisis, because the financial aristocracy was able to achieve an expansion of its social base, that is, the parasitic classes. The corporatocracy finds itself in conditions where it is forced to fight against the American state. The procedures of power there are such that they rely only on a broad social base. And a broad social base was created precisely by the reactionary classes, that is, the financial aristocracy, in their own interests. Reactionary classes (wellfer class and other classes) have been formed that live off the budget, through the process of financial redistribution from a working person to a dependent (in a normal society), or a parasite (in a modern society).

For corporatocracy, the obvious problem is that a rather broad base of parasitic classes has developed, and it has developed, first of all, at the expense of Russia, due to the choice of Russia, due to the fact that Russia decided to throw all its resources into the scales of world reaction, into the scales of weights of the outgoing class, and thereby delay the post-industrial transition.

The global corporatocracy is not very grateful to Russia, the Russian elite and the Russian people, who made this choice in 1991-93. If the coalition with the world corporatocracy, to which Gorbachev led, took place, then the global process of post-industrial transition could well have occurred peacefully. The process was possible on the basis of class compromise, class cooperation and the gradual transfer of power from corporatocracy to new classes, to new forms of organization of a corporate society, a network society, etc. All this was ruined precisely by this decision of the Yeltsinoids to throw all the power of the resources accumulated by the USSR to support the world financial aristocracy.

As a result of this betrayal, the corporatocracy is not disposed towards Russia. **Rightly considering Russia the main base of the reaction, today the corporatocracy is interested in destroying this base.** This does not come from dislike for the Russian people, as the Kurginians hired to confuse the essence of the issue lie, but from the understanding that without the destruction of Russia, the resource base of the financial aristocracy, the final victory of the corporatocracy as the ruling class on a global scale, and even on the scale of only the West, is impossible today. The financial aristocracy is a global class, and today it relies on Russia to the same extent as the corporatocracy on China.

Declassing industrial classes

Today we are witnessing the unfolding of the process of forceful demolition of those states that are based on old financial technologies, on the dominance of the financial aristocracy and its social support - the declassed elements of the post-industrial society that arose as a result of the degradation of the classes of the industrial society.

What are these elements? First of all, this is a declassed bureaucracy. In an industrial society, the bureaucracy was engaged in management processes, the redistribution of financial flows. The declassification of the bureaucracy occurred when the purpose of management disappeared.

The bureaucracy in an industrial society had a clear function - it ensured the process of formation of a mass responsible and skilled workforce. It managed the social processes that created this workforce: education, welfare, health care, prevention, cultural development, and so on. The bureaucracy knew what to do, it was a progressive class.

But in the world of automated (and now the era of automatic) production, there is no need for a mass responsible and skilled workforce. As a result, the bureaucracy is declassed,



it has no purpose of activity, it does not know what to use the levers of control for.

Bureaucrats are accustomed to organizing education for specific purposes. But now these goals are objectively unnecessary, and there are no other goals, because the industrial system of education is not needed at all by the new society. What does the bureaucracy do? She rightly treats the business she is engaged in as nonsense. Bureaucrats see that the only meaningful activity is

cutting.

Previously, sawing was an accompanying process. In the Soviet Union, there was also a cut, but it did not interfere with normal driving, because there were normal guidelines. When there are no normal guidelines, there are no normal classes - only the cut remains. This infuriates everyone. But we must not be indignant, but realize that sawing is not a moral, but an objectively economically conditioned activity. AND the scope of this activity is growing not only in Russia, but also in all countries where the process of declassification is underway.

The same is happening with the working class. The working class is not needed in a world where everything is done by machines, and specific people need some source of income. They are forced to work in outdated factories. Since these factories are not competitive, the workers are demanding subsidies in order to be paid wages. The workers thus became state employees. As a result, we got one more purely parasitic class.

The same thing happens with the intelligentsia, that is, with budget workers who carried out the processes of forming the labor force in an industrial society. They also declassified. If a teacher half a century ago had a clear and specific mission of turning a blockhead into a conscious and productive person, now education is required to form qualified consumers. And for this, nothing needs to be taught, the student and so the consumer.



the budget.

It becomes less and less clear why this system exists school education. going on declassing those people who work in it. They realize (some more, some less) the uselessness of what they are doing. But they understand that they need this imitation in order to be paid some money. Therefore, they do their best to support those who now pay them this money, that is, they are on

If someone comes along who thinks sensibly, the workers of the degenerated Soviet education system will simply be put on unemployment benefits. It can be in the same amount as the current salary, just don't pretend that you are a teacher - nobody really needs you. What you are doing is not useful, it does not bring new value, it only brings harm. Objectively, the activity of a modern teacher brings a negative value, because a child leaves the current school worse than if he had no school at all.

The state doctor also does not bring any benefit. It only brings harm. It has nothing to do with his personal or professional qualities. This is a consequence of the social conditions in which a public health worker is placed.

Normal medicine is organized in addition to the budget. They are being treated there.



Budget medicine only devours resources and destroys the health of the nation. A public health doctor, regardless of individual qualifications, is a declassed element. Outside the system, it could bring undoubted benefits, that is, produce new value in the form of an increase in life and creativity. patients' abilities. But within the framework of the system, he **is forced** to

perform procedures to extort the victim of the system of last money and destroy it by the execution of a technique that prohibits treating more than one disease at the same time.

Today, all these declassed, lumpenized elements are united in a parasitic class headed by a financial aristocracy. These are the forces of modern reaction. Organized, active and extremely aggressive reactions, looking for their lost place in a new life. As the leader of the lumpen intelligentsia S.E. Kurginyan, "give us the metaphysical meaning of life». But **the disappearance of meaning and a sense of the fullness of life among the lumpen intelligentsia is a consequence of the objective fact of lumpenization** due to changes in the structure of the economy and society.

Historical optimism is the property of the progressive producing classes, who create new value, and do not fight for budget handouts of parasites. It is quite possible for each **specific person to move** from the lumpen declassed state to the class of post-industrial producers, but there is no desire to preserve one's lumpen state and at the same time find the meaning of the existence of the future. Kurginyan can support this illusion among his adherents for some time, proposing to integrate the imitation of activities meaningful in the last century into the imitation of a socialist society meaningful in the last century, but this path is doomed, since its resource base is inevitably shrinking - a budgetary form of exploitation of new producing classes in favor of the lumpen.



Progressive forces seek and fail to find an opportunity to negotiate with the lumpen about their peaceful transformation into the consumer class. The problem here is the configuration class union financial aristocracy + lumpenbureaucracy + lumpenparasite underlying the global world reaction. The ideology of the reaction is the concept of perverted democracy (ochlocracy), according to which the disposal of the property and financial resources of the producing classes must be carried out by decisions of the majority and their elected representatives. Since the lumpen make up such a majority, they elect representatives of their interests to the state power, which expropriates the product of labor of the producing classes of the post-industrial society (post-industrial producer, netocracy and partially corporatocracy) for subsequent distribution among themselves.

Thus, instead of the class of dependents (**leisure class**), which is **objectively necessary** for the post-industrial economy, and which the producing classes would provide with the resources necessary for a full-fledged life, in the reactionary state there exists and rules the ball a parasitic class that not only lives at the expense of producers, but also regulates production activity.

This regulation ignores the objective interests of producers and the progressive relations of production that have actually taken shape on the basis of modern productive forces. An inevitable contradiction arises between the nature of the productive forces, the economic basis of society, and the political superstructure. As a result of this contradiction, the actual production of new value today is only 3-20% of what is allowed by the existing level of development of the productive forces.



Is there a possibility of a peaceful transformation of parasitic classes into consumerism and the exclusion of their suffocating influence on the productive forces? Theoretically exists.

For example, if the Russian Federation were a nation state, and there would be no external control, there would be an opportunity to agree between representatives of the post-industrial and parasitic classes on the transition to new management tools. This would lead to the transformation of the parasitic class into a dependent class, that is, into a class that does not have a negative impact.

Dependents differ from parasites in that they consume resources but **do not negatively focus on production processes.** As a result of their activities, negative value is not created in society. Parasitic classes not only consume resources, but also produce a negative cost to the economy as a whole. Today, this applies to the bureaucracy, and to factories, and to lumpen teachers, and to public sector doctors, and other declassed elements of the

electorate.

The process of eliminating parasites from the processes of economic regulation within 3-5 years would lead to a 4-8-fold increase in the country's GDP only on the existing technological base. In reality, 3-4% of the population is now producing added value in Russia, that is, there are 25-35 consumers of all types of subsidies per 1 worker. This is not a problem. 2% -10% of the producing class with 90% -98% of dependents is the norm for a post-industrial economy. The same is true in other countries today. Statistics do not fully reflect this fact only because they use units that are outdated from the last century (for example, they include workers from subsidized industries among producers), and therefore give an erroneous figure that 10% in Russia is engaged in productive activities.

The exclusion of the influence of parasites on the regulation of the economy (that is, the introduction of the rule that only those who contribute more money to the budget than they receive subsidies from there have active voting rights) could be conditioned by the obligation of the producing classes to provide the dependents with the current level of provision of benefits with further growth. As an experiment conducted by the corporatocracy in Georgia, one of the most impoverished, corrupt and poorly educated CIS countries, showed, only a change in tax policy and the elimination of bureaucratic economic regulation bodies led to an increase in budget revenues in the first year by 3 times instead of the planned growth of 20%. Over the course of several years, the amount of funds allocated to provide for dependents has increased several times, as well as their standard of living. All this took place against the backdrop of a government that was far from being the most intelligent, which arranged failure after failure in foreign and domestic policy, but, on the other hand, was removed from interfering in the economy.

With the introduction of similar (and preferably more thoughtful and effective) measures across Russia, one could count on an 8-fold increase in GDP in 5 years, an increase in deductions to the budget for the maintenance of the lumpen classes and cut them into the most respected, authoritative and prominent representatives of the lumpen - 5-6 times.

Why are the productive classes in Russia today unable to come to an agreement with the authorities? Because the authorities are entirely tied to their activities to support the global financial aristocracy, to sell Russia's resources for currencies issued by the global financial authorities and, thus, ensure their emission. If this situation changed in Russia, class cooperation would become possible.

What is the likelihood of such cooperation?

The basis of the Russian regime is made up of two clan-classes: the clan of security forces and the clan of pure compradors. This is a generally accepted, but not entirely correct classification, because within the clans there are still quite closed and serious consortia with their own interests. In reality, there are more of these independent clans. A simplified genesis scheme claims that the security forces go back to the personnel of the Second Main Directorate of the KGB, and the compradors - to the First. In fact, the genesis goes back to broader coalitions, but such an approximation is somewhat applicable to the first approximation when presenting the situation to the general public.

Due to this genesis, there are contradictions between competing groups. There is a very serious competition between them. On the other hand, both ruling clan-classes are equally tied to the processes of providing the world financial aristocracy with resources. Therefore, both inevitably find themselves in opposition to the corporatocracy.

It is likely that some of these clans will bet on the corporatocracy, rely on its resources and start reformatting the regime in Russia in order to pull it out of subordination to the financial aristocracy. This is the first possible option. The second option is even more likely: they will all continue to go with the flow, remain in the positions of the financial aristocracy, and they will be beaten, wetted, wetted and wetted.

Reformatting the world by corporatocracy



We see that the essence of the crisis of the modern social structure is that parasites prevent the production of new value. This is happening on a global scale. Today, corporatocracy, netocracy, as well as post-industrial producers who are not aware of themselves, but are looking for something, find themselves in the deepest class contradictions with parasitic classes. The

level **of class self-consciousness** does not yet allow us to assess the essence of these contradictions, which makes the class struggle unconscious, furious, and strategically ill-conceived.

This happens in all countries. Post-social states based on parasitic classes, which will be incapable of planned transformation into post-industrial forms, will inevitably be destroyed. If transformations are impossible due to some agreements, payments compensations, some transient processes, then their destruction will take place by force.

We have seen how the corporatocracy, with the advent of this decade, showed its teeth. She showed how she would use certain forceful methods to demolish this or that regime. So far, we have seen this in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and so on.

Why was the Arab world chosen? Because the level of corruption and the level of subordination of these countries to the financial aristocracy is outrageous. In fact, these

countries were completely under the financial aristocracy, it was necessary to kick out this resource base from under it. A typical example is Gaddafi, who managed 12-15 years ago to negotiate with the financial aristocracy on "Russian" terms. That is, that all the resources of Libya will be sold for the currency issued by the global financial authorities and will be the backing of this currency. He honestly worked out his "Washington Consensus" - and got what he deserved. As it turned out, the financial aristocracy could not protect him.



We see the unfolding of the war in Syria. Those Arab regimes that are affiliated with the corporatocracy are actively fighting against the Libyan regime. The financial aristocracy is not able to provide this regime with active assistance and throws consumables into the furnace -Russian compradors.

The Syrian regime was not tied directly to the financial aristocracy itself. He was tied more to trade and financial circles, and through them - indirectly - to the financial aristocracy. The financial aristocracy rather sluggishly supports the Syrian regime, mainly this support was hung on country, which is not a pity. Today, the only one who supports Syria is Russia.

Syria today is just a testing ground for developing technologies to loosen the situation in countries that are governed in the old way, that is, through money. In Russia, where there are no other instruments of governance, not only in the state, but also in society, it is very easy to stir up the situation. But today, not only corporatocracy is playing against Russia. A coalition of all forces is being formed against Russia, which are interested in the speedy weakening and defeat of the financial aristocracy and the removal of those brakes that exist for the world's post-industrial development.

Russia in its current form lies on the path of postindustrial development like a brake, a huge deck, a big rock. The financial aristocracy leaned on it, and only together with this rock can the financiers be moved. Therefore, there is a desire to blow up such a rock. For this, the tools of Islamic fundamentalism are used today.



The paradox is that both hostile forces use the same

social institutions as their tools. The financial aristocracy, on the one hand, develops parasitism in society, and on the other hand, it catches up with a large number of guest workers so that this culturally alien element decomposes society and prevents it from consolidating against the financial aristocracy and the compradors who serve it. On the other hand, corporatocracy uses the same alien element to form power consortia within it, which could fundamentally destabilize the situation, destabilize the state. For example, within the framework of the Muslim diasporas in Moscow, which seem to be the backbone of the regime, a huge number of power groups are already being formed, which in one way or another will be engaged in destabilization.

They have a somewhat different function than the power groups that were formed in the 90s and that formed the current regime. These groups, Caucasians first of all, had the goal of control, interception of control over trade resources, financial flows. To control these flows, to globally turn these flows into dollar collateral.

The new groups face the task of only destabilizing the state, its liquidation. They are faced with the task of eliminating the system that turns Russia's resources into the base of the world's financial aristocracy. For this, this hour partisan groups are formed, they slowly come into action, grope for each other, form coalitions.

Today's Russia in the context of reformatting the world



The situation in Russia is subject to all communities patterns post-industrial transition. It is difficult to talk about some kind of lag in this transition, although the processes characteristic of countries post-industrial core, are combined in the CIS countries with processes characteristic of the periphery zone. The catastrophic collapse of the social state in 1992-1996, which was ahead of the rest of the world, can be considered as some specificity,

but in the future we see a general trend of degradation. Belonging to the periphery is also determined by the comprador character of both the ruling bureaucracy and the bourgeois bureaucracy. A sign of the periphery is the lag in the formation of the class of post-industrial producers, although the potential for its formation brings Russia closer to the countries of the core (by Russia here, of course, we mean not Half-Russia-Russian Federation, but the Russian egregor in general).

A feature of Russia is the orientation of the economy towards the exploitation of natural resources. After the patriotic coalition organized by Boldyrev, Sokolov and Karmokov in 1994 legally blocked the transfer of oil and gas fields into the hands of foreign companies, it became possible to partially withdraw oil and gas rent to the budget, which was implemented in 2000-2003. Since then, this part of the oil and gas rent has been the main

source of life resources of the parasitic classes, which makes possible their **peaceful coexistence and class cooperation** with the post-industrial classes, as it creates an alternative for them to attempts to rob the productive classes and the antagonism they attract.



On the other hand, the situation in the Russian Federation today is characterized by a sharp surge in social contradictions caused by **the political mistakes** of the current government, unable to see the real class alignment in society. These social contradictions are actively used by the global corporatocracy in order to accelerate the collapse of the state and complicate the conditions for the transition of the Russian egregor from a national-state to a meta-

corporate organization, and in the program, the maximum is to disrupt this transition with the subsequent disappearance of the Russian egregor in the next generation due to assimilation and partial extermination.

Analysis of trends (collapse of the controlled resource base) shows a high probability of the disappearance of the Russian Federation as a territorial state of the classical (Westphalian) type by 2017-2020. Because of this, the issue of egregorial transition has been acute for Russians already in the current decade.

The experience of Russian survival after the collapse of feudal statehood in 1917 shows that **the only condition for the survival of the nation was reliance on a progressive historical class** (international, by the way, in essence, but nationally rooted). Moreover, by 1917 this class existed only in its infancy, and even then only in the capitals, in the Donbass and the Urals. At the same time, up to 40% of the population of this class were ethnic Chinese and other foreigners, which did not prevent the class as a whole from playing a state-forming role, with the subsequent evolution of the state in the 30s-40s from a proletarian state to a national one.

It should be noted that the formation of the state of industrial producers on the ruins of the Russian Empire, relying on the newly emerging progressive class, was considered by the world political establishment as a not very clear adventure. The ideologist of the process, V.I. Lenin set the task of forming and educating this class by the party-order, which, incidentally, was engaged in educating the class in the previous decade. With the external adventurism of such a strategy, it was successful due to the absence of external threats in 1923-1935, which gave time for the formation of a class and the beginning of industrialization, and due to external assistance in industrialization.

The engine of the process of establishing a new, industrial, state was the bureaucracy, organized into a party-order of globalist orientation. The final formalization of the state, however, took place only in 1935-1939, and its transformation into a national industrial state of Russians took place in 1942-48, followed by a transition to the welfare state model.

For all the adventurous nature of this project, it turned out to be **the only possible** way for the Russians to survive in the conditions of the natural collapse of the imperial state in February 1917.

Today we see a complete repetition of the situation of a hundred years ago at a new, higher level. The historical regularity attracts the bourgeois-democratic state of the Russian Federation to the inevitable collapse in the conditions of the change of historical formations. The form **of decomposition** of this state is a conspiracy of a part of the elites in alliance with the world corporatocracy against the autocratic part of the elites, as was the case in 1917, when the conspiracy of the highest generals and the feudal elite in alliance with the world financial oligarchy led to the liquidation and disintegration of the Russian Empire. The release of a false manifesto about the renunciation of the discredited Emperor, captured by the generals and the highest dignitaries of the Empire, was only a formalization of the collapse.

The main issue of designing the future today is to, without waiting for the collapse of the state, to carry out **the formation and education of a progressive historical class** of post-industrial producers who could take on the mission of forming a post-state form of existence of the Russian egregore by the time when historical development brings Russians face to face before this call. There can be no question of waiting for the natural formation of this class, which today is only in its infancy, since the natural time frame of this process goes beyond the existence of traditional statehood, so that its "natural" formation runs the risk of being completed already within the framework of other egregors after the disappearance of the Russian.
LECTURE 3: BUSINESS IN THE ERA OF REINDUSTRIALIZATION

reindustrialization

Previous lectures we talked about global issues - social change, geopolitics and the fate of peoples. Despite the importance of this topic, I still want to understand what specific recommendations regarding the choice of business strategy follow from the trends we discussed? What business seems to be the most promising at the present stage, WHAT is happening in the world economy now? What processes should you sit on, and in which processes can you achieve maximum success?

When I wrote the course "Business" for SHAL 12 years ago, I did excursions there into various kinds of reengineering and other aspects of technical civilization, I talked a lot about production automation. But in practice, when it came to what kind of business to do **in the last twelve years**, I always talked about the need to act in the field of information technology. The information business, the club business, the business associated with humanitarian issues, public relations were the most effective, most promising, most influential and profitable in the era ending today. This is exactly what I have been saying until recently, because this era is only ending now. It is today that we are finally entering the moment when those main directions, which I, when outlining, once spoke about in the Business course, are beginning to be implemented. Then they were still the obvious future, but the future. Today they are real.

What is a new stage in the development of the post-industrial economy? To designate it, such a term has recently developed - **reindustrialization.** The term is not entirely correct, because it is internally contradictory in form: the economy today is post-industrial, we have moved into some form of economy that is "after the industry", and suddenly now we are saying that we will again be engaged in the construction of the industry. What it is? Industry after industry? Something like life after death? Or sex after death, as the talks on the merger between Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces were once called? The terminology is not very good, but so far there is no other.

What is called reindustrialization?

Previously, the industry was built on the industrial paradigm. This is the paradigm of mechanization of production, and partial automation of production. An industrial facility, industrial production is a set of people who, with the help of machines, carry out the production of goods. The person was engaged in production processes in the implementation **of operational** management.

This is the main symptom of the industrial phase in the industry. The operator, the worker was engaged in the operational management of equipment, **operational support of the production process.** Therefore, a lot of people were needed, they were **directly** involved

in the process of replication - this was the essence of the industrial paradigm.

The post-industrial paradigm of production is that a person is excluded from the process of operational support of production. He is engaged only in strategic management and maintenance of production. This is called the "post-industrial paradigm of the industry».



For the first time it all arose in the last century. It cannot be said that only now we have come to the technical feasibility of implementing this. For the first time, flexible production systems (FMS) appeared already in the 80s. At that time, three cities were the leaders in this direction: Leningrad, Tokyo and Osaka. They took the first positions in the creation of the GPS. The technical possibility for the so-called reindustrialization was then created.

But this is a technical possibility. As it turned out, humanity was not ready for this socially, in terms of social processes, in terms of the structure of society. Society was not ready to accept the automated industry. In some corners where this could be done, or where some kind of experimental sites were created for this, or where society was falling apart so much that you could do whatever you wanted - in such places such experimental the hotspots where these flexible production systems worked. The work experience was quite large, I relied on it - if you remember - 10-12 years ago, when I talked about the work of the State Fire Service.



For example, this GPS produces 100 bags per 125 rproduct per minute.

The real social conditions for this process to proceed based on new technology have developed only now, and have developed in only one country: the leading country in the world post-industrial development, the United States. In order for this new industrial paradigm to operate en masse, in order for new production complexes to be formed on new foundations, the old industry had to be completely destroyed, eliminated as a competitor.

The technical possibility of the transition appeared 30 years ago, but all these 30 years the overwhelming mass of the old industry with its paradigm, with its view of things, with its inertia did not allow building a new industry. I am already silent about the factors connected with the crisis of industrialism, the formation of parasitic classes and a parasitic social order.

A 30-year process, when the old industry cannot satisfy the needs of society to the required extent, and the new industry is not allowed to break through - this was the process of **decay industrial society.** Thanks to to that what reactionary classes got huge resources as gift from post-Soviet nomenklatura, they were able to prolong this process of decay for so long.

However, today the old industry in the United States is dead. The US economy is open, and therefore, despite all protectionist measures, it cannot compete with Chinese industry, which was deliberately created by the world corporatocracy as a gravedigger of the old American industry.

Now the site has been cleared, and legislation more and more suitable for reindustrialization is being formed. The market shows demand for products of reindustrialization. Products in the new paradigm of established industries turn out to be significantly cheaper, significantly higher quality, and - what is important - these are products of a qualitatively new level. Now we are on the verge of transition to this modern production paradigm.

Reindustrial competition

We will see the reindustrialization of the United States in the next 12 years. What does this mean? We will see the construction from scratch of a completely new industry, fully automated and very high-performance. Over the next 12 years, it will simply force out external competitors from the American market. The Chinese, Japanese, and Europeans will lose out more and more in the competition because they will be several years behind the United States in the process of building industry on new foundations.

It will look about the same as the consequences of American superiority in information technology looked 12 years ago. At the end of the 20th century, Americans made a huge breakthrough in information technology, primarily in sales technologies due to the competent use of the Internet. Labor productivity in the field of sales exceeded the European one at times. Therefore, when the euro was introduced in the 2000s, it fell very quickly. For the euro then they gave 80 American cents. I wrote then that in purchasing power parity the dollar was overvalued by about half and predicted that as soon as the Europeans caught up with the Americans in sales technologies, the euro would cost not 80 cents, but 160.

In the next 7-8 years, the Europeans struggled to catch up with the Americans in the field of sales. Caught up. And we really saw 160 cents per euro at the peak of this process. Then there was competition in other areas, other factors began to influence the course. But in the first decade of the 21st century, the main fundamental process behind the market that I talked about in 1999 was this process of closing the sales technology gap.

Now we are at the beginning of a new push, and again the United States is in a better position because they have largely eliminated the old industry and its lobbies. They can start the process of reindustrialization.

This process is starting. I'm not saying "it will start" - it's already starting today, it's taking place. Now in the United States begins the boom of new industrial production. Producing, producing, producing, this will be the magistrate of the development of the United States in the coming decade.

Who can now compete with the United States in terms of the nature of the economy? It could be Singapore, it could be Hong Kong, where conditions for reindustrialization are even better. But since the size of the United States and both of these cities is incomparable - in America there are a dime a dozen such cities - they are better viewed as some kind of branches of the American economy in Asia, and not as independent competitors.

All other countries do not have such an opportunity to rapidly reindustrialize. The Japanese, Russia, Europeans have the same burden hanging around their necks in the form of a parasitic state, parasitic social strata and procedures for the formation of power tailored

to their interests. The second problem is the presence of the old industry, which has its own lobbyists and which, through the state mechanism, does its best to hinder progress. But "with all her might" does not mean that she can totally obstruct. If someone wants to engage in reindustrialization in Russia, for example, or in Europe, he may well build modern automated production, fit it into society, and sell the product. Many are already doing it. It's not as easy as in America, but in general, doing business in these countries is not as easy as in America. Therefore, it is not possible to call these obstacles insurmountable.

However, there are lobbying groups and they stand in the way of progress. In Russia, the military-industrial complex plays this role today. You know that 20 years ago I not only called the military-industrial complex the most progressive force in Russia, the base of Russian technocracy. I actively lobbied for the interests of the military-industrial complex at that time. But since then, historical conditions have changed, and today the Russian military-industrial complex has become a lobby for the interests of an old, dying industry.

This gives rise to extreme inconsistency in the positions of the military-industrial complex. On the one hand, the top of this clan and Rogozin himself are very well aware of the need for technical innovation, the need to create new technology, the need to promote new technology, the need to create new weapons. But they do not understand (they sincerely understand, sincerely, and not only because there are certain interests behind it) that a completely different industry, a completely different tool is needed for the production of this new technology. They hope to solve the problem with the tool that they have today - the military-industrial complex of the last century, the tool of industrial civilization. "After all, they produced good planes under Tupolev. Maybe we'll stamp it now." This is the deepest delusion. It lies at the heart of the collapse that awaits the so-called "Rearmament Program".

We are in a situation where **the most promising direction is the organization of commodity production on a new, post-industrial basis** - on the basis of modern flexible technologies, GPS and more modern tools. Today, the ability to produce in small batches is important, because the equipment is very easily adjusted to the specific requirements of customers and sharpened to their interests. Car tuning can already be carried out today in the process of ordering it. This is the current level, in the future there will be a choice of orders of magnitude more options, and up to the point that it will be possible to take part in the design.

The process of involving a client in the design of a car was introduced by the leaders of the post-industrial automobile industry long ago. By leaders, I mean Porsche, of course. When you order a car there, you can change the shape of the body in a very wide range, you can change any characteristics of the engine, and anything. I am not a great specialist in

motoring, so such subtleties are of little interest to me, but there are people who order all this for themselves. This is used by all sorts of petty tyrants who order a car for themselves to match the color of nail polish. This will be possible in any area in the near future.



The first 3D printed racing car reached a speed of 140 km/h. Acceleration from 0 to 100 km / h - in 4 seconds.

Now the main money will be made in the production of goods, for which the material part is not as important as its ideological part. Business in the field of this material, high-tech production is the magistrate of today's technological progress and today's economic progress.

Engineering education in the era of reindustrialization

How to succeed in today's reality? For the generation that enters life in the next decade, which is now 12-20, it is important to have an engineering education. Without it, they are doomed to the periphery of public life. It's time for people with engineering education.

What do I mean by engineering education? Of course, not what was meant by engineering education in the USSR. The Soviet engineer was the subject of jokes for one simple reason: engineers in the Soviet Union were not called engineers as such, but advanced technicians, technical workers, engineers, people who were engaged in the operational support of the production process. If we move from Soviet classifications to sociological ones, they represented the top of the working class, the top of the most qualified, but no more.

These were the most highly skilled workers, the vanguard of the working class at that time. If the process of post-industrialization had proceeded normally in the USSR, then this vanguard of the working class would have become the natural vanguard of the transition, would have led the transition to the post-industrial system. But since the party apparatus of the CPSU since the time of Khrushchev made a bet not on the vanguard, but on the

rearguard of the working class, this layer turned out to be in opposition to the regime. And when the post-industrial transition was thwarted by the actions of the Yeltsin-party mafia, this layer was simply written off as shit, and that was the end of the matter.

Calling this layer engineers is rather difficult, because engineering is a creative activity. An engineer is a person who designs, materializes an idea. There is some idea. An engineer details it, forms the process of fitting it into material reality.

The actual number of engineers has always been small. There were at most twice as many engineers as such in Soviet times than in the 13th year in the Russian Empire. As for all the other gentlemen with degrees in engineering, it was about the same as now gentlemen with a degree in law, a degree in economics and other certificates of onanists.

When I talk about the importance of engineering education, I'm talking about **actually** engineering education. About education, which gives the ability to form, develop and implement technological processes. Any successful, highly profitable business in the coming decade will be associated with the implementation of the technological process. Anyone who knows how to design and implement a technological process will be the main specialist of this society.

To establish business processes in such an economy, you need to understand very well the technological processes that lie under these business processes. Social design in this society will be inseparable from engineering design.

For the last 12 years of the 20th century, we lived in the era of monetarism. To design social processes, it was necessary to understand the essence of financial processes. For the first 12 years of the 21st century, we lived in the era of humanitarian technology. To design social processes, one had to be a PR man, one had to understand humanitarian technologies. In the era of reindustrialization and engineering, in order to design social processes, business processes, whatever processes, you need to be an engineer. It is necessary to understand the technological processes underlying the modern productive forces.

What I am saying now is of the greatest importance both to the new generation and to those who now make decisions for this new generation. The future belongs to engineering education and only engineering education.

Features of business in the era of reindustrialization

What are the features of the new business? How is a business formed? On the one hand, it retains the main property that post-industrial business has in general - customer orientation. Here again I will refer to the basic course of business at SHAL and the course of post-industrialism, where I talked about the basic concepts. Then they were a little theoretical,



A group called Defense Distributed is developing a plastic civilian self-defense system. WikiWeapon.

but now they are absolutely practical - time has passed. And time worked for them.

It is very important today to learn how to translate the interests, needs, wishes of the client into technological processes and technological terminology. The most important profession is the profession of such a task manager who will be able to serve a specific client, translating his wishes into real tasks for production systems. This will require a technical background. It follows from this that all highly qualified, and therefore highly paid jobs in the service sector will require an engineering education.

Until today, we have lived in a world dominated by humanitarian technology. We lived in a world that has been ruled by PR people for the past 12 years. It was also the essence of the business. I

used to say all the time in my seminars "Business is PR". It was the main formula of the decade.

Without PR, business, of course, will not do in future eras. But the core business is shifting today. Today, the core of the business is engineering. This is a major business trend that we need to understand and be aware of. Only by realizing it, we will be able to correctly formulate for ourselves some prospects, tasks for building the future, building our own business.

Which business has the best prospects today? This becomes crystal clear from what has been said in the previous lectures.

Due to global destabilization, the further, the greater the increase in the power component, power operations. So, one way or another, we will have to use a technique that carries out violence.

The same technique can be used for both violence and production. From a technical point of view, there is no difference between an engine for a car and an engine for a tank. Maybe a tank needs more power, but it depends on what car and what tank. In terms of technology, there is no difference between military technology and civilian technology. In the Soviet Union there were concepts of "dual-use equipment", "dual-use production", "dual-use technologies".

Dual-use technology is a kind of production where today you stamp civilian products, and

tomorrow, after a little reconfiguration, you stamp weapons. I will now give, as an example, a very small business that my St. Petersburg relative, a student, a young boy, did. He has little interest in any geopolitical issues. He was never interested in them, he was interested in the opportunity to earn extra money, like all the guys who grew up in a society based on the religion of money. Moreover, he really has an objective lack of money, characteristic of this age in any civilization.

He came up with a good business - aerial photography. Together with a friend, they assembled a small UAV, attached a camera to it, and began to carry out aerial photography on orders from various clients. When he asked me "Where can I get investments for this business?", I told him that it is enough just to publish on the Internet that you want to make such a business - and the investor will appear. In fact, everything turned out to be even simpler - he needed only a little shabby about this business at the institute where he studies. Immediately, one of the teachers, who heard about this, drove him to an investor. It was not even necessary to advertise on the Internet - and so the boy was found.

Why did investments appear as soon as this business was hinted at? Where did they come from? There was neither proper fundraising activity, nor a normal search for an investor - the money came by itself. Maybe lucky? But why I initially said that "the money will come sooner than you think" (and at the same time I warned him to be very careful with these investors). What was my reasoning?

Aerial photography technology is a dual-use technology. And everything related to dual purpose in the world around us has long been monitored by some interested forces. More about which, we'll talk further. Anyone who is a little bit connected with technology, from today's youth, who tries to do business in the technical field, is being tracked today, starting almost from kindergarten. If a boy takes up aircraft modeling in kindergarten, it means that they will look after him there too, and somehow help him move in this direction.



This is the reality of the coming era of reindustrialization and engineering business. If you step into a new technology field - and not just a new technology, but a new technical paradigm - you will immediately be in the flow, you will immediately have the wind in your sails. 10-12 years ago, all projects related to various humanitarian technologies, PR technologies instantly received

100% wind in the sails. Fundraising, which brought breathtaking financial flows to these humanitarian projects 5-7 years ago, today brings crumbs. Streams dry up, turn into a stream. Investors have become extremely picky about PR projects. They are of little interest anymore. PR people have already descended from the first rank to the second layer,

and in their place come in a new generation those who have a technical education in their hands.

We need to understand this in order to make meaningful decisions in business today. This is the mainstream, the highway, the basic process in the economy. A good business is the business that will be associated with this stream, with this mainstream that will fit into it.

Organization of reindustrialization in the CIS

All this is good, but we do not live in an airless space. We don't even live in America. How, in specific, not too happy conditions, to implement a business based on reengineering? What will we face?

When I talked about the backlash from the traditional industry, I didn't mean that there are some Sonderkommandos that go to every new reengineering business and try to derail it. This is wrong. The brains of the captains of industry are so arranged that they do not see these processes - they solve their problems. But in solving their own problems, they knock out budget subsidies for themselves and thereby complicate the conditions for competition for everyone else. They lobby for the kind of tax and other regime that is beneficial to a dying industry and not beneficial to an industry that is based on deserted technologies.

How to act in this situation? From a political and strategic point of view, we need to take over the process of lobbying. As before, the monetarists lobbied for free economic zones, so now it is necessary to lobby for high-tech production zones. But this is not a business level. This is the political level. This can be done by the party if it pumps up sufficient power for such lobbying activities in the near future.

At the business level, you just need to look for options in which you fit a completely new business process based on a new technological process into the business environment that exists. It is very important to understand that there is a demand for such things. If you work within the framework of some dual-purpose technologies, then you can get the roof of those who are interested in these technologies - certain power structures.

Russia and Eastern Europe in general is a place where the roof of power structures means actual inaccessibility for ordinary civil legislation. WHAT you do, HOW you do it - under the protection of secrecy, under the protection of the state interest, under the protection of the decision of the authorities on a special regime of activity, no one will dare to ask you.

This is the first way. It is effective in China. Now in China, almost all new business goes this way, because they have to fight with the old industry. Moreover, both with the old industry operating within the country - it is now already sluggish and does not particularly lobby for anything - and with the old industry that has developed in free economic zones based on the technologies of the early 21st century, and does not want to give up its

positions. On the other hand, it is already beginning to reach the top of the Chinese authorities - especially at the level of special services - that these guys from free economic zones with a new reindustrialization wave in America will not be able to compete, especially in the military-technical field. So, we need to grow something more promising, we need to protect these guys. In the near future, things will come to the formation of super-new economic zones for them with a legal regime tailored for this. Just like in the old SEZs, the legal regime was geared towards industrialization.

In Russia, this is more difficult. In Russia and other CIS countries, in comparison with the Chinese leadership, there is a very low intellectual level of the authorities. So low that hardly any of them will even understand what I'm talking about - it's beyond their mentality. Everything is dominated by the sluggishness of the apparatus and the huge corruption that forms this absolute sluggishness. Even if the boss decides something, orders, and makes some paperwork, then all the same, those who didn't give a damn about this boss will come to you and demand from you the fulfillment of some of their conditions, some requisitions. Nevertheless, in some power structures - state or rather semi-state - now you can find a roof.

The second option is not to be limited to national jurisdiction: to organize production in those zones in which there are conditions for this, and then import. Importing to the CIS countries is also a difficult matter, bearing in mind the rare corruption of the customs process and customs authorities, but this is a kind of way out. Since now there is a kind of Customs Union and customs preferences between different CIS members, it is possible to work within the framework of these preferences. There are countries with rather weak and corrupt regimes. There is Ukraine, in which the regime is now stagnant, but if it collapses in the next elections (there will be re-elections and the backbone of the Don regime will collapse), a mess will begin, characteristic of Ukraine, within which it will be possible to push through the relevant legislation, allowing this or that extraterritoriality for business. Either free and high-tech zones with their own tax regime, or do it at some local level - achieve an increase in the capabilities of local authorities, etc.

In countries with a strong regime, such as Belarus, it is possible to somehow reach the top of the regime, since insanity there has not yet reached the degree that it has reached in Russia. With the intellectual level there is also not very good, but there the level of corruption is less, which means that the level of manageability is higher. If you convince the supreme leadership of something, then the result will be. They will issue a law - you can work in peace. In Russia, no matter what the central government decides, they have no real power, and therefore there is nothing to negotiate with them.

Social consequences of the formation of a new industry



Since the conditions in cyberpunk zones are not very suitable for organizing unmanned industries and business based on them, the counterelite is forced to quietly form enclaves. Enclaves can arise on the basis of zones where the necessary jurisdictions are created for the production of new, for reindustrialization. There are huge production power. Such a

zone has no competition in the cyberpunk zone, because there the jurisdiction does not allow something like this to be produced efficiently.

The consequence of this situation will be dumping expansion into the market of the rest of the world turning into cyberpunk. If, for example, inside the Ukrainian state - no matter where - suddenly such a zone appears (there is not a lot of people there, there are not many workers, it is enough just to ensure the protection of the production zone and install automated production there so that cops, firefighters and others do not go there representatives of wide Ukrainian professions), and there is no internal customs border - and this production center has been capturing the Ukrainian market for several years. Just because no one can compete with him - he produces anything - and cheaply. He produces what the rest are simply not able to produce at the technological level.

As a result of such a variant of events, within these enclaves, financial resources and the corresponding power resource are rapidly concentrated. On this basis, he begins to manipulate the central government, putting it under his control, as in the era of reliance on heavy industry, the owners of heavy industry put all sorts of dons and Dnepropetrovsk mafias. This is a possible development.

There is another feature of this new industry that allows for enclavation. The old industry was environmentally extremely dirty. If you concentrated production somewhere, then you should have been prepared that the ecological situation in such a place would be incompatible with life. Those processes in which people are employed have a huge number of restrictions on the construction of this production process. The result is waste in large quantities and the collapse of the environment.

With the beginning of automation, it became possible to process more deeply. The industry has become more environmentally friendly. Automatic production can be completely put on a closed cycle. All waste will remain there and be recycled. Therefore, new industrial zones can be built quite cheaply so that there will be no environmental problems at all. It will be possible to put these productions even at resorts.

In the industrial era, however, irresponsible people also set up production in resorts. In Mariupol, for example, factories line up along the sea. And the area, which was built up by these monsters of the Soviet heavy industry, was officially called the "resort of all-Union significance».

Then it was a crime, but now it can be done quite calmly. New productions do not pollute the environment - they can be placed anywhere, and the air will be clean and fresh there, and the water will be normal, and everything will be wonderful there.

LECTURE 4: WAR

Preliminary remarks

Hopes for the transformation of society without disruption into a world war have been very high throughout the past decade. We hoped that the elites would still be able to come to an agreement, that the elites would be able to master the technologies that would make it possible to carry out this post-industrial transition in a milder form. This did not happen just not because the elites did not want to negotiate - they wanted to negotiate - but because they were not ready to master those new social technologies that correspond to new social conditions. Therefore, the further development of events leads to a world war, and its probability today has grown to almost 50%.



War inevitably will be conducted corporatocracy against all states that, one way or another, ensure the dominance of the financial aristocracy and rely on parasitic classes. Since today both the states of Europe and the United States are just such states, the war will be waged and, in fact, is already unfolding against them.

How will this war be fought?

Many analysts pay attention to the fact that the World War now unfolding will not take the form of a war between states, but in the form of disintegration internal processes. This process is now starting Europe and the USA, the separation of the Basques and Catalans in Spain is an example of this. It's part of the world war toolkit. But one should not think that everything will come down to this - there will undoubtedly be direct clashes.

What is war? How is it defined? Excellence in productive forces. Whoever has new productive forces in his hands has new military resources, new military equipment. And **since there is military-technical superiority, it must be implemented.** It will be implemented within the framework of direct military - technical clashes. And we will talk about them further: what kind of weapons they will fight with, what will be the tactics and strategy for using these weapons, and where will we end up with these tactics in the end.

For people who remain captive to the ideas of the last century, it seems that in order to wage war, it is necessary that there be states on the one hand and states on the other. This has become accustomed to during the last two or three centuries, when territorial states dominated the world and organized humanity. In earlier times, of course, there were no such illusions: wars were fought by private armies, cities, no matter what these armed forces relied on. And now it will be.

If we remember, in the First World War, the financial aristocracy waged war against Germany, and against Austria, and against Russia. But at the same time, on the one hand, Germany and Austria, and on the other hand, Russia managed to push each other. Today, the corporatocracy, in the transition to the hot phase of the world war now unfolding, will use the same move. A war will be organized between those states that need to be destroyed. It is clear that in the conditions of the current crisis of states this can be easily achieved.

Means of war



There are many sites on the Internet dedicated to the military equipment that is now being put into service in the troops in different countries. Those who have not yet been banned in Google can independently compile an overview of modern UAVs, aquadrones, automatic artillery installations and other means of modern warfare. So I will skip such a review and immediately get down to business.

The troops of backward countries still have a lot of old equipment. At the same time, automated means of war came to the troops a long time ago. If we talk about Israel or the United States, then over the past decade, thousands of UAVs and other drones have already entered the troops. At first they were purely reconnaissance drones, recently we have seen a breakthrough in attack drones.

So, there was a breakthrough at the level of technology a long time ago. A few years into production - and we will see how fully automatic drones will come to the troops and take their head place, that is, pure robots capable of making their own decisions about delivering strikes and about all the issues that arise in front of them during the battle.

We see the same situation in the ground forces. What did the ground forces look like during World War II? What do they say in all military schools in Russia now? The troops, according to the ideas of the last century, are some kind of subdivisions, organizations of groups of people that carry out forceful influences.



And what do the troops represent in this century? Automatic artillery systems were put into service in the German Army a year and a half ago.

What does the battle process look like, in which a new type of artillery unit participates? Several UAVs are on duty over the theater.

They carry out artillery reconnaissance, that is, they are engaged in target designation. This is not new. What's new is that they track all the shots that come from that side. Having caught two or three points of a projectile fired from that side, they transfer them to a calculator, which instantly determines the trajectory and looks where the projectile will fall. If he sees that the place where the projectile fell is a threat to one of the artillery installations under the control of the cyber center, then the cyber center simply gives a signal there, and this installation quickly moves away from its place while the projectile is still flying.

Naturally, if a person is involved in this process, a showdown, ambitions, stupidity and other human factors will begin, which only delay the prompt decision-making. Therefore, a person is excluded from the decision-making process, from the process of controlling the battle. Entirely and completely the battle is carried out purely by automation.

This is no longer the future. These systems have already entered service with the German ground forces. Therefore, I talk about what is, and not about what will ever be there.

Today, in advanced armies, automatic combat systems determine the situation. Does this mean that these armies are ready for war using these combat systems? No, it doesn't. Because the structure of these armies, the nature of the organization of the combat command and control of these armies today is still such that it does not correspond to the new conditions, the new character and the new technology of warfare.

We see the right technology, but we don't see the right organization of the parts. We have not yet embarked on a sufficient reform of the organization of the units. The reform that is being carried out in the German army simply does not yet take into account many factors. The land generals are carrying out the reform, and this is a problem. If we talk about the organization of units in the past, in the Second World War, in the post-war period, then the organization of units aimed at modern military equipment was only in aviation.

The adequate organization of a modern high-tech military unit is fundamentally different from the classical organization of the ground forces. It is more like organizing aviation units. In the aviation division, the human factor is either excluded from the combat process or its participation is minimized: people are only engaged in the process of routine and current maintenance of equipment. From the very process of combat, a person is almost completely withdrawn.

In aviation, back in the last century, only pilots fought, there were 20 pilots in a regiment. But behind these 20 pilots is a huge system that keeps the technology running. Within each squadron and the regiment itself, we see technical services. Routine maintenance is carried out within the squadron, current repairs are already done in special workshops, which are the technical unit of the regiment. We see the airfield maintenance battalion attached to this regiment - it is already engaged in airfield maintenance, over-scheduled repairs, flight support, etc. The brigade also includes a radio engineering battalion, which is engaged in aerial reconnaissance, target designation, dispatching service, electronic wrestling, etc. So, 20 warring pilots are served not just by an air regiment, but by an entire air brigade, which includes this regiment.

This is a fundamentally different organization than the ground forces. In the ground forces, the main combat force is manpower, technical means are attached to it - guns, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, which also cannot be used anywhere now. Such an organization corresponded to the era of Adolf Aloizych. How do you not cram automated forces into it, if the organization of regiments, brigades, divisions according to the old land model



remains on top, then something unfit for combat is obtained.

In the 70s of the last century, it already became clear that an ordinary land division could not have a classic composition. Then the composition of the non-white division was developed. The American division of the 70s looked like this: in not included overland organized battalions And battalions of army aviation (then -

helicopter). That is, it was no longer in its pure form a land, but an air-land mixed division. Normally there were as many aviation battalions as tank battalions. Roughly speaking, 3 infantry, 3 tank, 3 helicopter, 3+3+3. In addition, there were 3 folded brigade headquarters, and the composition of the brigades, depending on the combat mission, was formed by the division commander as he liked. For some task he took an infantry battalion and two tank battalions, for some tank and two infantry battalions, for some - a helicopter and an infantry battalion. This flexible structure was optimal for those times.

The USSR was very far behind the United States then in military reform, which led to such sluggishness of the Soviet troops during the Afghan war. The organization left over from the <u>Second World War</u>, in those conditions, it was already impossible to fight. They coped with the performance of combat missions very poorly, although the losses of the warring side were 2 orders of magnitude greater. We saw the same thing later in the Chechen campaign, when the Russian army had a superiority of 100 thousand against 7 thousand (and this is a great superiority), but for several years it was not able to defeat the enemy. The authorities were forced to negotiate with the enemy, to use his splits. This is a consequence of the archaic organization.



Now we have reached a new stage and found ourselves in a completely new situation. Today organization troops changes fundamentally. There can no longer be even a hint of similarity with the organization of land units of the 20th century in combat-ready units.

Today in the Russian Federation, as part of the military reform, they copy the American system of 30 years ago, which is absolutely outdated. Moreover, they do not copy a

flexible organization, but one that was formed for the <u>Middle East</u> wars. For some reason, stable separate brigades are being introduced, instead of being dynamic structures within the framework of a higher connection. They form a brigade, in essence, instead of a regiment, within the framework of the states of the old regiment. The result is a parody of the regiment, since it is the regimental organization that is traditional for Russia.

People do not understand at all why and what they are reforming, so they are just monkeying around. The only reason for turning regiments into brigades is that their commanders can now be generals instead of colonels.

Information age war

In the previous lecture, I told how two boys did a small business in which they used a UAV assembled by themselves for aerial photography in the interests of the customer. As soon as they told them somewhere at their institute that they were going to do such a business, an investor immediately appeared. Suddenly, out of nowhere, an investor appears to us. Fundraising was not needed, the investor just took it and showed up. It usually does.

Why does this happen? Because there are people and organizations that analyze the course of future wars and understand what modern technologies will be in demand. Accordingly, it is necessary to take into account people who are on the "you" with these technologies, control over their activities is necessary, since these are technologies of the so-called dual purpose. There are structures that control dual-use technologies in order to mobilize them at the start of the war.

Who is doing this for us? It was in Leningrad, or - as it is not quite correctly called now by the name of one of its parts - St. Petersburg. Since this is happening in Leningrad, and this seems to be the territory of the Russian Federation, it means that there must be some kind of special services of the Russian Federation. I would be very happy if someone who was supposed to do this would do it. Roughly speaking, in the Russian Federation there is a military-industrial complex, there is Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who is in charge of the arms program. In a normal state, he should have been attached to the special services, which should deal with this. To my regret, there is nothing of this in Russia. This means that investors who find themselves in such projects instantly and with enviable constancy are driven by other services. What?

In order to understand how the preparations for the war are going, I will make a tiny excursion back to the time of my relatively public political activity within the framework of the Russian Federation, to the beginning of the 90s of the last century. Then there was a charitable organization called the Soros Foundation. She was engaged in organizing humanitarian aid for teachers throughout the country, giving out awards. Gave awards to scientists. In general, all this unfortunate intelligentsia that suffered from Yeltsin's reforms, which for some reason are called Gaidar's reforms, although their official author was the famous "economic killer" Jeffrey Sachs.

In 1994 or 1995, I had to prepare parliamentary hearings in the State Duma, during which our poor deputies had to give a lecture on what the Soros Foundation was really doing. The Soros Foundation established a prize for our esteemed scientist - 500 dollars. In order to receive this award, the applicant had to describe in detail all his developments: what he did, what he achieved, and so on. 30,000 scientists wrote reports. For 15 million dollars, Soros received a complete review of all technical documentation, an overview of the technical achievements of the USSR. Reported for 1 million.

In order to obtain such a volume of information within the framework of normal intelligence work, which was carried out by the corresponding services of the USSR and the United States during the Cold War, expenses and investments of the order of 150 billion and 10-12 years of work were needed. For a couple of years, the Soros Foundation, having spent ridiculous money, received all this amount of information. The deputies were a little crazy when we explained this technology to them. They also had to learn about how the monitoring of personnel potential was done through the Soros Teachers. So the deputies learned how professional and modern analytical intelligence works.

Since then, the Russian deputies have become very, very suspicious, but they have not become smarter. Having burned themselves in milk, they are now blowing into the water, but without any understanding of what is really happening and how to counteract this.

Today, no one is interested in the potential of the USSR, they are interested in the future. The current intelligence structures operate completely legally. Not only analytical intelligence, but also operational intelligence is now openly operating. It operates not through residency, but through legal organizations that keep people associated with them, cooperating with them, who are on their awards, in some other form of cooperation in all universities, research institutes and other places. They instantly receive information about where some kind of stirring occurs. Since they are able to process this information quickly,

they try to put every movement under control. 3 kopecks for investment - and they are a co-investor-co-owner. At any moment when the need arises, you can pull a little and send partners in the right direction.

This is a real process that is now taking place not only in Russia. It occurs in most countries of the world. Somewhere there is opposition to it, somewhere there is no opposition to it.

It is impossible to counteract this activity at the level of counterintelligence, it is possible only at the level of nationalism. For example, in China, every Chinese regards the Americans and American organizations as a potential adversary, an enemy, as it was in the USSR. Therefore, it would be difficult to carry out such things in the USSR: not because the KGB was particularly in the way there (the KGB was not very effective then, as it is now), but because every person had internal censorship, and thought: "yeah, this is cooperation with enemy, it's me being bred, oh no, it won't work, "and quietly dumped. In China, this is still the case, so it is difficult to introduce such developments there. In Russia, this is not so, because you can squeal for a very long time about the greatness of the God-bearing people, about the universal fate of Russia, but deep down, every citizen of the Russian Federation already understands that, firstly, this is no longer a state, and secondly, Russia has already ended, nothing to show off. Based on this internal attitude, this understanding of life imposed by the media, state propaganda, schools, etc., Russians are very actively cooperating with these organizations.

Productive forces and military organization

Such was the war of the information age, which is now being replaced by the era of automatic production.

In order to understand the structure of the challenges ahead, I will return a little to the sphere of production, because one must understand that military technology is a consequence of production technology, and military organization is a consequence of production organization. For example, manufacturing arose, and with it the working class,

and out of it emerged the Napoleonic mass rifle army. Then comes the steel industry and we see an army with an emphasis on artillery. Mechanized productions appear, we see enough technically educated people as conscripts, as personnel, and by the First World War it is to some extent a military-technical army, and by the Second World War it is already a purely technical army: they are fighting with equipment.



Now we see a new structure of productive forces. In the previous decade - it was

dominated by PR technologies - and we see, for example, the German Army reform project (which by the time it was launched, like all such projects, was 10 years out of date, but clearly reflects the basis of that ideology). It focuses on the "department of fear", that is, on the organization, first of all, of intelligence services and a system of terror. As part of this reform, they are now trying to generalize and reproduce the experience of the GESTAPO.

This is the right adaptation to the situation where PR technologies dominate, that is, to the situation of 1988-2012. But now we are entering an era when automatic production technologies will dominate. Production technologies are becoming the mainstream, the core of the world economy.



To understand what forces future development will be based on, let's see what a modern production complex looks like. The simplest modern production apparatus, the quintessence of current technology, is the 3D printer. Roughly speaking, you can do anything with a 3D printer. You create an image-project on a computer, then, under the control of the computer, certain necessary materials are supplied to the output of the 3D printer, then the 3D printer overtakes these same materials in layers and a certain three-dimensional object with the properties you specify is obtained. This is the manufacturing process.



There are already developed prototypes (in this decade they will go into series), building 3D printers. This is enough big sizes construction installations into which concrete is supplied, this concrete they layers pour over given contour, result what

during 1-2 days grows up one-story house. This 3D printer includes a

manipulator that inserts door and window frames, pipes into walls, etc. Such is the 3D printer, which today automatically builds a house. There are already many video clips on the Internet



demonstrating the operation of such a 3D printer. Within a year or two, it will be brought to mind, and the issue of mass production of construction 3D printers is the issue of this decade.

With the help of a 3D printer today they make working mechanisms. There are video clips on the Internet about how a certain kid made a 3D printer that works with a laser on composite materials, and then printed an aircraft engine from these composite materials.

This technology is widely advertised on the internet today. The first jet engine worked for some time, turned out to be not very perfect, which is understandable: this is the first casting. A few more years - and the technology will be brought to mind.



The other day, RTR-24 showed how the Japanese made a robot using a 3D printer. Processors have been made using 3D printers before. Layer-by-layer spraying is a technology that was not invented now, already in the 70s it was sprayed only in this way. All microprocessors that we know, from those that were in the 70s, and even more so those that came into use with the advent of personal computers, they are all made

on 3D printers. The Japanese are now using the same 3D printers, in addition to the schemes, they also made mechanisms. They depicted a moving doll, called it a robot (although the robot must do some production functions, but this one simply depicts something). In any case, they made a capable moving doll using this same 3D printer.

What is a 3D printer? This is a production in which there is no person as a participant and operator of the copying process. There is a designer who designs on a computer what needs to be produced, and then we have a purely automatic process of making any number of copies of this product.

Today, you can 3D print an aircraft engine by laser-spraying it out of composite materials. The task of making an aircraft case out of powder or aluminum alloy is an order of magnitude less difficult. After some time, it will be possible to make 3D printers yourself using 3D printers. Not only direct automatic production will appear, but there will be **a** strategic automation of the entire production process, including the production of means of production.

This is reality. The future has already arrived.



Today, the production of complex equipment is becoming available to small and smallest businesses, which until recently, at the end of the last century, required turning to large technical industries, to factories. Small firms designed something, debugged, and then gave production to large factories. There was no other option. The production of any equipment, including military

equipment, was the lot of only large production systems. And they were, of course, under

state control. This was the essence of the industrial age. It is possible to produce something serious only in large factories, and they were controlled by the state. When Adolf Aloizych was preparing Germany for war, he had to build gigantic underground factories. Mining workings, mines, of which a wild amount has remained in Germany since the 19th century, were concreted and reinforced. In these underground caves, machines were installed in huge numbers and were engaged in the production of aircraft, tanks and other military equipment during the <u>Second World War</u>.



Only the state can pull off such an operation, with a huge effort, with a very high consolidation of the elite. The entire elite must be ready to participate in this whole process. The construction of an underground plant is a huge investment, huge organizational costs, and a lot of work. It was necessary to create concentration camps in order to build factories, and then serve them. This is a gigantic organizational process that only the state could afford. And

not just a state, but an extremely efficient state. Some gouging state would not have been able to organize such a process, which was organized by Adolf Aloizych associates or the CPSU (b) in the USSR.

Only big states, big corporations, big systems could be engaged in the production of military equipment in the 20th century. Only 10 years have passed since the end of the 20th century - and we saw a completely different picture. Today, any kid can put himself a 3D printer in the basement, and if his head works well, then he can design an UAV or some other nasty thing. He can design it, and I can't even predict what he designs.

It became possible for an individual or some small group to have their own production of ultra-modern, extremely effective military equipment. Adolf Aloizych had to build a giant underground plant, and today it is enough to have a 3D printer in the basement.

A non-specialist in modern military equipment will be indignant at this point: "The plant produced huge aircraft, and this one can only do some UAVs." If we compare by the mass of the metal, then Adolf Aloizych will be out of reach. And if in terms of strike power, then the strike power of this UAV, if combat use is properly organized, is in no way inferior to the power of that same Messerschmidt. For example, it is easier to knock out a tank for a small UAV, and even more so for an UAV, than for a Messerschmidt.

In the depths of the cellars today you can do anything. Weapons systems are capable of producing not organizations, but very small cohesive innovative groups. The smaller their composition, the less the possibility of betrayal, the less the possibility of control, the less there are fools and the problems associated with these fools. The smaller the group that is trying to organize some kind of force operations, the more likely this group is to succeed,

and the more difficult it is to counteract. Everyone who is now trying to oppose such groups is well aware of this.

Today, the anti-terrorist forces of states are confronting groups that are still working on old technology, on old equipment. That is, they do not produce their own equipment, except for a bomb in the style of Academician Morozov, who, before teaching us the correct history, was engaged in the manufacture of bombs, for which he served time. Terrorists have not gone further than Morozov over the past 150 years.

But this is for today. And tomorrow (right tomorrow: I don't mean something distant, I mean what will happen in this decade) is already an opportunity to produce modern military equipment, the last word in military equipment, weapons systems within the framework of a resource that such small groups have.

modern army

Today, ground combat weapons - all kinds of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery and other belongings that the ground forces have - are just targets. Saddam Hussein had more of this stuff, probably than Hitler. In 1990, he ran into a US division organized along the lines of the 1970s. This one division defeated his entire millionth army with all its weapons systems from the Second World War - the great creation of the Soviet military-industrial complex now being reanimated by Rogozin. Since the Americans had no other goals, and what to do next, they did not know, they simply defeated and limited themselves to this. "Do not climb, Saddamko, into Kuwait, because we are roofing Kuwait, and we are a steep roof».

Whether the state has ground forces or does not have ground forces is the question of the first week of the war. Nobody canceled the main rule of the war of the last century: air supremacy decides everything. In 1941, the Germans managed to gain air supremacy, and their superiority over the Soviet army turned out to be absolute for the entire 1941 year. Then they lost this dominance in the air.



After the Second World War, air supremacy also decided everything. In the Israeli-Arab clashes, Israel had air supremacy every time, and that was everything. Who has a smaller army, who has more, who has better tanks, who has worse, who made how many mistakes. In terms of the number of errors, both Israel and the Arabs

competed recklessly. This did not cancel the result: air supremacy decided everything, the ground forces of the enemy from the air were simply destroyed.

Israel made its conclusions, and since then it has been leaning on aviation. There are some ground, in fact, police forces. There are some "like tanks" - police armored cars that enter

the city blocks - they entered, they scared, they left. It cannot be called a fighting force. But they have aviation, which ensures the security of this state.

Israel today has the most advanced army in military-technical terms. Israel is the main manufacturer of UAVs. American drones are made under the Israeli franchise. Israel has little economic and human potential and must solve all its problems with small means. Therefore, he made UAVs that solve aviation problems, but are 100 times cheaper.

Israel has built aircraft carriers that perform the same task as American aircraft carriers, only in a more limited water area (that is, they solve these tasks in the Mediterranean Sea, and not in the ocean), but are close in strike power to American aircraft carriers. Moreover, they are ships of only the second rank. The Israeli frigate is based on a huge number of UAVs that can strike where they need to. Escort ships for such an aircraft carrier are also much cheaper, simpler and smaller. Israel made submarines with missiles with nuclear warheads (it is clear that they hide this), and nuclear torpedoes - and all this is an order of magnitude lighter and cheaper than that of the older American blockhead brother.

Israel today has the second most powerful army in the world. Its combat capabilities exceed those of England, France, and Russia. There is no comparison with China, because



they are unlikely to ever collide, and this would be a clarification of the question of who is stronger - an elephant or a whale. You don't have to find out, because you can't find out.

Israel is second in military power only to the United States, although it has a very small army in terms of numbers. But even this number is already excessive, since the army needs military reform. With the current military-technical state, at least half of the personnel is

redundant, and it is necessary to get rid of it already. They do not get rid of them because it is necessary to maintain the tone of the nation, and the army is a means of education.

To maintain military power at the level of the second military power in the world today, an army of half the size of the current Israeli army is enough. Most of it is the ballast left over from the organizational orientation of previous centuries. First of all, these are the so-called ground forces, which it is not clear where to put them in the current conditions.

What are the armies of other states? These are armies organized as a whole either according to the experience of the Second World War, or according to the experience of the clashes of the last third of the 20th century, that is, somehow modernized. In the USA - modernized back in the 70s. The European armies have been modernizing for 20 years, the Russian army has also been modernizing for 3 years, 40 years late with structural reform.

But all of them remain, according to the basic strategic global structure, armies from the era of the Second World War.

Within their framework, there is some degree of integration of high-tech units, successful or unsuccessful. There is an understanding of what needs to be put on high-tech units. There is understanding in the NATO command, in the command of the Bundeswehr. They put on high-tech units, the rest are reduced. There is understanding to some extent in the Russian General Staff. The military-industrial complex



understands this even better. Rogozin understands this even better.

Rogozin is trying to organize the production of the most modern technology possible. But he is bound hand and foot by two circumstances. The reform of the army itself is not under his jurisdiction, he cannot intervene in any way. He cannot reform the production process itself. He has no alternative to deal with the clumsy structure of the times of Comrade Stalin. There is no other military-industrial complex in Russia, except for the one inherited from Comrade Stalin, and since then, to one degree or another, has collapsed. In addition, Rogozin is also forced to lobby for the interests of the military-industrial complex.

It is impossible to lobby for interests, and to cut something superfluous there yourself. Therefore, on the one hand, Rogozin is bound by his position, and, on the other hand, by his understanding of reality. He sincerely wants to use this ancient instrument, inherited from Comrade Stalin, to produce modern technology. This is impossible, because this tool was sharpened for something else. He is imprisoned to rivet tanks.

Finally, Rogozin's position is made desperate by political restrictions, the obligations of the authorities to the Uralvagonzavods. He is forced to give orders for these tanks, which could still be fought with Hitler, but where to stick them now is completely incomprehensible. Who can be scared today with a tank? It is much easier to scare a hedgehog with a naked rear. Uralvagonzavod assembles these rumbling cars, promising that they will frighten the demonstrators with them... This tank simply does not rumble before China. To Moscow from the Urals, he also does not rumble under his own power. It is not clear where to put this tank now, but orders have to be placed, just in the order of cutting.

Under these conditions, they are now trying to produce some modern equipment in Russia. We may not have time to see how Rogozin succeeds, because the hot phase of the World War may begin earlier.

LECTURE 5: WORLD WAR BEGINS

I talked about technologies that are changing the nature of war and the nature of social relations. As Marx taught, social relations are built on the basis of the technologies that society has. First of all, this applies to military technologies or dual-use technologies. Generally speaking, manufacturing and military technologies are related. In fact, these are the same technologies used in different directions.

The unity of the technological and military order is very clearly visible. The era of manufacturing is coming - and with it comes the massive army of Napoleon. The early industrial age comes - and there is an army based on a needle gun, a rifle, and new forms of organization associated with this - the so-called Prussian army.



Then comes the World War. The Germans have an ingenious Schlieffen plan. Schlieffen is indeed the greatest of the then military strategists. But the Schlieffen plan is a plan of mobile warfare, a war of a previous era.

Schlieffen sees: there is a new technique. He takes it into account very well. A new military organization has been formed: gigantic military corps, huge armies of many millions, which did not exist before. They, according to the Schlieffen plan, implement mobile warfare, which carried out by 300 thousandth army, the size of several corps. In this regard, Schlieffen summarizes how he maneuvered the hulls. He transfers this to the maneuvering of armies. In World War I, they are trying to implement this plan,

though already by other people who are not as authoritative, tough and clear-thinking as Schlieffen himself.

And then it turns out that the war is completely different. After a couple of months, it turns out that the war is positional. No maneuvers, no detours, no Cannes. On this side of the trench, on the other side of the trench. Either attack head-on or shoot. Completely different technology of war. The German, French, Austrian, Russian General Staff turned out to be simply not adapted to it. Foch, on the eve of the war, promoted the romantic theory of breakthroughs, the theory of strikes, which had nothing to do with trench warfare. The Russian and Austrian General Staff were in the rearguard of German and French military thought.



With the outbreak of World War I, all military theory collapsed. In reality, everything turned out to be completely different. Military and economic calculations, which were built before, collapsed. For several years it was not clear who was in control of the situation at all. New forces began to enter the arena. The reformatting of states began, the most unstable empires simply collapsed. This is the lag in understanding reality.

Tanks appeared between the wars. When you read today the writings of military theorists of that time, for example, Tukhachevsky, you see that a person understands the tank, he is passionate about this new technology, he likes it. Then the tactics of combat use begin. It turns out that the whole concept of Tukhachevsky is a copy of the combat use of cavalry armies. In reality, it is impossible to use tanks like this. It is ridiculous even to read what the military strategist of that time writes.

The same thing happened later. Afghanistan included an army sharpened to fight Hitler. She adapted to the situation there. It immediately became clear that we needed a different organization, a different structure of military units, different tactics, strategy, logistics. Somehow they rebuilt. We got out of there. Since then, the Russian General Staff has been able to fight only in the mountains with the Mujahideen.

Military theory always lags behind reality catastrophically. Each Napoleon is opposed by Melas at the beginning of his career. The same thing happens in economic reality. But in economics, the question is about money, about personal interests, and the scale is smaller, and the organization is often not bureaucratic. Therefore, there the new sometimes makes its way earlier. When it has already broken through, then the new production relations begin to reformat the world through politics. The form of this reformatting is ultimately war. War comes and creates a new social organization.

The beginning of the hot phase of the world war

Let's say at some point we have a world war. Since 2011, "preliminary wars" began, similar to what the Libyan and Balkan wars were for the First World War. Today, first-class nations are not yet involved in direct hostilities. They are still sorted out with the help of arms supplies, PR and special operations. At some point, there will be a transition to the direct involvement of first-class nations in hostilities - this is called the hot phase of the World War.

What will happen during the transition to the hot phase of the World War?

At the first stage, we will see the clash of the armies of states. The entire ground military infrastructure, all the products of the Uralvagonzavods will be destroyed in the first few days, and then you can forget about it. Its further fate is of interest only to scrap metal collectors. The war will be in the air, and the war will be between one or another means of aviation.

This puts on the agenda the question of the ratio of survival of the UAV or UAV, on the one hand, and the mighty Soviet (American, French) fighter, on the other.



What is a modern fighter? This huge machine, gigantic weight, burning wild amount of energy. Most of its effective weight is the life support systems of the pilot who is in it. Even with these life support systems, only a very healthy man, very trained, can survive in this fighter cockpit. Only relying on these life support systems, he is able to perform his tasks, maneuver, control the aircraft.

It can be argued that while in the aircraft, the pilot controls the aircraft better than the drone operator, who has radio interference, delays, and other problems. Everyone who communicated with a computer is familiar with interference, delays, problems of the operating system. The operator has all these problems. But the UAV, for all its shortcomings, has one advantage - it is much cheaper. It does not need an oxygen supply system, an ejection system, etc. It does not need to contain a person. It becomes much easier. Considering that for every kilogram of useful weight there is a wild amount of fuel, the savings in size and weight are enormous. The reconnaissance UAV of the Israeli or American ground forces is launched from the hand. The fighter must throw it high up, the motor will start - and flew... All airfield infrastructures are not needed.

This is two orders of magnitude cheaper than maintaining conventional aircraft. An aircraft costs millions, an UAV costs tens of thousands. Any well-trained pilot can easily shoot down a drone. If the drone has an operator, then it loses by reaction. If there is no operator, then it is a robot. And a robot is always stupid: a person with good intuition very quickly determines the algorithms of this robot on an intuitive level and knows how to deceive him, where to beat him. It works at the level of the spinal cord. Human versus robot always wins a fight if he is trained enough. A pilot is a trained person by definition.

So, against one UAV, the plane will win. And against twenty? And against a hundred? If 20 drones are sent to 1 manned aircraft, it will shoot down a dozen, but in the end, someone will shoot it down too. It doesn't cost anything for a drone to go ramming, you don't feel sorry for drones. A variety of UAVs can be a cruise missile - a blunt flying bomb.



The battle is won by quantity, by mass. Aviation, which has a certain number of UAVs,

simply does not fight the enemy with the help of a pilot, but sends the vast majority of UAVs into battle. You can not cry about the losses and demolish all the enemy's manned aircraft.

Since everyone will acquire drones in the next couple of years, it can be argued that, using UAVs, everyone will knock out all enemy manned aircraft in the first month. In the first month of the hot phase of the world war, the end of manned aviation in military



affairs will take place forever. This is where the history of manned aviation will end, and only drones will continue to fight. But aviation is the last capable unit of the old-style army.

So, in the first week (maybe it will take a little longer, but from a technical point of view - in the first week) we see **the end of ground combat weapons.** In three weeks we will see **the end of manned aviation.** And

then there will be **a transition to completely new combat means** that this world war will bring to life.

World War Stabilization Phase

From this moment begins the process of competition in the production of new weapons, more and more destructive, more and more effective. States will not be able to organize their production and rapid modernization on the basis of their clumsy production systems. States are unable either today or tomorrow to build a correct system for their combat use, because the very organization of units and formations does not allow the correct organization of the combat use of new equipment, which is not only a product of new technologies, but also a product of new relations between man and technology. This element is not taken into account in the structure. Therefore, **the military organization of states begins to disintegrate**, like any inefficient structure. During the war, a structure that shows its military inefficiency disintegrates very quickly and easily.

Let us recall the history of the fall of the Russian Empire or the Austrian Empire, which showed their unpreparedness for war, which launched the process of disintegration. The entire elite broke up into warring groups, conspiracies began in these warring groups. They ate the supreme power, then quarreled among themselves and gnawed at each other's throats until, out of nowhere, people from outside appeared who said "we know what to do, and you went to Paris", and everyone went there where they were sent.

The breakdown is very fast. It took the Russian Empire six months to finally collapse. But at that time, information technologies were not as effective as they are now: everything took longer to reach people, it took weeks to travel in a sealed wagon. So it won't even take six months. Everything will crumble and everyone will scatter. There was power - and there is no power.

The state infrastructure in any state is nothing more than a copy of its military structure. If the military structure fails, then the civil state structure also fails.

Formally, the state that crumbles faster will lose the war. The one that crumbles later will look like the winner. But only to look, because the collapse of its military infrastructure will be obvious, and it will be unable to occupy the "defeated" society, even to inflict on it the necessary damage to terrorize it. In the conditions of the collapse of states, first corporate armies enter the scene, and then some partisan structures that oppose them. On the one hand, private armies, on the other hand, structures opposing them.

In the Russian version, for example, there is a private army of Gazprom, which is forced to guard pipelines in order to somehow ensure trade. It will be opposed by partisan groups that do not need to protect anything. They are in a strategically better position. Even if they are smaller and weaker, they make up for it with their strategic position. They blackmail, they are forced to negotiate.



Guerrilla groups

Corporate armies

From this moment on, the competition between corporate armies and small partisan groups will begin, which will make themselves known. There will be many of them, the process of natural selection will begin. Those who cannot provide secrecy, who will illiterately conduct their military operations, will perish. Adaptive will survive, create an effective system of their own security and start kicking everyone around. The main task of the military structure will be to terrorize the municipal-feudal formations in order to obtain the desired resource from them. Municipal formations are quite vulnerable, it is easy to hit their points of vulnerability - at transformer substations, at sewage treatment plants, etc.

The competition between these groups will be extremely intense. They will either negotiate among themselves how they will divide this city, or they will fight among themselves, like gangs competing for objects of feudal exploitation. At this stage of the war, we will see a completely new situation, the competition of small groups that rely on extremely small, low-resource basement production of military equipment.

Competition for new technology will be at the level of quality. Anyone who comes up with a new machine that exterminates the enemy better than the previous one will have tremendous advantages, and replication will cost him almost nothing.

Let's suppose that some smart person appeared in the private army of Gazprom with organizational skills. For example, the same Dmitry Rogozin will come there. Suppose that, having freed himself from the circumstances that weighed on him, he will be able to realize reality, spit on large factories, understand what is really happening where, pull boys from everywhere who are somehow smart and put them in a sharashka. But what can be organized in a sharashka? Copying someone else's technology, preferably with improvement.



Those who have new ideas, and not those who copy, will win in real power competition. Large structures are doomed to be copied, to catch up with the situation. In the conditions of a military clash, whoever catches up with time loses. It will be defeated by an aggressor who has some new samples.

It is enough to invent today to develop a technological process based on GPS, APS, 3D printers and other latest technology in a week or less. Under these conditions, the strategic situation will change in a week or two.

The final phase of the World War

So, a completely chaotic process will be established. Between these anarchist groups, in the course of a long slaughter, some balance will arise. As part of this balance, they will negotiate temporary coalitions and division. But the balance will change very quickly, and the agreements can hardly be tenacious. In the course of the war, more and more waves of technical changes will come. Large material losses in the framework of this war will slow down technical development, but not so much that it would be possible to bargain for decades on the basis of some existing alignment of forces.

The only way out of this process can be a totalitarian takeover of these groups. This is how the situation of the civil war in Russia of 1918-1922 was resolved. The VKP(b) - a party that relied on the one hand on the resources of the old General Staff of the Russian Empire,

on the other hand - on extensive experience in underground terrorist work and organizational work, controlled new productive forces and a new class of producers. It was the party of the class that was the holder of industrial production technology. Since the war of that era was an industrial war, those who waged an industrial war were stronger in organizational terms than those who waged a peasant war, like Makhno.

In the situation described above, the consolidator and winner can only be an organizationally stronger rival who, relying on the new progressive class, on the class of bearers of new technologies, will be able to **act on a class scale.** It is he who will carry out the consolidation of this class on the basis, on the one hand, of class interests, and on the other hand, on the basis of organizational superiority.

Since all the guys who are able to organize the production of military equipment and wage modern warfare constitute the class of post-industrial producers, then regardless of the extent to which they realize and understand their class interest, the ideological authority of the organization expressing the class interest will be such that it will create attractiveness for joining this organization as an independent, but coherent with all acting forces.

As a result, partisan groups will begin to merge into this structure, as was the case with the Red Army, into which all the village gangs, who saw a powerful and clear force, were pouring. They saw a clear ideology, organizational superiority, a clear and comfortable vision of the future, which they were able to explain to them even at their low level of class self-consciousness. As part of this, the Red Army was formed, which became the basis of the state, first under the name of the Russian Federation, and then the USSR, and the Communist Party, as a derivative emanation of the organizing force of this Red Army. For the first decade it was a purely anarchist party. Then they began to rebuild it under new economic, historical and other conditions for a new era. But this is no longer relevant to the topic we are considering.

In the era of the First World War, everything looked exactly like that. If during the First World War we saw the collapse of two empires, Russian and Austrian, now we will see the collapse of all states. Even first-class European states will crumble, although some more stable post-state formations will emerge in Europe than in the rest of the world. However, even some forms of the nation-state may remain.

If a new type party, a class party of post-industrial producers, netocracy and post-industrial technocracy, is formed before the start of the hot phase of the World War, it will be able to take control of the situation through network consolidation in a short time, and the war will be short enough and not too destructive. If there is no such party by the time the war starts, then the war runs the risk of dragging on, and the destruction caused by it may turn out to be so total that instead of a post-industrial transition, there will simply be the elimination of the Russian egregore.

military organization

How does the organization of units, subunits, the organization of combat command and control and combat employment change under the new conditions? A capable military organization of the industrial era is a kind of tracing paper, a kind of chip in the production organization. The regiment organizes a certain plant or factory. The ground regiment is more like a factory, the air regiment is like a factory. We see a specific industrial - technological organization of the military structure.

In Europe, during the era of world wars in the first half of the last century, we saw an emphasis on some kind of technocracy, on a technocratic organization (at least during World War II), and in the USSR infantry units prevailed for a number of reasons. Of course, there was also a bet on artillery (I will not analyze the Soviet strategy now), but for social reasons, the emphasis was placed on infantry units. This reflected the transitional state of the country from agrarian to industrial. The military organization was oriented towards transitional thinking from an agrarian to an industrial society. In Western Europe there was an industrial organization, although there were also remnants of an agrarian organization.

Today, the white belt countries and some <u>Asian countries</u> have armed forces that are completely tailored to the industrial organization. Consider the example of an industrial organization. I have already cited the World War II air regiment as an example. Its structure has changed little up to the present day. Now the air regiments in the Russian Federation have been liquidated, but until the end of the tenth years of the twenty-first century, this organization was still preserved.

The air regiment is an extremely small organization, if you look at it from the point of view of the combat strength: the commander and several pilots are fighting with the help of several combat vehicles. In the modern scenario, the air regiment - 24 combat vehicles (three squadrons of 8 each). An earlier organization contained about 40 combat vehicles in an air regiment. This is the combat strength of the regiment. But in addition to this, we see a huge mass of engineering and technical personnel. Each squadron has technicians, and if in the Second World War it was just one technician who is responsible for one aircraft, then in the organization of the times of the end of the last century, these are technicians who are responsible for different areas of weapons: chassis, electronics, navigation equipment, weapons and so on.

The near rear of the air regiment is already a small aircraft repair plant, which each regiment has. Most of the regiment's personnel are the personnel of this aircraft repair plant. A very numerous air regiment is obtained with its own aircraft repair plant, rear services, which must supply and service all this. To this was added a radio engineering battalion, at one time also a whole battalion, which was engaged in electronic warfare.

Well, the airfield maintenance battalion, which was engaged in various kinds of airfield maintenance, refueling, etc. Sometimes the aircraft factory was taken out of the regiment / brigade and turned into an aircraft factory.

Such is the organization of aviation units. Aviation is a complex technique, and labor is still manual, mechanized, but not yet automated. Therefore, the unit needs a factory, a gigantic manpower to provide the striking power of one regiment. Although the air regiment was not as numerous as the infantry regiment, but if you count the composition of the entire brigade serving it, then it was close in composition to the infantry. The air regiment itself could not function without several service battalions, all of which constituted an air brigade.

Such is the specificity of the organization of the high-tech military part of the industrial era. There were also non-high-tech parts. Tanks played an important role in World War II, although air supremacy still prevailed. After the Second World War, everyone lost interest in tanks, except for those who remained brains in that world war. The Soviet Union considered it necessary to have 60 thousand tanks, of which forty thousand tanks should be kept in Europe. All of NATO had 11,000 tanks. They were not going to fight with these tanks, and the number of these tanks was declining. Now there are no tanks as such, various automated systems have come in their place.

Aviation, missile units in the Soviet Union, that is, everything that worked through the air these were really combat forces that could be used in a war, say, in the 80s. The rest of the units (tank, infantry, etc.) were inapplicable in any military operations, because there were no challenges and there were no theaters in which these units could fight. Unless trying to fight China on an equal footing, but then it turned out that China had four or five times more of these antediluvian resources, so they would not have had to fight anyway.

What, besides these very aviation forces, did the Soviet Union have effective? They love to advertise the airborne troops. As the experience of using airborne troops in the conditions of real hostilities of the Second World War showed, everywhere their use ended at least very badly. In the second half of the 20th century, landing operations were successful only in those cases when the landing went to an empty coast, that is, the absence of enemy opposition was assumed in advance.

The only amphibious operation of the last third of the 20th century that faced minimal opposition ended in disaster. I am referring to the United States landing operation on the island of Grenada. This is a tiny island with 70 thousand people, where the authorities quarreled among themselves. The prime minister bet on Cuba, and the vice premier bet on the CIA. The premiere quietly banged. This became the pretext for the US landing operation.
We drove the planes, threw off a couple of battalions of paratroopers. The number of paratroopers was comparable to the population of this island, and no one was going to resist. But a team of Cuban builders worked on this island under a contract. Cubans, of course, serve in the army. They had a normal, good draft army, where they taught the combat use of the weapons that they had, and were not driven to potatoes. They had a reflex on the Americans: the builders instantly ran to some anti-aircraft installations of the Grenadian army, uncovered them and fired well at the landing Americans. The losses from this operation were such that the Americans had to liquidate the main shock unit, which was the first to land, there was no one to complete the personnel there.

It was the collapse of the landing as an ideology itself, even if we do not count the failures of the Evpatoria landings, small lands and other things that happened in the Second World War. Landing troops are not at all something that can be capable. The USSR had giant airborne divisions. So far, Russia has 5 airborne divisions.



The paratroopers fight only one day a year, on August 2nd. But they fight exclusively against the local population at the place of residence.

When they tried to use the Airborne Forces in Afghanistan, they had to completely rebuild the structure of units and formations. Ultimately, a completely different military force arose, called the Special Forces. These sabotage units became the only capable ground units. The Americans

went the same way - they have sabotage units that are capable, and the rest are just pretending to be.

This is the reality of yesterday and the day before yesterday. What will be the capable subunits that will be formed by the stable phase of the war, when all the old combat weapons will be fired, and the war will begin with those that can really fight? It will also be 2 types of parts.



First, high-tech parts. If the high-tech military force in the 20th century was only aviation, now it will be automatic aviation and ground forces, but already organized precisely as high-tech ones. Secondly, these are small sabotage and anti-terrorist units. Their main strike force will be a manpower, equipped with very, very

specific weapons kits, including portable nuclear weapons. These sabotage subunits, which are extremely small in number and have gigantic striking power, will make up the second part of the real combat force. Everything else is police units, like internal troops in Russia (but this is to terrorize the population at the level of feudal formations).

Unity of production and combat process



Consider a combat force organization that relies on high-tech weapons. I have already said that the war is waged primarily by cyber systems. The war is waged by cyber-centers without the participation of a person, because a person cannot interfere in operational management. He can interfere in the management process only at the strategic level. Human will only be needed as a strategist.

How will the maintenance, supply and other support

of the combat process be organized? The combat process inevitably turns out to be combined with the production process. If in the twentieth century we saw divisions for the combat process and the maintenance process (repair, routine maintenance and the so-called secondary production process), now the primary production process is integrated into the combat use system.

The production of weapons is now inseparable from their combat use. Previously, these were different processes, but now they are one and the same process. The people who carry out the production and the fastest possible modernization of weapons rely on the combat experience that is going on here and now. They must make and implement decisions on the modernization of weapons instantly. Whoever can integrate the innovation process with the process of combat use has the prospect, the chances of winning. **Modernization and production of new weapons is becoming part of the combat cycle.** Whoever quickly produced and put into operation a new modernized weapon is on horseback.

Technological foundations of the production and combat process

What will this technology be based on? Now there is a transition from automation of programming to automation of design of microcircuits. The process of designing microcircuits has been automated for a long time, but the question is that the synthesis of these microcircuits should become automatic.

The microcircuit today becomes an analogue of the program. The further, the more algorithms and other control constructs are integrated directly into the iron level, which in the era of computers were implemented by program code. Now these algorithms must be implemented directly by the chip.

Previously, those who developed a new process described this process with an algorithm, then sent it to Bangalore, where coding decoys translated it into the form of a program. This program was loaded into the processor, and the computer worked it out. This is yesterday's technology. Coding decoys are long and buggy, and their presence ensures that

the loop fails. This put the automation of program synthesis on the agenda. Today, the one who created the description of a new process runs it into an automatic coding system, and it recodes it into a program. These systems are written using artificial intelligence tools, in terms of describing environments and goals, and so on. They generate some kind of object code that expresses the control algorithm.



This, too, is already a passing day. The next stage is when not the object code will be generated, but directly the hardware implementation of this developed process. **Technological the mainstream today is the transition from focusing on the production of mainframe computers and programs to the production of program**

chips. Each program, each management process will be implemented at the hardware level. **The process of designing microcircuits replaces the process of programming in the field of manufacturing complex equipment.** We create a microcircuit program for each process that we need to control. The further, the faster we must do it. Therefore, the task is to automate the process of designing such microcircuits.

The production center will develop control processes, modernize combat processes and directly form equipment and control systems for this equipment, which implements the developed modernized combat process. Consequently, **the combat process as a whole is designed**, then the equipment is designed for it, then the control system is designed for it **at the hardware level.** All this is instantly implemented by automatic production, and goes into battle right from the assembly line, from under a 3d printer or GPS. This is the combat cycle.

We see that the combat process is a copy of the production process. From it follows **the essence of the new economic relations.** The business of the reindustrialization era is a business based on such production cycles. The production cycle and the combat cycle are practically the same thing. **Production relations are determined by the organization of production, the organization of units, the organization of supply, that is, the entire military organization.**

Resources for the production of new technology are small in terms of mass. These are not mass resources - a certain amount of composite materials, a certain amount of raw materials for the production of microcircuits. We need expensive, but in small quantities, rare earth metals. The production processes themselves can be classified as nanotechnologies.

In Russia, no one knows what nanotechnology is. They know that there are some graphene tubes, people consider economic light bulbs to be nanotechnologies. In reality, nanotechnologies are technologies for the formation of these very microcircuits, products from composite and new materials. It requires small resources, very small amounts of energy, very small and small production equipment. But the intellectual component of the product is 99% of its added value. As a result, **the production bases are very small and are included in the system of combat use.** The production of military equipment, the development of a combat process and combat use are now merging into one process.

In the twentieth century, these were different processes. In World War II, on the one hand, there was industry, on the other hand, the front. Some were engaged in production, others - in combat use. This system was inherited after the Second World War. In the US, there is still a military-industrial complex, and there is a combat use. In Russia, apart from the Stalinist military-industrial complex, there is nothing else. They periodically try to reanimate it, on its basis the question is decided whether there is life after death. Comrade Rogozin is now busy with this. After death, you can galvanize, but it will not live.

Where we see real processes of combat use, for example in Israel, they already combine combat and production components, but they are still at the beginning of this path. Israel now has the only permanently fighting army, so they have to do it. They do it intuitively, without reflecting yet. Strategic thinking is not enough there either, but the processes are already moving in the direction that we foresee.

military caste

Who is capable of waging a modern war? Of course, the military. In the era of mass armies, the understanding of who can be a military man has largely been erased. Today, war is the business of small power organizations, and in these organizations there is no place for superfluous people.

In the USSR, there were a huge number of military institutes, which were actually engineering universities. Most of the institutions of higher education of the Ministry of Defense were not military, but engineering universities. Somehow they depicted something related to military affairs - antediluvian shagistics, some military tricks, but in fact they were engineering universities. From there, guys with a higher engineering degree came out, they were hung up with a secondary military officer.

What is secondary military education? A boy who knows how to be a commander. For the most part, the guys who left these schools turned out to be such commanders as a ballerina out of me. Fuckers suckers, to put it politely. They were given shoulder straps. It was impossible to tell by the uniform where the shady engineer was and where the right military man was. Even at the Human Resources level, this was not a completely distinguishable procedure. There was no caste of military commanders.

They tried to make some elite troops, for example, the Airborne Forces. They tried to use morale boosting methods stolen from the American caste army. But in reality, they were simply collective farmers who were taught to play Zarnitsa. Collective farmers are at their best. The best paratroopers were just from the collective farmers. What was from the cities - it was... well, the Makhnovist army was better. If you want to see what the Soviet-post-Soviet airborne troops are like, take a walk around Moscow on the second or third of August.

Inside the GRU there was an attempt to build a military caste. There were rules that the military really should have. There were combat-ready units that were capable of carrying out real combat operations. There were boys who understood what to do, how to do it. These were real military men who represented a military caste.

The problem of the USSR was that the lack of real caste education was not only at the level of the lower classes. It was also at the command level. The personnel of, say, the General Staff, the services of the Ministry of Defense are more like civilian institutions than what military structures should represent from you.

All this is the result of the natural decomposition of the army, which did not correspond in its organization to the real structure of challenges, technologies, and in general to the real way of life that has developed. It has become something that has become an imitation of the army. It got to the point that the air defense system led some kid on an amateur airplane from the very border, and no one gave the order to shoot him down just because at that time the commander in chief was in the country. As if the Commander-in-Chief did not have special communications at his dacha... It suddenly became clear that in this huge clumsy army no one takes on any power and responsibility. After that, it became clear that such an army was simply not needed. Even the best Soviet generals that I knew (say, General Varennikov, who had an exceptional ability for this environment to command, take responsibility), even they were not ready to take the risk of breaking the situation in difficult situations, as the history of August 1991 showed. m year.

For new military structures, it will be very important to make the right separation between the engineering and technical staff and the military, who are engaged in strategy and combat use. It is very important to understand that **an engineer should not have shoulder straps.**

In the military-industrial complex of the USSR, all general designers had shoulder straps of such dimensions that when a representative of the customer came, he could shut his throat with this shoulder strap. The General Staff understood what weapons were needed. But a representative of the General Staff arrives at the appropriate firm and begins to explain what he needs. The general designer says "no, you need this». And how will I argue with the general designer when I am a colonel and he is a colonel general?

As a result, the quality of weapons went downhill. Often they did good things, but not the

ones that are needed. When real combat use began in the 90s, all this Soviet equipment had to be modernized at best. Which one was not modernized - they were all written off.

The military caste and the engineering staff must be clearly separated. In small consortia it seems that everything can be done in a friendly way. But if you do not separate, problems arise. **Engineering and technical personnel should go about their business and not get involved in issues of combat use.** A completely different approach is important here, the will is important. Will is the intuitive knowledge of what to do.

Absolute confidence in one's intuition and willingness to take risks, willingness to push through one's decision is what is needed for a military caste. **Guys who take real risks, manage risks, play risks - these are the military. The rest are non-military.** If this is not understood, there will be the same collapse as that of the USSR and the Soviet army.

Base and Elites

The most important issue for the post-industrial combat unit is the issue of basing.



Let's say you made such a system, installed production facilities somewhere in the basement, planted a group of boys who competently synthesize combat processes, organize design, and issue military equipment to the mountain. Then you begin to apply this combat technique. Soon they figured you out, the forester came - he dispersed everyone. Since there will no longer

be jokes, the forester will not disperse, but simply beat everyone.

The main issue in this case is the issue of basing secrecy, and this is already a difficult issue. It is possible to solve the problem of secrecy, but it cannot be solved absolutely. Therefore, the question of defense arises. This means that only a base that has **a critical mass necessary for self-defense**, for survival, can survive. Of course, it is not as grandiose and monstrous as, say, an air base of the twentieth century, but small terrorist groups are extremely vulnerable. Somewhere in the middle of that lies some kind of stable military organization, a stable military base.

This critical scale will be determined very quickly (the rest will not survive), and then we will see the competition of such military bases. Some will be based on old military structures, some on the basis of private armies, some will be organized from scratch, but we will see an evolutionary process. In the course of the war itself, the processes of the birth, folding, formation, and survival of such military bases will take place. We will see a natural selection of military bases, combat competition. At this stage, we will see the war of all against all.

How will the situation look from the point of view of a peaceful man in the street? I will turn to the works of Asya Kashapova, who writes under the pseudonym "Berkem al

Atomi", which I periodically make fun of at seminars, but, nevertheless, I recommend everyone to read it. Despite the fact that there is a purely feminine look, she cuts through certain things correctly. She looks from the point of view of a civil person, but she correctly wrote about some moments of destabilization, because she generalized the real experience of her childhood in the joyful 90s. For example, that the main danger will be from the police, that the population needs to have time to clean up the police in the first hours. The sooner you clean up the police, the more people will survive. The remnants of the military of old times organize some kind of civil power. For war, such "military" people are just not needed, but they will be useful for organizing civilian life. The cops will be shot, a world in which survival is possible will be maintained within the framework of settlements. This is how the municipal-feudal organization will arise.

In the descriptions of Asya Kashapova, a number of purely feminine mistakes were made. For her, a defendable base is a means of protection, a means of survival. A woman is basically focused on survival, all resources are on survival. Hence the female jealousy in the family, which is aimed at pulling all the resources to itself so that they do not leave the family. If there is a whore on the side, then she sees that resources will leave the family. Then a woman (not necessarily a wife, maybe a mother-in-law, mother) inevitably starts a scandal about the fact that resources are being pulled from the family, but she cannot allow this. This is a purely feminine approach to business.

There is also a male approach to business. For a man, a base is needed to be the backbone of operations. The male approach is aggressive when viewed from a purely tactical point of view, but when viewed strategically, it is expansive. A man needs a base in order to have a forceful impact on the environment. A man is ready, of course, to think about security issues, but security issues are important for him only as issues of ensuring expansion, expansive actions. This is the idea of the life of real, correct military men.

The right military man looks at everything from the point of view of not defense, but expansion. Defense is only a necessary component, but any military man understands that defense cannot be absolute. You can win only by destroying the enemy. If you don't destroy the enemy, then no matter how you build up



the defense, you wouldn't be surrounded, like Asya Kashapova, with mines, or put some kind of air defense equipment - it doesn't work. There are no invulnerable bases.

At all times, the military chose, of course, such places for basing, which provide the best protection. Before the advent of cannons, these were castles, burghs on dominant high-rises, which are difficult to storm and easily beat off the attackers. In those days, they occupied the most advantageous strategic position and kept it. Later, the best places for



linear defense were chosen, they were strengthened, fortified areas were built (for example, the Maginot Line, the Mannerheim Line, the Karbyshev Line). It also worked or not - depending on the situation. In the new World War, it will be about ensuring that combat systems are based in places where they are the least vulnerable, where they are most difficult to identify and get. This is the first part of the basing problem.

the defense itself, that is, the formation of such means of defense that make it very difficult, make it almost impossible to get to the carcass that is spinning the whole thing. To not get a depth charge, for example. The question of underground basing is now being developed. We parse it in our strategy games.

Protection makes sense when you protect your production system, the living force that sits there. But if you made such a system as Asya Kashapova to cover up the apartment - this is beyond the thinking of the military. In order to ensure offensive strike operations, this will, of course, be done. As a result, places, zones, very limited zones will appear, which are much less vulnerable to the enemy's strike weapons, just like there was a fortress in the era of agrarian civilization, the era of agrarian wars. The garrison that kept it normally sat in this fortress, but when some significant problem arose, the entire population had to flee under the protection of this fortress. Who was taken there? The one who was needed by the owner from the point of view of resources could be hidden in the dungeon. Who was not needed - all sorts of peisans - at best they were used to protect the walls and lived near the outer walls in dugouts. Most of those who remained outside the walls of the fortress were forced to build some kind of ramparts around the fortress and defend themselves. They also became the first victims.

A fortress is a place where the elite is kept. We will see the repetition of the well-known on a new, higher level. There will be places that will be so well protected that the elite can afford to settle down there. But who will be the elite in these military conditions? Those who will be taken there will be the elite. The rest will be meat, whether or not they considered themselves elite under the previous regime.

Landowners, bourgeois, officers considered themselves the elite under the tsarist regime. They became meat for slaughter as soon as the civil war began. Some Makhno is watching: some old man is sitting in a landowner's house, there is a lot of property.

Take away the property, bury the old man. What was the elite under the previous regime will inevitably go to the drain if it does not have time to fit into these new consortia in advance, which will have real means of protection.



Tactics and strategy

Means of defense and means of attack are the same. For example, there are air defense missiles against an aircraft. These are the military means of fifty years ago. They are not needed in a new war, because missiles are too expensive, and there are many drones, and they are cheap.

Only a drone can provide air defense against a drone.

The war will really go between the bases, because relative to the rest it will not be a war, but a massacre. The bases will deploy swarms of UAVs, artillery robots and process this or that territory in the order of educational activities. If there is any military equipment in that territory, then in a day or two it is cleared, after which the corresponding feudal formation is terrorized until it realizes that the base is its owner. The civilian population, feudal formations become a resource, over which they establish control by terrorizing the base.

Then a situation arises when a competitive war begins between these bases, a competitive squabble. Everywhere it will go in the form of UAV air battles, and the task of the air battle will be to create conditions for striking at the base itself.

From the air, it is hardly possible to destroy a well-organized base: if it is deep enough, it will withstand a nuclear explosion. The bases will be air battles to prepare the conditions for the operation of sabotage units to clean up the hostile base. The main goal is to get to the carcasses, to the manpower of the enemy. A window for a successful forceful sabotage is possible only if the enemy's combat cycle fails. The base that wins this war and disrupts the opponent's management cycle creates that small time window when, with a good pace of operation, there is a chance to destroy the enemy base with a sabotage operation.

This is what is possible now, when it has not yet begun, to talk about strategy, about the tactics of combat use, about the tactics of combat rivalry. Solid writings on strategy and tactics do not appear before the war, but after. The task of military science is to generalize experience. In our time, given the speed of development of events, military science in this form is no longer needed, because generalized experience becomes obsolete even before it is generalized. Of course, the real experience of the combat use of this war will be summarized and described after the war.

Now I can not say what the nuances will be. Certain nuances are possible, they also need to be calculated. But these nuances will come to light precisely in the process of combat use. Those who will have the ability to quickly analyze their own and others' experience of combat use, to isolate the main thing from it, to quickly modernize combat processes and technical support, will win.

All this relates to the sphere of tactics: there are military bases, there are military-technical complexes on which they are based and which they somehow reproduce with each cycle at a certain modernized level. Between them there is a fighting competition. If there is no direct combat competition, then the task is to ensure its dominance over the district by terrorizing the population, feudal formations, feudal authorities, and subordinating them to their will.

At the level of tactics, it will quickly become clear that two bases have quite serious chances to kill one, and even more so three. There will be a question of building some coalitions. In the best position will be bases that for their competitors will be within difficult reach - for example, on ocean islands. Distance will play in their favor. Distance is not an absolute, but a relative advantage, but which, with a competent approach, can turn into an absolute one. Those based on ocean islands or inside the Heartland will have the advantage of invulnerability, but in terms of resource control, they will not have an advantage: resources are bad in such places.

There are, of course, islands that are good with resources. There are also places in the Siberian taiga that are very good for organizing such a base, but where do you get resources from? If you think about it in advance, you can turn around well. There are quite a lot of potential resources there, but there are simply not enough people and production structures. In this case, it will be necessary to organize wider production processes that supply the resources from which the combat system is formed. Generally speaking, these problems are solvable in all places, both in the north and in the south, and in the depths of the continent, and on the islands. You can even try to defend the city. Various schedules are possible. We will try to analyze the details in our strategic games.

For each such base, supply issues are very important. And it will go with air. Everything happens in the air. Today, we have already moved away from the classical geopolitical alignment of tallasocracy and tellurocracy, when those who focus on maritime military trade technologies and those who focus on land-based production and military technologies opposed. The theory of Admiral Machen and Mackinder postulated that the tellurocracy holds the Heartland and the thalassocracy holds the islands, is based on the islands. Between them there is a certain Rimland for which they are fighting, that is, the coastal zone from the sea to the depths available for naval operations. The whole history from the point of view of geopolitics is the competition of these two forces.

Now, in place of these two forces, there is a new total force that will control the course of history - AEROCRACY. It will become the dominant force of the post-industrial era.

LECTURE 6: CYBER CENTER WAR

We are now moving to the phase of re-industrialization, PR is moving into infrastructure. Now I will have to look at things more broadly, and as a result, say something extremely paradoxical. Until now, all the so-called sociologists have argued that we are entering the information society, and the ruling class of this society will be those who manage information flows, wage information wars. We were told that netocracy, corporatocracy, post-industrial producers will be engaged in information wars and information production.

Unfortunately, this is just an uncritical prolongation of current trends. Information has become a basic resource not in the 21st century, but in the 20th. In the late 70s of the last century, the information society reached the stage of cybernetic civilization.

This transitional process has now ended. Until now, there have been active information wars. Whoever had the best information technology, PR technology, logistics management technology, organizational technology, in general, all these information technologies, won all these implicit battles. Everything happened under the rug. We have only seen the tip of the iceberg. We have seen the era of information wars.

It cannot be said that the USSR became a victim of the information war, it just became a victim of internal processes, and not external ones. But Yugoslavia was smashed beautifully and in front of everyone with the help of information wars. It was information wars that Gaddafi and other heroes lost.

Now the level of proficiency in information technology is leveling off everywhere. Therefore, the advantage in this information technology disappears. **Information technologies go into infrastructure.** In the next 12 years, the main money will not be made on information technologies, and the main military successes will also not be in the field of information wars. Sociologists pass off the past as the future, or rather, the present, which becomes the past with indescribable speed.

In reality, we do not live in an information civilization, we are entering a **post-information** phase. On what processes, on what values, on what resources will a new civilization be built? What technologies will money be made on, what technologies will war be built on, what technologies and resources will power be built on? This is a key question of



modern sociology and political science. But academic science is only capable of chewing the leftovers of practitioners half a century ago to the point of vomiting.

Cyberwar: prehistory

We are entering the era of cyber warfare. The main question is what is a cyber operation, civilian or military?

This question did not arise today. At the level of fundamental science, he sucked for a long time. Cybernetics, not as a science, but as a meme of mass culture (if we keep in mind that the term itself became popular with the appearance of the famous book by N. Wiener) arose in the depths of the military department. Wiener's book summarized his experience at the Pentagon during World War II and after, that is, 70 years ago. Wiener summarized this 70-year-old experience with the book "Cybernetics". According to most of its ideas about reality, it has long been outdated, because it was not so much a theoretical book as a manifesto of mass culture. More precisely, not even mass, but simply culture, because this book is more of a cultural object than a scientific one.

Wiener's book set a certain ideology, a certain way of thinking. All the 60s passed under the slogan of the development of cybernetics. No one then really understood the topic, they sucked on management, processes, how to optimize something. Everyone in the American military department understood that this was important, that it was necessary to introduce management techniques. The company IBM was born - a branch of the military department - which for 70 years has been engaged in the annexation of the results of military research on a civilian basis, as later was the branch of IBM, Microsoft, the NSA branch of Google or the FBI branch of Facebook.

The understanding of the technical side of the matter was absolute. But there was no clear understanding of what the introduction of all this happiness would lead to, what the resulting restructuring of society would lead to. But in the 70s of the last century, the concept of the modern management process, and, accordingly, modern warfare, arose in Russia. It was based on two things.

On the one hand, there are machines, in the long term - robots that solve all these issues. There were no robots then, because an effective element base had not been created. But already on that element base, machines were created and the question arose - how will they manage the situation? This whole stupid Pobiska-style ACS concept was built in the hope of taking all the mess that exists in the field of management and translating everything into a programming language at once, resulting in an ACS.



In reality, the introduction of automated control, not to mention automatic, required a change in the nature of business processes, or, as they said then, production processes. The position of a person in management changed fundamentally. A person is not able to accompany and provide the decision-making process in real time. It became clear that the nature of the management process was changing, and the nature of

the planning process, the transition to action.

Professor V.I. Varshavsky posed these questions and actively researched them. I

recommend reading the popular book by V.I. Varshavsky and D.A. Pospelov "The Orchestra Plays Without a Conductor", which reflects their views on things of the 70s of the last century. The authors describe situations and approaches in which automation is self-organizing.

In the center of V.I. Varshavsky's research was the process **of self-organization** of automation. Next to him, to his full height, the main question arose - where is the place of a person? What is the management cycle turning into, more precisely, the business process itself, the military process, the production process? What does the process turn into in a world where automation has found its place?

Varshavsky then could not fit all this into those state programs that were in the USSR. There was enough insanity in the USSR. Glushkov needed to introduce American equipment for automated control systems, which simply reflected the Soviet mess that already existed, and did not try to rebuild anything. It was impossible to fit into the civilian sector; by that time, insanity in its purest form dominated the State Planning Commission. Kosygin was already near death, and did not dream of any innovations. It became clear to Varshavsky that if he could introduce it somewhere, it would only be in the military department, and he began to develop the concept of modern warfare. Next, I will tell you what came of it.

"A red star"

V.I. Varshavsky's theory of war is based on the so-called Varshavsky's five-term cybercycle, which was then codenamed "Red Star". The graphic representation of the process looked like a pentagon, where there are some additional internal connections, a certain pentagram appears there. This purely graphical representation became a symbol and gave the working name to the process.

In the West, military art provides, on the one hand, tactics (direct combat in units and formations), and, on the other hand, strategy (general management of the theater of operations). The Soviet military school has a third component - the so-called operational art. Tactics is management, a description of the processes of combat units. Strategy is the management of the entire theater of war. Operational art describes management at the level of a particular operation. A corps, several corps, an army, an army group, which was called a front - the level of operational art.

This scheme arose from the experience of the First World War, it was quite well developed by Shaposhnikov. For a formal description of the operation, Varshavsky developed this very cycle. It began with a certain collection of information, and the processes of collecting information were prescribed and formalized. The next stage is building a context, contextualization of this data, analysis, awareness. That is, the image of the war, the image of the theater of operations, the image of the operational situation at the level at which the plan is being developed was built.

Formation of the image of the operational environment was very important. Here a dialectical unity was formed, the interaction between the image, the idea of a theater of operations, and, on the other hand, the theater of operations itself. Accordingly, through the process of this collection of information and the operational establishment of adequacy, a dialectical unity was maintained between them, but at the same time they remained some kind of opposites of each other. On the basis of this concept, context, the planning process was carried out. How?

Suppose there is some fairly complex formal model of the theater of operations. With the help of heuristics, it was optimized, and some fundamental moves were found that made up the military plan. Based on this plan, the decision was made. The role of man was important at the second stage, where the image of the theater of operations was formed, and at the fourth stage, when the decision was made. The fifth stage is the execution of decisions.

In the process of execution of decisions, new information arose. This brings us back to the first stage; information comes in, and this cycle repeats over and over again. A cycle along the "red star" was deployed, a kind of spiral arose, which led in several iterations to the solution of a combat mission.

What was new here, in comparison with the management processes in the Second World War? During the Second World War, these processes were very slow, they were not automated. Everything was done, roughly speaking, by hand: intelligence worked out, consolidated departments bring together intelligence data, are engaged in criticism, verification, as such, the formation of the image of a theater of military operations does not occur, some kind of proto-image arises, a military plan is being developed without much regard for what is being done enemy. Sometimes some really brilliant commander appears, who, purely on an intuitive level, cuts through, and what his opponent's plan will be. Since there is already experience of war with this enemy, and he for himself, at the level of intuition, formed what that commander in chief would do. How Stalin was able to intuitively predict what the German field marshal would do on the other side. Thanks to this, he frustrates the plan, and there is a win. It was all very long. The military plan was the product of several months, its implementation - almost the entire military season. It takes 5 years to go through 5 cycles.

This is how the war unfolded in the middle of the last century. Automation has dramatically accelerated this process. But quantitative growth always means a qualitative transition. In the 70s, it became clear that if planning used to take several months, now it

would take weeks, even days - the information would be normal. Intelligence has already become electronic, not military, and began to work an order of magnitude faster. Next comes the analysis of electronic intelligence data, building a context plan, a context image, a theater of operations, and then you can move on to planning.

The one who is able to carry out this process faster, that is, whoever had the Red Star cycle was shorter in time, won. Whoever takes one turn of this spiral in less time, he manages to frustrate the plans of his opponent all the time. If you have completed one cycle quickly, and have already begun to form another, then it turns out that the enemy is initially lagging behind at the level of plan formation. On the next round, he lags behind at the stage of execution of the plan: when you have already begun to execute, he still has inactivity. When he is already beginning to collect information about the catastrophe that was the result of the blow and his inaction, you have already turned around once more and put the finishing plan into action. It was about the fact that the acceleration of processes will finally defeat the enemy.

This did not find enough understanding in Soviet military circles, it turned out to be too complicated for the then Soviet military leadership. The only thing that made them listen at least a little bit was the intelligence reports that the Americans are developing a cyber war, they are all doing it. Therefore, they recognized that, like, we would also need this cyber war, somewhere in the 23rd century there... Do it, okay, it might come in handy. That was the position.

By the end of the 70s, there was a need for military reform, and if this military reform had been carried out, then the USSR would have received a modern, powerful cyber army at the beginning of the information age, which would not only be invincible, but also capable of solving any tasks. Such an army would solve the Afghan issue in a couple of months. Any other issues that would arise, she would quickly resolve with high-speed cyber operations. Since the USSR did not create such an army due to the sluggishness of the political and administrative system, the Afghan war showed the inefficiency of its military organization, which made the collapse of civilian structures inevitable as well.

Boyd cycle

In the United States, there was already an understanding of the need to build an automated army in the 80s. Then came the famous collapse of the USSR. It happened without any war. In the process of this collapse, the rather aged employees of Varshavsky began to scatter. They were primarily interested in Boston, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I really wanted to get a chair there.

And then one of Varshavsky's closest employees ends up in Boston in 1990. Since he needs to somehow advance and make a career - the person is no longer young, the department is

either now or never - he decided to sell this very "red star" to the Pentagon, and make a career out of it.

He very quickly found interested accomplices at MIT who had the same ideas. On this, he fit in well with the professorial crowd, who knew how to develop the Pentagon's gold vein. They sold the concept of cyberwarfare to the Pentagon.

The Pentagon has been extremely receptive to this because the very ideas of cyber control have been in the air since the Second World War. Everyone understood that the information age had already begun, information wars were already underway, and real technology was needed. They immediately realized that, finally, the same technology was being offered.

But R. sold this technology not in its pure form, but with some adaptation to the American mentality. He included in it only what he considered understandable to the Americans. If he began to offer them something that would look too abstruse, he could be pushed aside. And he remembered very well how his boss suffered from the stupidity of Soviet warriors.



Rns. Clause 1.2. OODA military activity cycle rationale

This is how a "new" theory of the military cybercycle emerged, from which the main basic process was thrown out - the dialectical process of forming the image of the operational theater. It turned out to be easier than explaining to the US military what it was to create

the image of an operational theater. In addition, the description of this process was formulated exclusively in terms of dialectical materialism, and selling dialectical materialism to the Americans in 1991 did not seem to be a very promising business. Reformulating the theory in terms closer to the buyer turned out to be an order of magnitude more difficult than simply throwing out this stage.

This is how the so-called quartet arose. The first stage is information gathering. The second stage is orientation, from collecting information we immediately proceed to planning. Formation of plans, then some evaluation of these plans. Then - the optimization stage, where numerous heuristics were used, all the developments of Botvinnik and other schools. Next is the decision stage, and then the **action stage**.

This is an interesting difference between the American concept and the original one. Because in Soviet terminology this is the stage **of execution**, and in American terminology it is the stage **of action**. What is the difference - that in the Soviet approach some people make decisions and others execute them, while in the American one the same people make decisions and act. This is very significant.

Thus a new technology of war arose. The Pentagon very competently introduced it into the military environment, in the best traditions of the era of PR technologies.

Imagine: the military caste is very closed, people are quite conservative, and suddenly they begin to pester them with a mathematical theory that is quite deep, absolutely new, requiring new thinking. Even if their commanders came to them, they would be listened to sourly and politely forgotten. Therefore, it was important to correctly publicize, competently implement. This is something that the USSR never knew how to explain new ideas to the actual military caste.

A powerful PR campaign was carried out. She was assigned to the most charismatic of the Pentagon's PR figures. This super PR man was a retired pilot, a hero of either the Second World War or the Korean War. A truly heroic pilot with a good name, with a very good tongue. He began to promote this cycle. His name was John Boyd. For several years, he gave 1500 lectures, or, as it is called in the US, presentations. By this, he brought a new ideology to almost almost every lieutenant.

This is how a completely new military technology, a new generation, a new military order arose in the 1990s. The brains of the American military caste have changed. On this base, the military organization itself immediately began to change very quickly. The very course of warfare began to change, they became purely informational, purely cyber-wars.

This entire quartet, the truncated "Red Star", was called the Boyd cycle. The task of maximum acceleration, optimization of the Boyd cycle was set. As a result, the American army became invincible, and got the opportunity to solve large strategic tasks with small

means precisely due to the fact that the Boyd cycle, the decision-making cycle, became several times shorter than in any army built on the ideas left over from the Second World War. The world has changed. An invincible <u>American army</u> emerged, based on the Boyd cycle.



Rice. Clause 1.3. Multiple "spiral" repetition of the OODA cycle Cyber center in military and civilian applications

The cyber center, the automated decision-making system, is what modern military technology is based on. Those who do not have this cyber center have nothing to do in the modern world.

In the Russian-speaking environment, they do not now understand very well what a cyber center is. Apart from cybersyn, which was owned by Salvador Allenda in the 70s and then by its author, Stafford Beer, was very well advertised, no one knows about other cybercenters. There was no literature. But cyber centers, decision support centers have already been created everywhere today. They are the main instrument of warfare. Without them, all the military equipment that modern armies have is meaningless.

The most important thing in the theory and practice of modern combat use is speed and adequacy, an increase in speed and adequacy. Only the Boyd cycle, this information cyber quartet, today ensures the successful use of all military means. Everything else - already coffins povalennye. The rest is not armies, but masses for extermination.



Рис. П.1.5. Графическая интерпретация временных соотношений ООDА-циклов для противоборствующих сторон

Competition today is in the field of increasing the adequacy and speed of cyber centers. If we return from the Boyd cycle to the Varshavsky cycle, restore it in its original form, then in time it will differ little from the Boyd cycle, but in terms of the level of adequacy of management it will surpass it many times due to the emergence of this very dialectical link between the theater of military operations and its image, through which global control is carried out - not at the level of decisions, algorithms of actions, as in the Boyd cycle, but at the level of more encompassing procedures. There you can apply the favorite procedures of Varshavsky and Rosenblum - logic programming. And all the related heuristics, based not on algorithms, but on the formation of conclusions in the information environment.

This is a more powerful technology, it was reduced before the Boyd cycle in order to be able to sell it to Americans with their algorithmic thinking. But, at the same time, Varshavsky himself left for Israel. What he did there is no longer known. Unlike the Americans, the Israelis do not conduct public relations campaigns about the nature of their military tactics and strategy. They prefer to discuss it in a very narrow circle. Therefore, it is not very clear to what extent and what was introduced there. Either the Red Star was introduced there, or its further development has already been introduced there.

 Table A.1.2. Time spent on the implementation of OODA (OODA) - a cycle in wars of different eras (on the example of the USA)

	American Revolutionary Warrior (1776-1783)	Civil War between North and South (1861-1865)	The Second World War (1939-1945)	Wonna in the Persian Gulf (1990-1991)	War of the future
Observation	Time of observation with the HELP of a telescope and transmission of information by vestibules	Time of observation and transmission of information by telegraph	Observation time and transmission of information via radio or wired communication	Close to real time	real time
Orientation (Orientation)	weeks	days	Watch	minutes	continuously
Decision	Months	weeks	days	Watch	Immediately, instantly
Action	Season	Month	weeks	days	Watch

In the 80s, we had a fairly broad discussion, a discussion about the fact that the "Red Star" is not enough, that it needs to be closed by some kind of supervising process, that is, a broader strategic vision. It was supposed to supplement "KZ" with an epicycle to increase the adaptation of the theater image. The epicycle increased adequacy through strategic supervision without increasing the process time due to parallelization.

Whether it was introduced there or not, I cannot say, because there is simply no information, except for the information that Varshavsky lived in Israel for the last 10 years. By the nature of combat use, by the structure of the military equipment that the Israeli army is now ordering, manufacturing, and implementing, it becomes clear that everything there is focused on cyber warfare, that a cyber army is being built in an absolutely pure form. There are police forces, of course, but the army fights, firstly, with robots, and secondly, it fights at the most accelerated cycles: in any battle with the enemy, it manages to complete the combat cycle even at the stage when he had just carried out planning and starts to move on to implementation. If not just the Varshavsky cycle was introduced there, but the Red Star with supervision, then in this case it can be argued that today the Israeli army is the strongest in the world. If only the Red Star cycle has been introduced there, then this is the second army in the world.

Today, these cyber-centers, cyber-systems are already at war with each other, in which the unity of weapons, structure, military-technical side and military-organizational side is realized. These technical means can only be used within this cycle.

If you have robots - this speeds up the process of collecting information, the process of real-time combat several times. If, at the same time, a certain respected general makes a

decision, who takes it at a speed that is orders of magnitude lower than a computer could take it, then it turns out that such a brake is sitting, and while he is thinking, he was banged. Therefore, the respected general has to be withdrawn from this very cycle. The only place where he can be transferred is to the level of goal-setting, where he sets goals, or to the level of supervision, where, with his military experience and his intuition, he is able to make some changes, refinements to the very model of reality, on the basis of which the cyber center operates.

Today, the task of any war in American strategy and tactics is formulated as the task of maximizing the acceleration of the cyber-cycle, and due to this, the defeat of the enemy. You manage to do more operations, more turns of the spiral than he does, in the same time. While trying to hit you one hit, you hit him four. And he fell.

On the other hand, is this spiral ideal? For the spiral based on the Red Star, it became clear in the 80s that it would not be ideal, not necessarily on an ideal trajectory, if it was not corrected. This is where this supervising epicycle arose, which should also control the optimality of the trajectory in real time.

Automated, and in the future automatic war control systems are today the main combat means, there is a war of these systems. An attempt to formulate counteraction in terms of specific strikes, repulsion of strikes, counteraction to weapons - this has long gone into infrastructure. If you are engaged in reflection, you have lost the war.

The winner is the one who passes his spiral faster, due to acceleration. This is the first option that the Americans are betting on, they are working on it. The second option is to win by increasing the adequacy. The introduction of the Red Star cycle with its supervising epicycle makes this possible.

Other things being equal, if two cycles are equal in time, then the one that provides a more stable optimal trajectory wins, that is, the direction of the spiral itself (after all, it can go to victory, or it can deviate to the side due to the inadequacy of the image of the theater of war). The winner is the one who maintains the direction more clearly, on each cycle. Even if he lags behind, but maintains the direction more clearly, he wins: and **adequacy turns out to be a more important factor than speed** in this very concept of military application.

In addition, a blow to the cycle itself is possible. We are now moving to a whole new level, to a whole new stage, when it comes to breaking the Boyd cycle. Today, the main condition for victory is **the destruction of the opponent's cyber-cycle.** It doesn't matter how much military equipment he has left after that. The main thing is to disorganize the system. It remains only to finish off if your system is not disorganized, but his is disorganized. It is a matter of time, and a fairly short one. The decisive moment is who will have the system collapse first. And here we are already moving to a completely new

approach to warfare.

Post-information transition

I have already said that the beginning of the world war will inevitably go differently than the staffs expect it to. They will be removed from the game by the development of the process. The German General Staff in the First World War had the best, most elaborate, in the entire history of military thought, an ingenious plan for a maneuvering campaign. The Schlieffen plan is a classic of world military thought, there was nothing better. But the era of maneuver warfare is gone. Instead of maneuver warfare, they received trench warfare, a war of fronts. The German General Staff was not ready for this war. Where there was some kind of mobile warfare, in East Prussia, the German generals deployed with might and main and created a reputation for themselves as military geniuses. As soon as the transition to positional warfare began there, it became unclear what to do.

The developments of the German General Staff failed throughout the First World War. They did not know what to do with this trench war. But in World War II, the French prepared well for a positional war, strengthened their positions. They built a giant fortress, a five-seven-story concrete wall along its entire border - many floors of firing points. And then it turned out that the war had become maneuverable. Fritz passed this wall.

The same thing is happening now with the current main headquarters. When the war goes into an active phase, some new forces will inevitably come out of the shadows, form, appear, which do not need to have such an organization scale, but which will be able to form a kind of cyber center. They will have military means and concepts of their combat use, effective combat control systems.

The main thing in the upcoming war is the effectiveness of the combat control system. It is so much more important than the combat effectiveness of the means used that sometimes it seems like a paradox. It is possible, using not very effective combat means, with the help of an effective combat control system to win a campaign.

The stable phase of the World War is the competitive phase of combat control systems. Whoever can create this cyber-center in himself, he is on horseback, he is an active unit. But it is not the cyber centers that are built on the developments of the 70s that will win now. Both the Boyd cycle, and the Red Star cycle, and the Varshavsky cycle with the epicycle - they are conceptually based on the fact that there is a **continuous decision-making process** for both you and the enemy, that both of you are in a system of **combat competition.** This is a competitive system. In it, you can win by accelerating, or by increasing the adequacy of your actions.

But there is another way to win the war - to disrupt the enemy's cyber cycle, that is, to destroy the enemy's control process itself. It is within the framework of this strategy that

the groupings of the period of the stable phase of the World War will fight among themselves.

How to achieve these loop failures? Now we will analyze several fundamental points on which strategies for breaking the opponent's cybercycle are based.

To begin with, I recommend that you read the book of the Syrian joker, pseudomathematician, stock exchange guru Masim Nicholas Taleb "The Black Swan". Taleb there sucks on a thing that is known and obvious to cybernetics, but completely incomprehensible to the rest of the public. He clarifies that **our understanding of the nature of probabilities in reality is inadequate.** As soon as you come across practice, it turns out that the nature of the probability distribution is described not by a normal distribution (that is, Gaussian), but by a fractal metric. The probability space metric is initially fractal. When we look at the process from afar, the normal distribution turns out to be a good approximation. To describe processes that have already occurred, to study the forms of processes, the mathematical apparatus of Gauss works, but as soon as we deal with the process of single realizations of probability, a completely different alignment is revealed. On the example of exchange and other cases, Taleb shows that in fact the probability that we can assume is not realized. In fact, the probability of an event that seems incredible to us is much greater.

Taleb uses fractal mathematics to describe probability distributions and probabilistic processes due to the lack of a more adequate apparatus for studying essentially discrete processes. At the edges of the Gaussian, quantization starts to work. Where there is a mass accumulation, the Gaussian gives a good approximation. Not even non-linear functions emerge on the edge, and not even a fractal, but non-functions. When you start working at the level of these unlikely events, you must work in other insurance algorithms and in other implementation algorithms.

As a digression, I will say that I do not like Taleb's book: there is a lot of superfluous stuff. He talks a lot about his childhood, and he talks like a typical representative of the Lebanese nation that is bending under all, how a whore is silent that the civil war in Lebanon is not a consequence of some kind of accident, but of quite definite and vile actions of the Syrian Alawites. He has relatives in Lebanon, so he is afraid to name the authors of this accident - the intervention of the Syrian special services. Therefore, with grief, he lies that the probability of an incredible event has come true. It is funny to read about his love for Mandelbrot. It's not relevant, just skip it. It is only the general impression about these things that matters. Taking into account my remarks, I advise you to read this book, it is an interesting book.

When it becomes clear to you that the field of probabilities is not arranged in the way it

seems from our everyday experience, from our mathematical education, then you will think about how to work with these very probability flows. And then it becomes clear that **you can beat any opponent when you manage the flows of probabilities more adequately.** To beat on those extreme cases when he is mistaken in his probability model, when he incorrectly estimates the probabilities.

The farther from the Gaussian, the more it is inadequate, and, accordingly, human ideas are inadequate. The opponent chose the wrong algorithm, made the wrong decision - here you bypass him. If you start to outperform your opponent in managing the flows of probabilities, then you will inevitably destroy his very basic management process in a few cycles. You beat the parameters of this process. Your adequacy regarding the field of probabilities is higher. On this, the opponent loses, his cyber process is destroyed.

This is one of the methods of control destruction - through probabilities.

There are methods associated with the so-called **control debilitation.** They hit the human element in automated (but not automatic) combat control systems. This technique is based on the creation of so many information flows that the human decision-making element is not designed and capable of processing. As soon as you learn to hit the human element in this system, the human component, by creating several multidirectional flows, you are the winner. There are quite a few examples of modern combat use, they are known among military analysts, they can be discussed there. Outside this circle it is more difficult - few people are interested.

This no longer applies to the information side of the matter. This is already **flow control based on an intuitive-dialectical approach, an intuitive-dialectical method. The weapon of domination of the ruling classes of the future society lies in the ability to control these flows.** The competition is now in the economic sphere, and in the event of a collision, it will move into the military sphere. In principle, this is one and the same competition.

Those corporations that today have a cyber center based on cyber-syn technology, or on the Boyd cycle (maybe someone has one based on the Red Star with supervision), get the opportunity to conduct power competition or, as it is written in a textbook for suckers, "unfair competition". That is, competition based not on market competitive advantages, but on non-market ones: the ability to control the flow of resources, the ability to control the stream of consciousness, the ability to control the consumer market, control the resources necessary for business. Both the military and business models involve a battle for control over the flow of resources. The thesis "Business is war" that I threw in at my seminars in the 1980s is completely natural, because business is war, a war for the control of resources.

Wars without information

Our consideration applies to military affairs and to business in exactly the same degree. Ahead of us is a fundamental change in the technology of warfare. Today, the technology of warfare is the possession of a cyber center. The technology of warfare tomorrow is the possession of the cyber center and the technology of disorganization of the enemy's cyber center.

Today, the core of the combat clash is the clash of cyber Collisions centers. on the material level, between means of combat use, are nothing more of realizing than a process probabilities. The plan itself. which is formed and implemented, is of a probabilistic nature, and in each specific clash of combat means. there is nothing more than the



realization of certain probabilities. If the probabilities are calculated correctly, you win; if they are incorrect, you lose. You control this field of probabilities. If you manage, building algorithms for combat use adequately, then you move forward. If you manage inadequately, you go to the drain.

This is the essence of modern warfare, it is also the essence of competitive struggle. If on the one hand there is Gazprom, in which some millers with their archaic, pre-Cambrian thinking are sitting, and on the other hand, the corporatocracy is waging war, which uses these cyber centers, then in order to win the war between a modern corporation and Gazprom, do not need combat means by themselves. Moves of a purely ideological nature are capable of winning the war by themselves. In this war, you will not see a single combat clash with the use of technical means that is familiar to you. But in reality, someone went to the drain as a result of this war.

It's happening now. While there are private wars between corporations. The moment states are involved in these wars, they will fall apart, crumble like the Libyan state. And then the war will again go between corporations.

After the states fall apart, the big corporations that now have big cyber centers will have a new rival. Anyone who creates a small cyber center (and the scale is not important here) enters the theater of war as a full-fledged player. In the general case, it is impossible to crush him with a mass if he plays competently, due to stealth. Can only be crushed by more

effective combat control, combat use.

From this point on, the situation shifts from a level where mass plays a role to a level where pure efficiency plays a role. It does not matter which of these centers has a large mass of combat assets. It is important which of these centers is more effective. You can now create quite effective combat weapons in the basement on this very 3D printer or mini-AGPS. That's enough for point strikes.

provocative management comes to the fore, that is, the impact on the very process of forming the implementation of these cycles, on the cyber process itself. Thus, the technology of warfare is again fundamentally changing, which is also the technology of doing business. The world is changing so fundamentally that it is just as unrealistic to explain it to people with Precambrian brains who sit in the Kremlin and the Russian General Staff as it was 20 years ago.

New Tech Base and Netocratic Community

For a long time there has been an increase in the information component of the war. From the 40s to the 90s, the information component in the technology of warfare grew. From the 1970s to the present day, the ideological component of warfare has grown. The word ideology is not used now, other words are used - psychotechnologies, information war. Now comes the era of indirect control, that is, the era of work on the failure of the enemy's management cycles on the one hand, and on the optimization, stabilization of management cycles at home. It becomes **a basic technology** in both military and civilian life.

What takes the place of information? To begin with, I can formulate that the place of information as a technological base is occupied by **intuitive dialectical control of the probability distribution.** The place of information as a technological base is occupied by intuitive dialectical control of the probability distribution. It is clear that after reading this combination of letters, you will have nothing left but a feeling of light awesomeness. What is intuitive-dialectical control of probability distribution? How can it be a technological base? To come to some kind of intuitive understanding of this definition, we will have to think a lot and read a lot.

To begin to understand what is at stake, you should first study what a management cycle is, then you will understand what a probability distribution is. On this basis, it is already possible to understand what the competition of the control centers of the probability distribution is. To understand why it is not a fact that large centers here have an advantage over small ones. It might be just the opposite.

The development of new production technologies, business, weapons production and combat use is the task of everyone who sees his future among the elite of the emerging post-industrial society - netocracy and post-industrial technocracy. The netocratic

community today sets itself the triune goal of assimilation and development of new, postinformation management technologies, synthesis of cyber centers and centers of technical creativity of youth, formation of social structures for adapting society to the processes of post-industrial transition.

In April-May 2013, we are planning a Business Game and a seminar in Kiev, within the framework of which we intend to develop in detail the process of establishing a modern high-tech business in the conditions of at least one of the countries where a significant part of the Russian egregore lives compactly. We will develop the educational system of the netocratic community. This small introductory course of lectures is the first brick in the system of this education. We will develop a network of public organizations in all countries where representatives of our community, the Russian netocracy, live. We set ourselves the task of creating effective social lifts for talented Russian youth for recruiting into the elite of the post-industrial society.

I welcome the initiative of the Russian part of our community to organize the Netocratic Party of Russia - an important tool for establishing social partnership and cooperation with all sectors of Russian society, the Russian elite, the Russian authorities. I support the course of the Party leadership towards building partnerships, drawing the line of class peace in order to most painlessly fit Russian society into the process of post-industrial transformation, ensuring the survival of the Russian egregor in this process. The leadership of the Research Institute managed to rise above the narrow-class approach, setting the task of the survival of the Russian egregor above the narrow-class interests of our community.

Without the rapid and effective deployment of a new generation of technological structures based on new principles of social organization, Russia will inevitably turn out to be a defenseless victim in the face of future geopolitical clashes and social transformations. And along with it, all the CIS countries, where most of the Russian egregor lives, and which are his historical cradle, turn out to be defenseless. The task of establishing a new technological basis, due to the existing structure of society in the Russian Federation, turns out to be insoluble without building that social and political partnership, the work on which the young leaders of R&D have set as their goal.



I understand how difficult and thorny the mission that the leadership of the Party has consciously chosen for itself. I know very well how little negotiable those whom fate has appointed them as partners. I understand that the success of the policy chosen by the leadership of the R&D depends not so much on the leadership of the Party, but on the ability of these partners to adequately perceive reality and adapt them to reality. And at the same time, I sincerely wish the success of the sacrificial mission, which not everyone would be able to fulfill. For example, I - with my political experience and knowledge of those with whom I have to deal - is already incapable.

With this parting word, I conclude our little introductory series of lectures. The new perception of reality that you have developed in the process of mastering it will allow you to make more adequate decisions in life, in business, in politics. In the process of your party education, personal growth, building modern business and public structures - may success be with you.