Modern armed conflict dictates new rules for the military-industrial complex. Modern wars follow different rules. Precision weapons became commonplace even in the hands of “rebels”. The conflicts in Ukraine, Libya, Syria and other regions all point to the fact that small wars now go by completely different rules. Precision and guided weapons have become an attribute of all the recent wars on our planet…
I think no one will deny the fact that the war in the sense in which we understood and knew it, if we do not talk about a full-scale war with fronts and nuclear weapons, has undergone significant changes, and I think the Russian defense Ministry should pay close attention to this fact.
The war in Ukraine, the civil war in Libya, the war in Syria, armed conflicts in Yemen and other regions, all indicate that small wars now go by completely different rules.
The time when guided weapons were available only to privileged militants has passed without a trace. In contemporary armed conflicts, anti-tank, anti-tank systems and MANPADS, sticking out from almost every bump…
How could anyone have imagined 10 years ago that the militants of the so-called Syrian opposition, during the armed conflict in Syria, will use chemical warfare agents and attack drones. How could anyone imagine that the Yemeni Houthis would resist the Arab coalition for four years and even launch rocket and bomb attacks on the cities of Saudi Arabia?
Probably, somewhere in the gallery of military-political thought, there were such theses, but no one seriously talked about it. And today, it’s the harsh truth of our lives.
If we look closely at the range of weapons used in the so-called small wars or armed conflicts, we can see that such a class of weapons as precision and guided weapons has become a direct attribute of all the recent wars on our planet. And this is not counting EW systems, intelligence, communications and combat control.
What used to be available only to the leading powers of the world, today is actively used in every military conflict on our planet.
When I was at the Army-2019 forum, I was interested in how our modern weapons and military equipment correspond to the challenges and threats that are dictated by the realities of the same war in Syria. And I have to admit the fact that while our weapons and military equipment generally correspond to the concept of waging a modern major war, there is still work to be done in relation to the armed conflicts that are taking place today in Libya, Syria, Yemen, Donbas, and even in Africa.
Let’s start with the sore spot, with the connection
Let us, for example, take KAMAZ-63968 “Typhoon”, which is armed with the military police of the Ministry of defense of the Russian Federation and is actively exploited in Syria. Modern wars follow different rules. Precision weapons have become commonplace even in the hands of “rebels»
KAMAZ-63968 ” TYPHOON»
Typhoon K-63968 is equipped with five video cameras for all-around view in the landing module and cockpit. The cabin is equipped with folding monitors, showing both the condition of the car and the external review.
The vehicle is equipped with on-Board Information and Control System (bius) GALS-D1M to monitor and regulate the engine, calculate the roll of the machine, the slope of the road, speed, location, etc. the Machine is excellent. I’d take one.
However, the problem is that those design bureaus that created it, they did it, based on those technical specifications and conceptual approaches that inevitably rely on the tactics of the Russian armed forces in the war described by the old combat regulations. This machine is not equipped with the telecommunications and information media it needs as part of the functions it performs in Syria.
Simply put, Typhoon K-63968 has the means of communication that would be necessary for this technique, if it was used as part of a motorized rifle battalion, but these means of communication and transmission of information are absolutely insufficient in the performance of patrol functions of the military police on this machine.
Russian communication troops are present in Syria, and they really provide reliable communication and data transmission, but only within the Hmeimim air base and the port of Tartus, and then Hello to my favorites from the company “NGO Angstrom” with their budget P-187 “Azart” and TETRA mode, since outside the bases of the Russian armed forces in Syria, everyone uses mobile phones and Chinese “balalaika” working in the bands of Syrian trunking communications.
This is indeed a fact, since in the Idlib zone of joint patrol, the Russian military police have to use mobile phones. I know of at least four such cases. You can say it’s not much, but that’s just what I know…
Sergei Pavlovich Korolev attribute the phrase – ” I do not agree-criticize, criticize-offer, offer-do, do-answer!»
Do, until not in my competence. Did would-responded. In the meantime, I can only offer.
For some reason, in Russia, the means of space communication are considered as an attribute of elite affiliation, although those satellite groups that are in service with the Ministry of defense and that provide communication to our troops, at best, are used with 20% efficiency.
On the contrary, satellite communication in the us army, is not an attribute of the authorities and is quite available even in the company link.
Even the militants, the so-called “Syrian opposition”, are armed with American base terminals AN/PRC-155 Manpack from General Dynamics, which not only create a secure mobile communication cell, but also allow via satellite is constantly in touch with its American curator.
Modern wars follow different rules
Precision weapons became commonplace even in the hands of “rebels”. Alas, in our armed forces, there are no such terminals. In the best case, if some special forces group will be given a satellite phone and strictly forbidden to call it.
In my opinion, all high-security vehicles used by the military police, and ideally, most of the military equipment of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, should be equipped with satellite communications and telecommunications. This is due to the fact that in those armed conflicts in which our armed forces take part, communication is not only an element of tactical control, but also the possibility of operational influence on the information and political situation of the conflict. And in the conditions of hybrid wars, it is sometimes more important than maintaining radio silence. But that’s not all.
To date, our military communications facilities, which are installed on military equipment and operated in the armed forces do not have the technical capability to support self-organizing broadband decentralized digital data networks. In other words, the radio station, which is installed on the same Typhoon K-63968 is unable to function as a base station, providing stronger coverage of the territory where the crew of this military equipment performs its tasks.
Not let us far stray from KAMAZ-63968 “Typhoon” and turn to the second issue
Looking through the reports of hostilities in Yemen, Syria, Donbas and even in Israel, we can notice a certain pattern and similarity of these military conflicts.
Anti-tank guided weapons systems, perhaps, have become the main attribute of the war. In addition to artillery, the main losses in manpower and equipment, the parties to these armed conflicts are from the use of ATGM and ATGM.
Those who are interested in the problems of modern armed conflicts, know perfectly well that the entire YouTube is littered with footage of the Houthis, where in Yemen they burn guided missiles military equipment of Saudi Arabia. Modern military equipment, which is made to the same standards of protection as the Russian KAMAZ-63968 “Typhoon”.
It is important to note that the American armored vehicles, which are armed with Saudi Arabia, that the Russian “Typhoon”, perfectly protect from bullets and mines,but they are completely defenseless before the ATGM and ATGM.
The war in Syria was no exception
During this armed conflict, the militants of the so-called Syrian opposition, as well as militants of terrorist groups, repeatedly demonstrated footage of the use of ATGM and ATGM on military equipment of the Syrian army and it should be noted that this type of weapons caused significant damage to government units.
To this day, Syria retains those areas, especially adjacent to Idlib or the terrorist enclave in Al-TANF, under the control of the United States, where there are ambushes of opposition fighters and terrorists with the use of ATGM and ATGM.
As an example of the use of ATGM and ATGM can lead the war in the Donbass, where in the conditions of positional conflict, this type of weapons is actively used not only to defeat military equipment, but also to damage personnel located in fortifications.
The modern concept of the use of weapons and military equipment by the main armies of the world as a whole is similar and develops quite linearly.
To date, the classic army consider the use of active protection systems against ATGM and ATGM exclusively on heavy and medium armored vehicles-tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and APCS.
Even Israel, which is in a state of armed conflict with the Hezbollah group, only in 2006, after the second Lebanese war, decided to equip merkav tanks with active protection complexes “Trophy”.
In modern wars, when the use of light armored vehicles, such as MRAP has become quite widespread, and the role of armored vehicles, tanks, IFVs, APCS was reduced to fire support, the role of ATGM and ATGM on the battlefield is often crucial.
Given these circumstances, there is an urgent need to ensure the protection of light armored wheeled vehicles, such as MRAP, from the defeat of guided weapons such as ATGM and ATGM.
To date, not all manufacturers of active protection systems of armored vehicles are ready to install their developments on light wheeled armored vehicles. Perhaps the only solution in the field of active protection systems of light armored vehicles presented by the German company IBD Deisenroth Engineering. Their KAZ AMAP-ADS system can be adapted for passenger transport applications.
As for the Russian systems of active protection of armored vehicles, the most advanced KAZ “Afganit” is installed on those types of weapons that are created within the framework of the Armata project and due to these circumstances KAZ “Afganit” does not have a sufficiently wide distribution.
I believe that the Russian defense Ministry should somewhat revise and adjust the specifications that it issues to our manufacturers of weapons and military equipment.
In my opinion, the military equipment, such as MRAP, which is supplied to the Russian army, should by default be equipped with active protection systems, such as KAZ “Afganit”. This is due to the trends that dictate modern armed conflicts, because the probability of getting under fire ATGM and ATGM, for example, in Syria, the military police unit of the Russian Federation on KAMAZ-63968 “Typhoon”, is much higher than the tank of the 25th division of the SPN” tiger Forces”, which provides fire support for offensives.
Of course, active protection systems are expensive, and they significantly increase the cost of military equipment.
But the question of price is a relative question. Just the other day, Yemeni Houthis attacked an oil refinery in Saudi Arabia using UAVs and ballistic missiles.
Even if we assume that these strike UAVs cost several tens of thousands of dollars, and missiles hundreds of thousands of dollars, the damage to Saudi Arabia is estimated in billions of losses, and the world economy will lose trillions from rising prices for energy resources.
And in this case, the actual practice of modern armed conflicts shows us that the question of the need to equip light armored vehicles, such as MRAP, with active protection systems, is completely irrelevant. Of course you need to equip. And the sooner this is done, the more likely it is that Russian units that in one way or another are involved in modern armed conflicts will not suffer from the fire of ATGM and ATGM.
The question of additional protection is fair not only in relation to light armored vehicles, such as KAMAZ-63968 “Typhoon”, it is more than fair even in relation to such types of weapons as zrpk “Armor” and SAM ” TOR ” and others…
Ask what does the active protection and air defense systems?
And despite the fact that there is a characteristic example that directly indicates that all military air defense systems must have such protection.
This example is in Syria, where during combat use, one of the zrpk “Shell”, was destroyed by a guided missile from an Israeli air force aircraft.
Of course, we can say that this complex was destroyed as a consequence of the negligence of the combat crew, which did not change position after the exhaustion of ammunition, and we can say that the zrpk “Armor” after the exhaustion of ammunition, became defenseless for attacks of guided weapons of the air – surface class. And then, and then, to be fair. Of course, you can rely on the qualification of combat calculations of military air defense systems, but in my opinion, additional insurance would not be superfluous.
I think it would be wise on the basis of the active protection system, to create for existing and future systems military air defense the last line of defense that was intended to ensure the safety and protection of the car’s air defense against possible missile attacks. Not only when this system has exhausted ammunition, but also in those cases when the air defense is broken and the air defense installation itself comes under attack.
There is another point that in my opinion requires attention
The experience of the armed conflict in Syria has shown that the protection systems that are installed on the aircraft of the Russian aerospace forces, on the equipment of the army aviation, is not a panacea for a possible attack using guided missiles or MANPADS.
We all remember how on February 3, 2018, a su-25 attack aircraft was shot down from MANPADS near Idlib. Pilot major Roman Filipov ejected and died in battle with terrorists Dzhebhat al-Nusra.
On 8 July 2016, a Russian mi-35M helicopter under the control of Russian instructor pilots Ryafagat Khabibulin and Yevgeny Dolgin was shot down by ISIS militants from the ATGM “TOW”. The helicopter crashed in an area controlled by the Syrian government army, the pilots were killed. Even from the fire of militants, Russia lost 3 helicopters.
Of course, new aircraft protection systems are being developed and implemented in Russia, the President-C system is already in place and is being put into service, which is capable of protecting aviation equipment not only from the Igla MANPADS, but also countering missiles of previous models, such as the Strela and foreign weapons of this class, such as the American-made Stinger systems.
This is really good, but this system at best provides protection for aircraft from missiles with infrared homing head and which are used on the principle of-shot and forgot.
However, there is a mass of guided weapons, which is armed with the same fighters of the Syrian opposition, which does not use the principles of automatic homing on the target. The same ATGM “TOW”, which terrorists shot down our helicopters, is corrected after a shot on wires. And our army aviation, which performs the main work in Syria, has no means of protection against such weapons. Heat traps, radio suppression, target simulators, laser illumination of homing heads, all this is useless against guided weapons, after which the missile flight is corrected by the shooter.
ATGM “TOW”
In my opinion, there is an urgent need to improve systems to counter such threats. In addition to thermal traps and laser illumination, which counteract the IR homing missiles, electronic jamming systems, which are designed to counteract the radio command and radar guidance, other systems of counteraction, it seems to me it is necessary to create elements of kinetic interception, both existing and prospective ammunition ATGM, ATGM and MANPADS.
What could it be
For example, special ammunition can be placed in the containers of shooting ltts, which when shooting move in the direction of an incoming missile ATGM, ATGM or MANPADS, and at a certain moment are undermined by a radio command fuse, thereby destroying fragments or knocking off course threatening ammunition.
For helicopters of army aviation, for example, you can create lateral rotating machine guns, which are used as machine-gun turret on the platform “Armata”, is paired with KAZ “Afghani”, in fact due to what military equipment on the platform has a protection upper hemisphere from potential attacks ATGM. As a special case, for these purposes, you can use a four-barreled aviation machine gun caliber 7.62 mm GSHG-7.62 Tula “design Bureau of instrumentation”. As it seems to me, it should cope with this function more than positively.
Another point that I would like to note as a trend of modern armed conflicts is the flow of the intensity of hostilities in conditions of limited visibility – that is, in the night.
Many have seen on YouTube summaries of the fighting, either on the channels of official sources, or on the channel AnnaNews, where you can see how the aircraft VKS strikes and hunt almost for individual cyclists militants.
In fact it is not for nothing
The fact is that the terrorists, understanding the technical capabilities of both the Syrian army and the Russian aerospace forces are trying to regroup and move their forces in such a way that it does not cause attention from the operators of UAVs and, as a consequence, air strikes.
To do this, the terrorists have developed a strategy of daily accumulation of forces and means in shelters, where the militants arrive in small groups or single order using individual vehicles in the form of mopeds, motorcycles or bicycles. And with the onset of darkness already carry out their sorties.
And if those units of the Syrian army, which operate in close conjunction with the Russian command of the Hmeimim air base, have the technical capabilities of reconnaissance and combat operations at night, then most of the units of the Syrian army do not have such a possibility and at night they bear significant losses from terrorist attacks.
In turn, the militants of the so-called Syrian opposition or terrorists operating under the auspices of the United States, are well equipped and have all the necessary technical capabilities to conduct combat operations at night.
Again, we can cite as an example the long-suffering Donbass, where the armed forces of Ukraine practically on a daily basis are shelling the territory of peaceful cities that are attached to the contact line. This armed conflict also predominantly takes place at night. This is due to the fact that it is much easier for armed formations of Ukraine to mask the advance of their equipment and fire groups from the OSCE monitoring mission at night.
As a conclusion, I would like to say that all these trends in modern armed conflicts certainly make new demands not only on the range of technical means that are designed to enable the Russian army to conduct combat operations at night, in the conditions of active use of guided weapons, but also requires the development of new tactics, new approaches to combat operations, which will be based, as well as on modern capabilities of weapons and military equipment, and features of hybrid warfare.
