The field of technology has become one of the most important in the struggle for power in the XXI century. By the beginning of the third decade of the new century, the formation of two main “technological ecosystems” – the American and Chinese-is obvious. In this regard, the dilemma is urgent for Russia: connect to one of the existing platforms or develop your own? The choice in favor of the first option involves determining the conditions under which such “joining”should take place. The second option requires a more ambitious strategy that will determine the key parameters of the Russian “technoecosystem” itself.
The American system is the oldest, largest and most developed. It relies on the undisputed technological leadership of the United States. The key goal of the American technology strategy is to maintain the initiative in innovation, extend its own dominance and prevent the emergence of comparable competitors in the global market. For this purpose, active personnel work is being carried out, preferential conditions are being created for the development of the startup ecosystem, and competition methods that are far from economic are being used.
The market capacity and favorable domestic conditions allowed the United States to bring to the market the largest technology and Internet giants, whose intellectual property rights are legally protected. An indirect but significant factor in the American techno-economic system is the creationof numerous common goods products.All this allows American companies to provide the entire world with a trial version of their own products, which gives the user the opportunity to get access to one of the most advanced technologies without excessive costs. The United States ‘ proposed principles of openness and freedom in the digital sphere are fascinating. However, there is no doubt that at the moment when Americans doubt their own hegemony in the technological environment, these principles will be immediately revised. There will be insurmountable borders and barriers designed to deter competitors and protect American leadership.
Even within the United States, the decisions of tech giants to block and delete more than 70,000 accounts, including the pages of President Donald Trump, are similar to open attempts to seize control tools from the authorities. In this case, the companies played for the political establishment against the unwanted” spoiler ” of the system. It is likely that in the coming years, a team of political, financial, and technological globalists will continue to work together to counter the national industrial agenda in America and elsewhere. At the same time, from the camp of Democrats, there are still concerns that, no matter how convenient regardless of the technologies offered by corporations, increasing the influence of tech giants is dangerous both because of their accumulation of “unprecedented economic power” and because of increasing “control over political communication and communications”[1]. The dominance of tech giants in the dissemination of information and their ability to politically mobilize the masses are already a threat to democratic governments.
The Chinese techno-economic platform is smaller than the American one, although the claims to technological leadership are also obvious here. A significant amount of financial and human resources allows the Chinese ecosystem to be self-contained and administratively redistribute resources to those areas of technological development that the CPC Politburo considers most promising. The Chinese were the first in the world to experiment with the autonomy of a number of services and services, building the “Great Firewall of China” (The Great Firewall of ChinaWhile the Americans offer a trial version of their product to the whole world, the competitiveness of the Chinese model is based on the cheapness of their offer and participation in financing advanced developments in other countries2. At the same time, China relies on wait-and-see tactics and does not respond to US provocations. America is rightly viewed in China as a more significant and powerful player in this area. However, the growth rate of the Chinese technology industry allows Beijing to count on the fact that it is only a matter of time before reaching a market position comparable to the United States. It is unlikely that the Americans they will be able to stop this process. There is a demand for pragmatism in world politics. Responding to it, an increasing number of American allies (including Europeans) are favorably accepting China’s proposals for cooperation in the digital sphere [3].
The growing awareness among European countries of the importance of digital sovereignty could potentially be of interest to Russia. Key European countries-Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands-fear dependence on Americans and Chinese. The need to develop a national technology platform is particularly emphasized by the French. Europeans are afraid of losing their subjectivity in the global technological environment and ultimately find themselves in a situation where their voice will not be taken into account [4].
Russia and the Europeans are united by the fear of becoming dependent on leading players and losing their own autonomy. At the same time, Russia, like some other European countries, has the competence to form an independent pole of power in the digital sphere. Russian arguments about developing a data compatibility standard are more likely to be heard in Europe than in China and the United States.
The latter two countries themselves have a significant amount of data and are not ready to share it with third countries. However, Moscow’s political differences with the Europeans can become an insurmountable obstacle to a full-fledged collaboration, which is an additional motivating factor for Russia in forming its own technology platform.
Global trends in the development of the digital environment
The global digital revolution has led to a radical transformation not only of technological and economic structures, but also of social relations and the very philosophy of human life. These changes are fully reflected in the sphere of international relations. The current situation in the world is similar (although at a fundamentally new level) over time of invention nuclear weapons and the beginning of space exploration, when technological changes significantly changed the international behavior of states. It is already possible to identify a number of trends launched by new technologies that will determine the direction of further evolution of the system of international relations.
The rapid development of science and technology has created prerequisites for reducing socio-economic inequality at the national and global levels. However, it also increased the vulnerability – and suspiciousness-of society in the face of new (or old, re-imagined) challenges and threats. New channels and methods of communication have significantly increased the information connectivity of the world. But they also contributed to the atomization of States that seek to protect such channels from foreign interference. The explosive growth of technologies and how they are used continues to blur the line between virtual and real the world, fact and fiction. This increases uncertainty in international relations and reinforces their anarchic state.
This uncertainty is compounded by the growing gap between the dynamics of development and innovation and the speed at which these changes are reflected in the regulatory fabric. Phenomena that are not regulated by international law become a challenge to the classical system of international relations. For example, there are no codified agreements to restrict the use of artificial intelligence or supercomputers and cloud computing in military region engages the Powers that possess such technologies in a vicious cycle of a constant arms race, which diverts resources and attention from the development of their civilian applications. Despite the fact that the Internet is becoming a key source of new threats in the new environment, world governments do not have common approaches to defining the concept of “sovereignty in cyberspace”, and work is not yet underway to develop international agreements similar to the outer space Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, or the airspace sovereignty Treaty.
The all-encompassing nature of digital transformation processes leads to the fact that they fall into the focus of attention of an increasing number of international organizations – both specialized (ITU) and non-core (UNESCO, UNCTAD, PACE). This disperses the international digital agenda and multiplies mutually exclusive approaches to its issues. The lack of a single and clear conceptual and categorical apparatus in this area exacerbates contradictions and disputes [5].
On more technologically-oriented international platforms – governmental and non – governmental-the struggle is unfolding for universal recognition of technical standards created by states or large corporations. The most successful lobbyists from among governments and businesses get a significant market advantage in the case of codification of their proposed standard: the whole world begins to consume their products, and they get the opportunity to significantly influence the further development of the chosen technology. A similar struggle for standards is far from over ongoing international political implications. Given the continued rapid penetration of digitalization into public life, digital technology suppliers are firmly tying their client states to themselves, making them more dependent on certain standards and types of solutions, making them more dependent on their exports-similar to the export of weapons or energy resources.
The seriousness of this problem is clearly illustrated, for example, by the situation faced by the EAEU member states in implementing digital integration. The creation of a unified system for electronic exchange of legally significant documents was greatly hampered by the fact that different EAEU states use different cryptographic standards, not all of which are recognized as secure. The lack of coordination in their implementation, albeit for objective reasons, has led to the emergence of a technical barrier to the development of integration processes, which has long-term political implications. and the economic consequences.
Global digitalization has significantly increased the international legal personality of non-State participants in international relations. Initially, the technical NGO “Corporation for Domain Names and IP addresses Management”, created with the participation of the US government to regulate issues related to domain names, IP addresses and the functioning of the global network, has become a leading institution of “Internet governance”, where states do not have a dominant role [6].
Multinational giants – Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Huawei, TikTok, Alibaba, YouTube – they are already talking to national and foreign governments on equal terms. It is impossible to ignore them as a factor of national security. On the one hand, the information accumulated by such ecosystems and the advanced solutions implemented by them are of great interest to the competent authorities. On the other hand, their ability as information resources to broadcast certain information messages to a huge audience, directly or indirectly – through controlled search results – becomes a factor in national political life. Specified values the properties of such corporations give them a “voice” in the international arena and at the same time make them subject to strict national regulation. The understandable desire of States to control their information activities and gain access to the data they hold leads to an erosion of liberal values – freedom of speech, secrecy of correspondence, secrecy of private life – and raises questions about their applicability in the changed digital age.
A separate issue in the confrontation between corporations and states remains the issue of their fair taxation, especially if their services operate in a foreign jurisdiction [7]. It is important to avoid double taxation of such platforms in order to avoid deterioration of the situation of consumers and the products and services they receive.
Perhaps for the first time, ordinary citizens have gained the ability to directly influence international relations on such a scale as today. Social networks, instant messengers, and Internet television almost won the competition with traditional media, turned every smartphone owner into a potential journalist and gave him the ability to instantly make his “news” for millions of people. This seemingly gratifying display of freedom to speak and be heard is overshadowed by the fact that in the era of “post-truth” verification of fact is no longer a requirement for our trust in it. In the best case scenario unintentional subjectivism or craving for the attention of an” amateur reporter ” who is not bound by professional journalistic ethics or publication policies, or at worst, spreading deliberately false information, can have devastating consequences for society and the state.
At the same time, the example of deleting Trump’s Twitter account demonstrates another trend. During the four years of Trump’s presidency, Twitter was an important resource of his power and the main tool for combating political opponents. With its help, Trump set the information agenda, dictated political will, appointed to positions and ignominiously dismissed yesterday’s like-minded people. For millions of supporters of the president of Twitter he became a mouthpiece of dissatisfaction with Washington. With its help, it was possible, while remaining misunderstood, to be at least heard by the elites. So some people were amused by the president’s tweets, others were scared, and others were annoyed.
At the symbolic level, the removal of Trump’s account – even after he has already backed down and called on his supporters to protest peacefully – is much more demonstrative and sudden “elimination” of him as president two weeks before the end of his term than through a court or impeachment. But more importantly, this mission to” eliminate ” was carried out not by Congress, not by the military, not by the Supreme Court, but by the head of the technology company Twitter.
This case is likely to raise the demand of third countries for “digital sovereignty” from American tech giants, on the one hand, and on the other hand, it will strengthen the intention of these states to protect themselves from the dominance of their own and foreign technology companies by more stringent legislative regulation of their activities in their territories. In the long run, this may reinforce the political fragmentation of the world.
Further development of cognitive technologies, primarily deepfake [8], gives attackers unlimited opportunities to create toxic content that can already be classified as weapons of mass destruction by its impact [9].
Thus, the growth of public freedom and the strengthening of tools for its implementation paradoxically develops in parallel with the strengthening of the police power of the state, and this becomes a new norm of everyday life. The second trend is also growing for objective reasons: the desire of states to ensure the safety of citizens, including by restricting their access to the darknet and uncontrolled elements of the network, can hardly be called a dictatorial whim of governments. The degree of deanonymization of users in the network will continue to increase.
The lack of institutions for arbitration or investigation of cyber incidents and cybercrime recognized by all players, as well as the still weak development of digital forensics tools, makes it almost impossible to reliably determine the party responsible for the incident. This, in turn, increases the level of distrust and conflict between countries. At the same time, in the context of the development of new technologies – primarily the Internet of Things and autonomous intelligent systems – it is enough for attackers to have a sufficiently powerful home computer or even a smartphone to crack the security system the hacker may not necessarily be a saboteur or terrorist, but it may also be a technically gifted “teenager”.
Countries ‘ attempt to protect themselves from such infiltration has a number of consequences. First of all, states seek to limit the vulnerability of the network by stimulating import substitution and deep localization – it is easier to trust “their” controlled manufacturer of equipment or solutions. This leads to the disintegration of international production chains and a certain erosion of the principles of the international division of labor. In an environment where everyone who can is starting to produce their own critical hardware and “software” (servers, operating systems, antivirus and security systems), the economic situation is growing. specialization loses its appeal. In addition, the definition of authorized operators, limiting competition in the market inevitably leads to a slowdown in technology development, forcing states to live in a dilemma: progress or security. Here, as in many other aspects of the global digital economy, there is a contradiction between information exchange as a global phenomenon and physical infrastructure that has a territorial connection, and therefore is under a certain sovereignty.
This contradiction is evident in the issue of storing, processing and moving information through Internet channels. Historically, there has been a serious imbalance in the geographical distribution of the basic infrastructure and the nationality of the main Internet players. More than 60 percent of the total number of domains are managed by American players (Verisign, Afilias), more than 50 percent of content delivery networks are owned by American companies (Amazon, Akamai, Cloudflare), all major first-level providers are residents of the United States, and ten of the thirteen DNS servers are located in the United States-servers. It is not surprising that with such an “Internet geography” and the awareness of the US readiness to take very extreme measures in unilateral sanctions [10], states that are not Washington’s direct allies are trying to create an alternative protected contour of the “national, sovereign Internet” – and the number of such states is increasing. On the other hand, according to experts, satellite Internet may displace cable Internet no later than the middle of this century , and the struggle will move to space or the upper atmosphere in a new round [11], but its nature consists in the reluctance of states leaving key infrastructure outside the zone of its sovereign control will continue.
The desire for sovereign control of an increasing number of States is also reflected in their attitude to the issue of storing personal data of citizens. And the European GDPR The Russian so-called “Spring package”, despite all the nuances of each approach, postulate the need for storing personal data by all internet market operators on servers located in national jurisdiction. This approach is aggressively opposed primarily by the Anglo-Saxon member states of the “five eyes system” (USA, Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, Australia), pointing out this measure as excessive and suppressing rights and freedoms. Given the imbalances in the Internet space described above, the position of the United States and its allies is understandable. However, as the price increases digitization of a person’s identity, the possibility of his digital identification, moving all his personal data to cloud storage, the cost of an error in protecting such information increases many times. In the event of a breach of the information storage security loop, the identity of a citizen can not just be taken over by intruders – it can be completely erased, and such a digital death will cut off the victims of the attack from the possibility of exercising basic social rights. That is why the increasing strictness of national data storage requirements is becoming the dominant requirement of the era.
For nation-states in the coming years, two crucial questions arise
The first questionis how much they can guarantee the viability of their information-critical infrastructure in the face of cyberwarfare and growing online piracy. Cyber attacks or system failures in networks can permanently shut down entire industries and cities with unpredictable consequences for the country and its population, but the relevance and magnitude of such threats are still far from being realized.
Second question – how well governments understand the principles and methods of ensuring the security of personal data and how the procedure for the turnover of depersonalized big data will be regulated. Mastering such data by another state will allow it to build a reliable picture of the development of the economy and industry, agricultural vulnerabilities, epidemiological situation, consumption profiles, and adjust its political, military, or economic strategy accordingly. Obviously, the accelerated development of national legislation regulating the principles of circulation national big data and entering into interstate negotiations on this issue is a matter of the near future.
States and the future digital world: duopoly or oligopoly?
Even today, the presence of states in the top league of world politics is unimaginable without a development strategy in the global digital environment, the availability of resources, their own ideas and products in this area. The very category of “great power” in the XXI CENTURY this means creating your own technology platforms, and ideally forming a techno-economic block. Mandatory attributes of such a block are a significant chunk of the global market it controls, its own currency zone with an issue center, its own development model, and a set of resources, technologies, and scientific competencies that allow the block to be independent of others, at least in key areas such as defense and critical infrastructure.
The attempt of each of the blocks to exclude the influence of competitors on their critical infrastructure inevitably leads to the politicization of technologies and technology wars. Digital technologies, being end-to-end for the entire modern economic and socio-political space, are becoming the main field of a new war [12]. Cyber attacks on digital critical infrastructure can be no less destructive than nuclear or biological weapons [13].
Against the background of the dominance of a number of developed countries in digital technologies and the emergence of global monopolies that control network infrastructure and data flows, there is a threat of digital inequality and digital colonialism. Digital technological sovereignty is becoming a necessary condition for the sovereignty of political and national independence.
Perestroika of the principles of functioning of international economic relations and the entire model of global geoeconomics provides the leading techno-economic blocks, a kind of” digital neo-colonialists ” of our time, with new opportunities. The gap – now digital-continues to widen between global digital technology providers and recipient countries, which are gradually becoming increasingly dependent on technologically advanced States.
At the current stage, the “digital neocolonialist” countries offer only preferential conditions for creating the infrastructure necessary for the transition to the digital future for objects of economic development. Thus, they immediately ensure that they are linked to their own solutions-from payment systems to data storage systems and electronic document management. But most importantly, they provide themselves with unlimited and almost free access to big data, receiving from this not only an immediate economic effect and an additional advantage when developing their own tools. artificial intelligence and neural networks [14], but also effective tools for controlling their digital colonies.
Digital colonialism will continue to strengthen, and we cannot rule out the revival of the UN Trusteeship Council – already with new, digital functions and powers. At the same time, the canonical borders of the first, second and third world countries have already undergone enormous changes and will continue to change. Former third world countries are given the opportunity to make a conditional leap “from feudalism to socialism, bypassing the stage of capitalism” – creating a new generation of advanced infrastructure without the need to maintain the functioning of the old infrastructure (in its absence).
In this sense, it is possible to foresee the digital breakthrough of the richer states of the Middle East and Africa and their entry into significant roles in the digital arena. Finally, international financial and labor relations are also changing – digital assets move to more comfortable jurisdictions even more easily than financial ones, and leave virtually no traces of such movement. The emergence of cryptocurrencies deprives states of a monopoly on another sovereign right – the right to issue. The concepts of “brain drain” and “labor emigration” are also changing: now national “digital proletarians” do not have to move abroad -they have enough, staying in their home borders, working for a foreign corporation, alienating all their intellectual property, and vice versa-talented hipsters can move to more comfortable climatic conditions, while continuing to develop the national economy.
At the same time, digital technologies that shape both everyday life and the information space of each person are beginning to have an increasingly noticeable impact on their psyche and decision-making practices. The individual not only becomes a slave to the digital platforms of global monopolies, but also really put in a framework where his entire existence is tied to devices – a mobile phone, tablet, “smart watch”. Under the guise of providing convenience, they restrict a person’s choice in decision-making and manipulate their behavior, including by pushing them to follow a “certain route”. In this unequal relationship, digital monopolies expropriate and exploit personal data and even creative content without control, under the threat of exclusion from the social environment.
The widespread adoption of digital technologies, including the digitization of industry and government agencies, and the introductionof 5G networks, creates an imperative to ensure the security and sustainability of the entire digital critical infrastructure. Without solving this problem, digitalization can turn out to be the construction of a “house in the sand”.
In order to eliminate “barricades” and “minefields” on the path of the digital economy, the state must guarantee both the safety of citizens and businesses, as well as clear legal relations in the digital environment. This is especially true for the ownership and use of personal and “depersonalized” data and created content.
Ownership and cost of data is just one of the problems accumulated in the digital environment that urgently need to be addressed. No less urgent is the need to resolve the contradiction between the requirements of national or local data storage and global transparency of technological and corporate processes, where data on engine operation on an aircraft belonging to an airline of one country and flying over another country is processed in real time in a third country.
As techno-economic blocks are formed, competition in the digital space takes the form of a war of platforms and standards [15]. At the same time, a number of countries and regional associations that do not have control over a large part of the global digital market or dominant platforms (for example, India, Brazil, Japan, Russia or the European Union) will have to find common ways to maintain independence and competitiveness, including by creating common platforms based on open architecture and open code.
Russia on the Digital Agenda: Opportunities and Limitations
Russia is one of the few countries that has the technological reserves and human competencies to build its own technological ecosystem. The powerful engineering and mathematics school inherited from the Soviet Union remains a source of a key resource for digital development – qualified personnel. Russia has most of the attributes of a sovereign technology platform. A national search engine has been developed and continues to develop. Russian social networks VKontakte and Odnoklassniki are still more popular than Facebook and Instagram not only in Russia, but also in most of the CIS countries. Our own cloud technologies are being developed, and domestic processors are being created. Digital solutions of Russian companies have significant export potential – primarily cognitive and self-learning systems, solutions in the field of cybersecurity, secure electronic document management, and platforms for providing services to the public. Launched two years ago, the national Digital Economy program will provide 97 percent of all national households and all social infrastructure facilities (schools, hospitals) by 2024., police stations) with access to high-speed broadband Internet. This will radically change the opportunities for developing entrepreneurship, telemedicine and distance education, and allow Russia to bridge the digital divide. Already, Russia is among the top 10 countries in terms of the number of Internet users, and the Gosuslugi website, with its two trillion annual transactions, is the most popular public service site in the world.
The share of the digital economy in the country’s GDP is growing. Despite the vagueness of the term itself, it is already about 4-5 percent of GDP, but it continues to grow rapidly at a pace comparable to the digital leaders. In addition, Russia has an impressive satellite and radio frequency resource, which is the key to the successful development of new-generation networks.
Thechallenges that Russia faces in the field of digital development shouldnot be underestimated. Some of them are only a “digital” consequence of” analog ” problems and threats. Others have a fundamentally new, original nature. In particular, Western sanctions not only restrict, among other things, access to foreign technologies, but also increase the risks of continuing dependence on such technologies to an unacceptable level. A case related to the refusal of Siemens to supply turbines to Crimea, jeopardized plans to provide the peninsula with heat. If we extrapolate this incident to the digital sphere, a similar failure of SAP, Oracle, CISCO or Microsoft to ensure timely updates of their solutions operating in Russia can cause disruptions – even collapse – in the operation of critical systems, including public administration and the banking sector.
These and other trends in the development of world politics over the past few years have made it more urgent for Russia to form a reliable protection of its own digital critical infrastructure. The implementation of this task depends both on the effectiveness of a gradual and gradual transition from imported software and hardware complexes, and on the creation of an effective command vertical from the regulator to the performer throughout the country.
The decision of the Russian government to create registers of domestic software and electronic equipment is designed to reduce such risks. Without being included in these registers, companies cannot expect to supply their solutions to Russian state corporations and state authorities. Such measures have a long-term positive effect on the development of Russia as a sovereign technological power.
Building counteraction in the field of information security is complicated by conceptual uncertainty – an indistinct separation of two close but different areas related to information flows. Both the security of signals in a physical network carrying information and malicious ideological content in Russian practice are defined by the same concept of “information security”. In the practice of Russian competitors in digital leadership, signal and network security is defined as cybersecurity (cybersecurity) [16]. Countering threats in these two areas requires different competencies. While in Russia there is a sufficient understanding of how to deal with cyber threats, in the field of information content, the Russian strategy requires a separate understanding and development.
Moscow’s accusations of cyber interference in the internal affairs of a number of states were used as a pretext for increasing sanctions pressure and undoubtedly damaged Russia’s international image. However, this campaign also had consequences for a number of large Russian enterprises and firms. They faced problems and discrimination in the markets of some Western countries. Perhaps even more significant than the reputational and even economic consequences are the risks that these accusations will be used by the United States and its allies as arguments for conducting “cyber strikes retaliation” or even “preemptive cyberstrikes” against Russia.
In the information space, Russia’s vulnerabilities are obvious due to the dominance of American monopolies in the domestic segment – Google and Facebook. These monopolies exploit Russian data for free and are increasingly trying to influence the information field and the political situation in Russian domestic politics. This includes manipulating content and restricting Russian users ‘ access to information and communication tools. Other non-Western countries face similar challenges. It makes sense to establish a more active dialogue with them about the principles of digital era legislation, especially in terms of data ownership rights, rules for their storage and use, joint fight against online piracy, and general rules behaviors for governments and businesses on the Internet. The fundamental challenge for Russian legislation in the digital sphere is to keep pace with the development of technologies and practices as dynamically as possible, especially in such important areas for society as cybercrime and digital finance.
Another problem today is the low ability of Russian companies and the government to compete with global corporations for the best personnel. At the same time, there may not be a formal “brain drain” – Russian talents continue to remain in Russia, but provide all the intellectual added value for foreign companies. Given the disparity between the economic potentials of Russian and multinational businesses, the solution to this problem is possible only within the framework of administrative or conceptual (but in any case state) relations.
Also, Russia and Russian companies practically do not work on international platforms to introduce technological standards and regulations that are favorable for the functioning of Russian developments. This is partly due to Russia’s lack of a doctrinal document outlining its own international priorities in this area, similar to the National Security Strategy or Foreign Policy Concept. In the long run, this omission may lead to technological isolation or de facto compulsion of Moscow to work with internationally recognized standards and protocols, including: which Russia did not actually take an active part in.
Roadmap for Russian leadership in the Digital Environment
The Russian digital agenda should reflect the position of our country as one of the main forces in the global system, as an exporter of security and stability. Russia’s global role in the digital world is the role of the leader of the “digital non-aligned movement” for those countries that would like to avoid the technological dictates of the”digital neo-colonialists”.
It is important that the development of the digital sector of the Russian economy, including electronics and information technology, is accompanied by expansion into global markets. Only in this case will Russia be able to recoup its investment in breakthrough technologies, conquer key technology platforms of the next-generation economy, and build large, competitive businesses.
Spread across eleven time zones, Russia (even in a world where distances are dramatically reduced) continues to play the role of a safe link between Europe and Asia. This applies equally to the global energy infrastructure needed to support the highly energy-intensive digital economy of the future, and to the quantum communications network needed for secure data transmission. The cold climate of the northern regions of Russia, coupled with cheap electricity, gives our country competitive advantages in the location of large data storage and processing centers.
One of the most important challenges for Russia today is the implementation of the EAEU digital integration program. It is necessary to ensure that state bodies and businesses of the Union member states can exchange legally relevant documents through the integrated information system of the EAEU (AIS EAEU) in a short time. This will increase the speed of transit cargo passing through the territory of the EAEU, increase the economic effects of this process and improve the quality of integration in the Union.
In addition, Russia, as the main “shareholder” of this process, should contribute to ensuring the interoperability of the EEU information system with the information systems of the CIS member states that tend to integrate, as well as states with which the EEU has or is planning a free trade agreement [17]. Digital integration here can and should outpace physical integration. Another important tool may be a special program (for example, with the Eurasian Development Bank) for implementing national e-government standards in interested countries. partner countries.
The task of expanding the Russian economic and digital space raises the urgent question of finding strategic allies in the digital world and using existing political mechanisms for this purpose. In this regard, we should use the positive potential of our relations with the leading economies of the future – India, Indonesia, Brazil and others.
Equally important is the work on digital dialogue with the European Union. First, digital transport corridors with the experience of seamless transit for business will become possible only if the EEU information system is interoperable with the information systems of Europe and China. Secondly, in the European direction, closer coordination is needed in terms of the use of the radio frequency spectrum – so far there are many contradictions with the EU border states on this issue. The solution to this problem is especially important if in the foreseeable future goods will be moved between countries by unmanned vehicles. In this case, both Russia and the EU you will need a single standard for new-generation networks and a single frequency range allocated to them. Third, Russia and the European Union have adopted comparable (at least in terms of principles) regulatory requirements for the storage and transfer of personal data. It is important to harmonize these requirements for business convenience.
In addition, Russia and the EU are drawn closer by the desire to impose fair taxes on foreign digital giants, primarily American companies. Forming a consensus on the principles of such taxation will help Russia and the EU to act more effectively at multilateral platforms dealing with this issue. In the medium term, the issue of creating a single cross-border “pool” of big data, marked up in a unified way and accessible (including for a certain fee) to third parties, primarily American and Chinese companies, also becomes important [18].
Collaboration with the EU is important, if only because the Russian and European integration blocs are squeezed between two very self – sufficient information platforms-the American and Chinese, each of which is already a “bigdatamonster”. To become an additional center of gravity, Russia and the European Union, which are relatively small in terms of population and data generation, simply need to join forces.
At the same time, common rules and principles for the functioning of national data management systems, which clearly define who and under what conditions this data may or may not be available, will ensure the national security of Russia and the EU. It is obvious that the entire volume of accumulated big data of a state or group of states is of exceptional intelligence, political, economic and military value, and ensuring their safety is one of the key tasks of national security. But there is also a more immediate political argument in favor of starting cooperation between Russia and the EU in the digital sphere. The progressive deterioration of Russian-European relations has drained the bilateral agenda of substantive topics. The issues of developing the digital economy and jointly countering common threats in the digital environment that really bring us together can provide fundamentally new areas for non-confrontational interaction.
A separate point for Russia is relations with the leading digital powers-China and the United States. Unlike the European and Eurasian tracks, joint economic projects with Moscow are extremely unlikely in both cases. Nevertheless, the political situation dictates different logics in relations with Washington and Beijing in this area.
With China, it is necessary to continue to coordinate their positions on international platforms regarding Internet regulation and data security issues. Our approaches are similar, although the Russian one seems more liberal and does not involve creating an analog of the “Great Digital Wall of China”in our country. But there are two other sensitive issues that we need to put aside the awkwardness and start discussing with Beijing.
The first is China’s technological penetration into the EAEU states within the framework of the “digital Silk Road” doctrine. As in the case of Eurasian integration in general, it is important to link and coordinate the actions of Chinese business and the state with the activities implemented within the framework of the EAEU 2025 Digital Agenda.
The second one is thedevelopmentof rules of conduct for Chinese companies in the Russian market of highly qualified labor and startups. Currently, Huawei conducts large-scale work on buying Russian technology companies and attracting Russian specialists to its R & D divisions. At the same time, the company’s salaries are significantly higher than the market, which leads to an influx of specialists from domestic companies. It is obvious that under the conditions of market rules and freedom of choice, this is a natural process, but it is also necessary to discuss compensatory actions for the national economy with the Chinese side. The Chinese side would never allow similar behavior of third-country companies in its market. Expansion of work with universities, localization Not just me&The transition to the creation of joint products, rather than the “cannibalization” of startup solutions, should become requirements for digital companies operating in our country.
Cooperation on political issues with the United States is even more urgent, despite the confrontational nature of bilateral relations. First of all, it is the development of confidence – building measures in cyberspace, discussion of restrictions on the military use of digital technologies, and convergence of approaches to Internet regulation. Russia and the United States could initiate negotiations on the creation of new tools for controlling new types of military technologies. It is also necessary to jointly understand the terminology: when talking about “Russian hackers”, Americans most often cite examples of ” social engineering» [19]. Every effort must be made to restore pragmatism to Russian-American relations, even if Washington is not currently interested in doing so. We are not talking about giving the United States a new credit of trust. Rather, it is about considering each move of Washington carefully and assessing its possible consequences, without considering it as a priori hostile to Russian interests.
Russia needs a coordinated, clearly articulated and structured agenda for work in multilateral organizations such as the ITU, the Digital Twenty, and the OECD. It is hardly reasonable to spend all your time pushing exclusively Russian approaches and engaging in fierce diplomatic battles with your partners. Instead, two groups of “digital truths”should be recognized at least internally.
The first. The location of DNSservers and the main Internet highways really did not work out in favor of Russia. Russia is not a first-level provider. When it comes to shaping the digital agenda, Russia is a major regional power, not the second pole of this system. Individual digital corporations have become so powerful that they talk to states on equal terms.
Second. The world tends much less towards “digital bipolarity” than it might seem. This is especially significant at the level of cyberspace regulation. Despite the proclaimed freedom of movement of information, most countries strive to localize data storage in one form or another. When it comes to digital regulation, all countries are authoritarian. There are areas that require strict regulation, even in more democratic countries. On the other hand, it is irrational to completely deny the concept of “multistakeholderism” – the multiplicity of responsible people – in the development of any decisions, related to regulation and further development of new technologies. The regulator must inevitably engage in a dialogue with technology owners, and this is most often a business. Having realized these realities, Russia will be able to act as a conciliatory state in multilateral associations, determined to find a compromise.
Russia also has a chance to become a representative of the interests of states that want to preserve their digital sovereignty and are not in the mood to be part of the Chinese or American digital empire, but do not have sufficient “subjectivity”for this. Both behaviors will expand our ability to realize our leadership potential, our ” gravity core.” This will make it possible to promote Russian candidates for leadership positions in such multilateral organizations as, for example, the ITU.
A more thorough selection of the members of our delegations and ensuring their versatility should be another important step in restructuring Russia’s work in international organizations. Today, the reality is that Russian diplomats are not always sufficiently aware of the technical aspects of the issues under consideration, while specialized technical specialists do not have enough knowledge of the art of negotiations. A separate role should be assigned to lobbyists – business representatives who are, in fact, the ultimate beneficiary of most decisions made. This kind of ” digital realism” instead of distractions to provocations and foreign policy “noises” orients Russia to exclusively pressing issues of ensuring the country’s digital interests in the world.
Recognizing that the 5G networking plan Russia has completely lost the initiative or the ability to actively influence the agenda, which should push Moscow to focus on preparing our proposals for the 7G network standard (or 6G after all?), to step up efforts to neutralize the threat of isolation of Russia in the issues of the radio frequency spectrum allocated for the needs of a new generation of communications. On this issue, Russian views do not coincide with the vast majority of countries in the world. The peculiarity of digital regulatory regulation is that new laws will be written by those who write the codes, that is, the technical content of the innovation will largely determine its regulatory framework. Therefore, it is important to increase the participation of Russian specialists in the development of standards and protocols for tomorrow’s technologies.
Among the technology markets of the future, the market for platforms for sovereign critical infrastructure – cybersecurity systems, communications, energy management, transport, financial flows and urban management systems, biosecurity and food control-stands out in particular. In the face of increasing tensions and uncertainty in the world, States are forced to pay increasing attention to their security and strengthen national control over their critical infrastructure.
The sovereign critical infrastructure market, which represents many trillions of dollars of orders for decades to come, is much like the global arms market. Decisions about technology partnerships are made at the sovereign level on the “friend – or-foe” principle, sales are made by systems, not components, implementation implies a high level of trust with localization of some technologies and forms a long-term political influence.
As in the arms market, Russia has its own “niche” in the market of sovereign critical infrastructure, estimated at 2030 percent of the total global market [20]. An important factor is that Russia positions itself as one of the leaders in the security systems market and has engineering schools with extensive experience in creating complex systems.
For Russia, the critical sovereign infrastructure market may become the most promising export destination. Recognized unique competencies in creating complex systems make Russia one of the leading potential suppliers of such systems – along with the United States and partly China. The independent software and hardware environment created in Russia is also an obvious competitive advantage. The “cold war” situation between the United States and China hypothetically opens up markets for Russia in the countries of Greater Eurasia, the Middle East, Latin America and Africa, which will try to reduce their technological infrastructure. and political dependence on the warring parties.
Having established itself as a “security exporter” in Eurasia, Russia can become a guarantor of its partners ‘ technological sovereignty. The presence of a trillion-dollar market of potential partners and unique competencies can help build a high-tech export strategy for years to come [21]. Thus, the country will have the opportunity to ensure its own security, increase international influence and try its hand at advancing technological development.
However, the conquest of sovereign critical infrastructure markets is impossible without the creation of breakthrough integrated platform solutions. Similarly, the implementation of such a strategy is impossible without creating strong ties with technological partners, without creating Russian educational and technological bases abroad [22].
Conclusions
Against the background of virtualization of all aspects of social life, the militarization of the information space is taking place. Taking advantage of the lack of borders in the digital space and generally accepted rules of conduct in it, states and organizations under their control distribute biased and disinformation content in order to promote their own interests and values. New technologies for creating virtual reality, such as deepfake They leave virtually no chance for the average person to separate lies from reality and can provoke religious and ethnic conflicts, destroy families, and destroy the reputations of politicians and innocent people with impunity.
In the coming years, the question of the regulatory structure of the entire global Internet will inevitably arise. Under the pressure of the block technological confrontation-mainly between the United States and China – and the ideological and political struggle, it is already divided into digital “enclaves”. The basic value of the Internet as a global equal and democratic environment (web neutrality The attempts promoted, in particular, by the United States, to make the quality and speed of network traffic dependent on the client’s wallet, also undermine it. The inclusiveness of the Internet is becoming the key to reducing digital inequality, and with it, the guarantor of global economic growth and social development.
Big data as the” new oil ” of the digital age should have an understandable owner and an understandable cost for the individual, business and the state. Only if a person and a citizen become the center of services and services in the digital environment, a balance of human rights, national priorities and business interests will be ensured, and it will be possible to regulate the currently uncontrolled global digital monopolies for the benefit of the entire society. Deleting the pages of President Trump and his supporters, as well as “deplatforming” the popular social network Parler among Republicans They clearly outline the prospect of actions by tech giants to eliminate economic and political competitors if these tech giants decide to operate outside the United States. If ideological opponents can be dealt with so harshly and relatively easily in the United States, why can’t this practice be made extraterritorial? Moreover, there are already precedents.
For Russia, the minimum task is to preserve its sovereignty when making decisions affecting the main areas of national security>. The maximum goal is to create your own competitive technological ecosystem, become the leader of the techno-economic block and a key participant in the process of developing new rules of the game in this area. In this sense, gaining economic sovereignty is a simpler task than gaining informational sovereignty. But it seems that the survival of states in the future depends on its solution.
Export oftechnologies and competencies for protecting sovereign critical infrastructure to countries that want to ensure their independence and defense capability can and should become one of the most important political and foreign economic priorities of Russia. This will provide the country with a significant financial inflow and international influence. This is exactly the path that the powers claiming leadership positions in this area are already following.
Currently, the implementation of the critical infrastructure technology export strategy is hindered by the lack of experience of Russian high-tech companies in creating integrated platform solutions, their weak presence in the markets of potential partners, and insufficient financial capacity to work on large long-term projects.
As civilizational and ideological confrontation escalates and examples of subversive information activity become more frequent, more and more countries are paying attention to the need for more careful monitoring of malicious and subversive content on the Internet. In the United States, where an information war is being waged between hostile political forces – as the 2020 presidential campaign showed-digital monopolies are resorting to outright censorship and manipulation in favor of their ideological supporters.
Russia should think about mechanisms for actively forming the information space, which would allow it to lead in terms of relevance and quality of content and thereby limit foreign influence in its information space.
The challenge of the new age is ” impatience of the spirit»: a short clip or post on a social network “wins” a full-fledged news report or analytical article, the variety of multimedia experiences distracts a person’s attention, and the speed of changes turns life into a race against time. The conservative, traditionally unhurried sphere of interstate communication is forced to change, ” run very fast in order to at least stay in place.” States that can quickly rebuild clumsy foreign policy mechanisms faster than others have every chance to take a leading position in this area. a fast-paced “brave new world”.
